2024 INSC 797
Coram: Surya Kant; K.M.S; K.V. Viswanathan
2024 INSC 797 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Civil Appeal No. ________ / 2024 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 7963 / 2023)
Horrmal (Deceased) through his LRs and …Appellant(s) others
versus
State of Haryana and others …Respondent(s)
WITH
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7|Page JUDGEMENT
SURYA KANT, J.
Delay condoned.
Leave granted.
These appeals are preferred by the expropriated landowners
(hereinafter ‘Appellants’), impugning the judgement dated
23.08.2022 passed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court at
Chandigarh (hereinafter, ‘High Court’), whereby their appeals
seeking further enhancement in compensation for their acquired
lands, have been dismissed. As a necessary corollary, the High
Court has allowed the cross appeals filed by the Respondent State,
challenging the enhancement in compensation made by the
Reference Court. Consequently, the Awards passed by the
Reference Court have been set aside and the compensation as was
granted by the Land Acquisition Collector (hereinafter, ‘LAC’) has
been restored.
A. FACTS
The instant dispute regarding the grant of just and fair
compensation originated with the issuance of a notification under
Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter, ‘1894
8|Page Act’) on 11.02.2011, for the acquisition of approximately 302.75
acres of land by the Respondent State. This land, including the
Appellants’ lands, is situated in the revenue estate of Tauru village
in Mewat District. The acquisition process was initiated for the
development and utilisation of land for public purposes,
specifically for carving out Residential and Utility Areas in Sectors
7, 8 and 11 in Mewat District under the Haryana Urban
Development Authority Act, 1977. A notification under Section 6
of the 1894 Act was thereafter issued on 10.02.2012.
The LAC passed the award on 22.10.2013 in respect of the
land admeasuring 302.75 acres and estimated the compensation
at Rupees 45,00,000/- per acre, along with 30% solatium and an
additional amount of 12% per annum for the acquired land.
Further, compensation for the lands abutting the
Mohammadpur—Sohna—Tauru bypass road were enhanced by
20% and 25%, respectively, over the already fixed rate. The LAC
assessed the compensation primarily based on the rates fixed by
the Divisional Level Rate Fixation Committee in the following
manner: (a) 2057 Kanal at Rupees 45,00,000/- per acre; (b) 113
Kanals and 9 Marlas at Rupees 54,00,000/- per acre; and (c) 251
Kanals and 11 Marlas at Rupees 56,25,000/- per acre. In addition
9|Page to this, the LAC also affixed compensation for building structures
and trees wherever subsisting on the acquired lands.
Aggrieved by the award dated 22.10.2013, the Appellants
filed Reference(s) under Section 18 of the 1894 Act before the
Additional District Judge, Mewat (hereinafter, ‘Reference Court’).
The Reference Court, vide separate awards, enhanced the market
value of the acquired land to Rupees 92,62,500/- per acre, in
addition to granting other statutory benefits. The Reference Court,
in this instance, relied upon a sale exemplar, Ex. P76, to assess
the market value of the acquired land as on the date of the
issuance of Section 4 notification, and subsequently increased the
compensation amount. Both the Appellants and the Respondent,
being dissatisfied with the decision of the Reference Court,
preferred appeals before the High Court.
In this vein, the High Court allowed the appeals preferred by
the Respondent State while dismissing those filed by the
Appellants. The High Court held that the Reference Court had
incorrectly estimated the market value and enhanced the
compensation as it ignored various sale instances of comparable
parcels of land that had been produced by the Respondents.
Additionally, the High Court also doubted the reliability of Ex. P76, 10 | P a g e which was the basis of the Reference Court’s decision, on the
ground that this sale deed belonged to a commercial plot of land
and was post the notification issued under Section 4 of the 1894
Act. Accordingly, the High Court set aside the award(s) of the
Reference Court and reverted the compensation amount to that
initially granted by the LAC. Hence, these appeals.
B. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
We have heard Learned Senior Counsel for the parties at a
considerable length and meticulously perused the documents
submitted on record.
S/Shri Narender Hooda, Sunil Dalal and Gagan Gupta,
Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants, first
demonstrated the potentiality of the acquired land. They
contended that the High Court had overlooked the fact that the
acquired lands fell squarely within the municipal limits of Tauru
city and were surrounded by civic amenities such as a Bus Stand,
Hospital, School, College, a Power Station and Industrial as well
as Residential establishments. They further asserted that the
acquired land was located on the Sohna-Tauru bypass and was in
close proximity to the Gurgaon-National Capital Region, as also
the Industrial Township established at Bhiwadi, Rajasthan. 11 | P a g e Additionally, the land is situated between the Sohna—Rewari
metal road on one side and the KMP Highway on the other. This
strategic location, they argued, indicated that the market value of
the acquired land, having immense potential at the time of
acquisition, could not have been valued at less than Rupees
5,00,00,000/- per acre.
It was contended that the sale exemplars, particularly Ex.
RW1/D and RW1/F, which have been relied upon by the LAC and
the High Court while assessing the rate of compensation at Rupees
45,00,000/- per acre, appertained to the smaller pieces of land and
were inferior in nature, as the sale consideration mentioned
therein was lower than the rate estimated by the LAC itself.
Instead, they urged that Ex. P76 and Ex. P3 ought to have been
relied upon, owing to their similarity and proximity to the acquired
land, as well as their temporal proximity to the date of issuance of
the Section 4 notification. They further emphasised that these sale
exemplars are the best sale instances to be considered since Ex.
P76 was registered only a few months after the Section 4
notification, whereas Ex. P3 was executed prior to the said
notification.
12 | P a g e 10. Given what had been adduced, Learned Senior Counsels
relied on a plethora of decisions in support of their arguments,
including the judgment of this Court in Dollar Co. v. Collector of
Madras,1 wherein it was held that a sale deed of a recent date
could be considered the best evidence. Additionally, they placed
reliance on the decision in Special Land Acquisition Officer and
another v. M.K. Rafiq Saheb,2 where this Court held that sale
deeds pertaining to smaller areas could be taken into
consideration by applying a cut.
Conversely, Mr. Vikramjit Bannerjee, learned Additional
Solicitor General of India, representing the Respondents,
contended that the sale deeds produced by the Appellants could
not be relied upon as they pertained to sale instances of tiny plots
of land constituting only a few Marlas. More specifically, he argued
that Ex. P3 was not reliable since it measured only 1 Kanal and
10.5 Marlas, making it significantly smaller in comparison to the
acquired land. Similarly, with respect to Ex. P76, which was also
heavily relied upon by the Appellants, he asserted that it ought to
be discarded, not only because it was subsequent to the Section 4
1 AIR 1975 SC 1670. 2 (2011) 7 SCC 714.
13 | P a g e notification but also since the land therein was purchased for a
commercial purpose by a private company for warehousing, and
thus would not accurately reflect the market value of the acquired
land.
Instead, Mr. Bannerjee urged that the sale instances placed
on record by the Respondents should be relied upon despite having
been recorded post the Section 4 notification, as they lend proper
guidance for estimating the market value of the acquired land on
the crucial date of 11.02.2021. Lastly, he asserted that even if the
Court were to consider the sale instance of a smaller parcel of land,
only those sale exemplars where the land has been used towards
developmental purposes should be relied upon, and after applying
the appropriate deduction towards development charges.
C. ISSUES
Having considered the factual background out of which the
dispute has arisen and the contentions put forth, the questions
that fall for our deliberation are set out as follows:
i. Whether the Appellants are entitled to higher rate of
compensation and if so, to what extent; and
14 | P a g e ii. How should the quantum of such compensation be
calculated?
D. ANALYSIS
As already elucidated in the facts of this case, there has been
a significant difference in the evaluations conducted by the
Reference Court and, subsequently, the High Court. The High
Court has reduced the valuation affixed by the Reference Court by
half and, instead, restored the compensation amount granted by
the LAC. Given the differences in the approaches adopted by these
courts and the variation in outcomes faced by the Appellants, it
becomes imperative for us to assess the evidence placed on record
by both parties and determine whether sufficient grounds subsist
for us to enhance the compensation so awarded.
In this regard, it would be appropriate to refer to the table
prepared by the High Court, which, in its decision, has aptly
summarised the different evidence produced by the parties as
follows:
15 | P a g e Sr. Ex. Vasika Dated Sale Area of Rate Village No. No No. Consideratio Land Sold Per acre n (In Rs.) (K.M.S)
Sale Deeds Produced by the respective parties in the Award dated: 06.01.2017,01.03.2017, 19.07.2017, 20.07.2017, 03.10.2017, 01.08.2017 Sale Deeds Produced by the Landowners 1. P2 1539 2.2.2010 1,75,000 50 Sq. Yds. 1,69,40,000 Tauru
P3 960 27.8.2010 32,27,000 922 Sq. Yds. 1,69,40,000 Tauru
P4 387 31.5.2010 3,36,000 96 Sq. Yds. 1,69,40,000 Tauru
P5 1725 17.12.2010 2,81,000 75 Sq. Yds. 1,81,33,867 Tauru
P6 1707 9.3.2010 2,62,500 75 Sq. Yds 1,69,40,000 Tauru
P7 2076 24.1.2011 5,25,000 150 Sq. Yds. 1,69,40,000 Tauru
P8 2187 7.2.2011 3,50,000 100 Sq. Yds. 1,69,40,000 Tauru
P9 4633 18.1.2012 7,50,000 140 Sq. Yds. 2,59,28,571 Tauru
P10 2186 7.2.2011 2,10,000 30 Sq. Yds. 16,94,000 Tauru
10 P76 1220 4.7.2011 10,18,87,500 66k (1320 M) 1,23,50,000 Tauru
Sale Deeds Produced by the State 11 RW 2481 29.8.2011 3,25,000 12.5 M 41,60,000 Tauru 1/C 12 RW1 1220 21.06.2012 60,00,000 1 Acre 4 K 40,00,000 Tauru /D (240 M) 13 RW1 1802 6.8.2012 17,25,000 3K-9M 40,00,000 Tauru /E (69M) 14 RW1 3798 25.11.2011 60,00,000 1 Acre 4k 40,00,000 Tauru /F (240 M) 15 RW 1779 3.8.2012 18,25,000 3K-13M 40,00,000 Tauru 1/G (73 M) 16 RW 4339 13.03.2013 8,32,500 225 Sq. Yds. 1,79,08,000 Tauru 1/H
17 R8 1724 17.12.10 2,00,000 10 M 32,00,000 Gvarka
16 | P a g e 18 R9 1591 01.12.10 4,80,000 17 M 45,17,648 Gvarka
19 R10 1304 20.10.2010 10,23,750 4K-11M 18,00,000 Gvarka
(91M) 20 R11 1396 3.11.2010 1,05,000 5M 33,60,000 Gvarka
21 R12 2116 31.1.2011 2,31,000 330 Sq. 33,88,000 Gvarka Yds.
22 R13 1851 29.12.2010 1,05,000 5M 33,60,000 Gvarka
R14 2124 1.2.2011 53,000 2.5M 33,92,000 Gvarka
R15 2243 14.2.2011 1,63,350 9M 29,04,000 Gvarka
25 R16 1404 8.11.2010 75000 6M 20,00,000 Gvarka
26 R18 2211 9.2.2011 36,300 2M 29,04,000 Gvarka
Upon further examination of the details of this table, it seems
to us that these exemplars can be classified in the following
manner: (a) sale instances executed prior to the issuance of
Section 4 notification; and (b) sales instances executed after the
issuance of the Section 4 notification. Thereupon, we have taken
the liberty of further representing this recalibrated categorisation
in a tabular form as follows:
Pre-Section 4 Post Section-4 notification notification Appellants P2-P8, P10 P9 and P76
Respondents R8-14, R16, R18 R15, RW1/C-H
17 | P a g e 17. Having distinguished between the two sets of sale instances
executed before and after the issuance of the Section 4 notification,
we would now proceed to determine whether the Appellants are
entitled to compensation at a rate higher than the one determined
by the High Court.
The process of assessing or affixing compensation is not
tethered to precision but is rather aimed at a nuanced estimation
of pertinent factors. This task is governed by Section 23(1) of the
Land Acquisition Act of 1894, which mandates that, in
determining compensation for acquired land, the Court must
consider the ‘market value’ of the land as of the ‘date of publication
of the notification under Section 4’. The ‘market value’ is to be
assessed with reference to factors such as standing crops and
trees, the severance of part of the land, damage to movable or
immovable property or earnings, the need to relocate one’s
residence or business, and any loss of profits from the land
between the publication of the declaration under Section 6 and the
Collector's assumption of possession.
This Court has through various judicial precedents,
including a three-judge bench decision in Special Land 18 | P a g e Acquisition Officer v. T. Adinarayan Setty,3 held that the
‘market value’ connotes the price that a willing buyer would pay to
a willing seller, taking into account the land’s current conditions
and its advantages and potentialities. For this, typically, the best
approach is the comparable sales method, under which the bona
fide sale exemplars of similar lands are relied upon to ascertain
the market value of the land under acquisition. However, to ensure
that the valuation is just and proper, this Court has explained that
such sale exemplars must satisfy certain criteria, including that:
(a) the sale must be a genuine transaction; (b) the sale deed must
have been executed around the time of the Section 4 notification;
(c) the land must be situated near the acquired land; (d) the nature
of the land covered in the sale instance must be similar to the
acquired land; and (e) the size of the plot covered by the sale
instance should be comparable to the land acquired.4
Apart from satisfying these factors, it is also imperative that
the sale exemplars reflect the price of the land on the ‘date of
publication of the notification under Section 4’. On account of this
express condition, there are numerous instances where this Court
3 AIR 1959 SC 429. 4 Shaji Kuriakose v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., (2001) 7 SCC 650.
19 | P a g e has laid down that the sale exemplars executed after the Section 4
notification should not ordinarily be relied upon.5 This is grounded
in the reasoning that once the acquisition process begins, it can
impact the valuation of the land, rendering subsequent sale
exemplars to be potentially inaccurate reflections of the true
valuation of the acquired land. This principle was cogently
addressed by this Court in A. Natesam Pillai v. Tahsildar,6
which held that the commencement of acquisition often leads to
an increase in the market values of adjacent lands, thereby
discrediting post-notification transactions as reliable indicators of
the acquired land’s value.
Having been equipped with the factors to be considered while
selecting a comparable sale instance to draw an estimate from, it
is perhaps suitable to tackle the core issue and ascertain which of
the sale exemplars produced before us may be most appropriate to
be utilised in this exercise.
In the case at hand, the High Court and the Reference Court
have disagreed on what sale exemplars could be used to determine
fair compensation. While the Reference Court relied on Ex P76, the
5 General Manager, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Rameshbhai Jivanbhai Patel, 2008 (14) SCC 745; Maya Devi v. State of Haryana, (2018) 2 SCC 474. 6 (2010) 9 SCC 118.
20 | P a g e High Court has rejected the same because it was executed after
the issuance of the Section 4 notification. Nevertheless, the High
Court has fallen prey to the same error and has relied upon the
Respondents’ sale exemplars, which were also executed after the
acquisition had already begun.
As discussed above, post-notification sales can only be
considered when better evidence is not available on record and
when the party relying on it can convincingly demonstrate that
there has been no upward trend in market prices due to the
acquisition.7 Consequently, in light of this analysis, the sale deeds
numbered P9, P76, R15 and RW1/C-H, which were executed after
the date of the issuance of the Section 4 notification, will invariably
have to be excluded from any further consideration, save and
except for exceptional and compelling circumstances.
Apart from these sale deeds that were not proximate
temporally, we also deem it appropriate to exclude the sale deeds
that are not comparable geographically. It is now a firmly
entrenched principle of law that, in the ordinary course, sale
exemplars of lands located in the surrounding villages should
7 Karan Singh v. Union of India, (1997) 8 SCC 186l; Rishi Pal Singh v. Meerut Development
Authority, (2006) 3 SCC 205.
21 | P a g e generally not be relied upon, as land valuation may vary
significantly by locality. In the landmark decision of Kanwar
Singh v. Union of India,8 this Court held that sale exemplars of
lands situated in an adjacent village cannot be used to determine
the market value of the acquired land since such lands may differ
in terms of quality and other attributes. On this ground, the sale
deeds enumerated Ex. R8 to Ex. R16 and Ex. R18 shall also have
to be excluded from consideration, as they pertain to a different
village, namely Gwarka, whereas the acquired land is situated in
village Tauru.
In light of the exclusions made thus far, we are presently left
with sale deeds numbered Ex. P2 to Ex. P8 and Ex. P10. In this
context, the Respondents have sought to argue that considering
the total area of the land in these sale deeds being very small in
size, they are also liable to be discarded. True it is, that such sale
deeds ought not to directly form the basis for determining the rate
at which compensation is to be awarded. Indeed, a thorough review
of relevant precedents in this backdrop does reveal that smaller
parcels of land conventionally command higher prices. Relying on
8 (1998) 8 SCC 136.
22 | P a g e such sale exemplars also, especially when only single solitary such
instances are presented, may thus not be appropriate.9
However, there is no bar in law against considering sale
exemplars of smaller plots, provided they are subjected to
adequate developmental charges. The rationale behind applying
such cuts lies in the fact that smaller plots often command higher
prices due to their developed nature, whereas a larger tract of land
which is acquired for development may require significant
allocation for creating roads, parks, essential services, etc.10
Accordingly, these sale exemplars can be relied upon only after
applying appropriate cuts. This Court in Chimanlal
Hargovinddas v. LAO,11 authoritatively ruled that when valuing a
large block of land, appropriate deduction must be made for setting
aside areas for roads, open spaces and dividing the land into
smaller plots suitable for the construction of buildings.
In the instant case, there are multiple sale deeds of smaller
plots, and these represent the best available evidence for
estimating compensation. Since there is no legal impediment to
considering such sale deeds, the logical progression in the
9 Administrator General of West Bengal v. Collector, Varanasi, (1988) 2 SCC 150. 10 Ibid; Atma Singh v. State of Haryana and others, (2008) 2 SCC 568. 11 (1988) 3 SCC 751.
23 | P a g e compensation estimation process would be to identify the most
suitable sale deed(s) for determining the market value and
subsequently, to apply adequate deductions on the same. The
solution to this state of flux may thus be found in the case of
Mehrawal Khewaji Trust v. State of Punjab,12 where this Court
laid down as follows:
“....It is clear that when there are several exemplars with reference to similar lands, it is the general rule that the highest of the exemplars, if it is satisfied that it is a bona fide transaction, has to be considered and accepted. When the land is being compulsorily taken away from a person, he is entitled to the highest value which similar land in the locality is shown to have fetched in a bona fide transaction entered into between a willing purchaser and a willing seller near about the time of the acquisition.” [Emphasis supplied]
This view has been reiterated in Sh. Himmat Singh v. State
of M.P.,13 where a three-judge bench of this Court consolidated
various precedents to affirm that in circumstances where there are
multiple sale deeds available for consideration, the Court shall rely
on the highest valued exemplars unless the prices fall within a
12 (2012) 5 SCC 432. 13 (2013) 16 SCC 392.
24 | P a g e narrow range, in which case calculating an average of the values
therein may be more congruous.
In these extenuating circumstances, there exists significant
disparity among the sale exemplars presently under consideration.
Amongst these sale exemplars, being Ex. P2-P8 and Ex. P10, the
highest sale instance values the land at Rupees 1,81,33,867 per
acre, whereas the lowest values it at Rupees 16,94,000 per acre.
Given this wide range and in light of the judicial precedents cited
above, we are of the opinion that we should rely upon the highest
sale exemplar, which is Ex. P5, rather than solely depending upon
an average of the multiple sale deeds produced before us. Despite
the Respondents’ vehement contention that Ex. P5 should not be
relied upon owing to it being a significantly smaller parcel of land—
the detailed analysis conducted above indicates no reason why Ex.
P5 cannot be utilised to determine the amount of compensation to
be awarded to the Appellants for the acquired land.
Thus, having established the sale exemplar being relied upon
and consequentially the base price to be Rupees 1,81,33,867 per
acre, we now proceed to the aspect of deductions to be applied to
the amount so determined. In this regard, there is no hard and fast
rule on the amount of deduction to be applied towards 25 | P a g e development charges. Instead, such deductions may, for the
purpose of making a small area of land comparable to larger tracts,
range from a minimum of 20% to a maximum of 75%.14
Since the degree of application of cuts is essentially a
question of fact dependent on the unique circumstances of each
case, the particulars to be reckoned with in determining the extent
of such deduction often include a myriad of factors, such as the
relative difference in the size of the land in the sale exemplar vis a
vis the acquired land, proximity to a road, nearness to developed
areas, etc.15 Additionally, several decisions have also taken into
account the nature of the lands because of the stark difference that
may exist between the valuation of an agricultural or undeveloped
land and the sale price of a small developed plot in a private
layout.16
Circling back to the facts of the present case, it is evident that
the land in Ex. P5 is similar in nature to the acquired land, both
being agricultural land. Its proximity to the acquired land and the
fact that it is situated in the same village of Tauru, are relevant
14 Balwan Singh v. State of Haryana and others, 2022 SCC Online SC 637; Chandrashekar
v. LAO, (2012) 1 SCC 390. 15 Subh Ram v. State of Haryana, (2010) 1 SCC 444. 16 Ibid.
26 | P a g e when determining the extent of deductions to be applied in
calculating the compensation to be granted to the Appellants.
Additionally, what is also of utmost importance is that the value of
the land is corroborated by surrounding circumstances, which
point towards its potentiality. Although Ex. P76 cannot be relied
upon since it was executed after the Section 4 notification, it
nonetheless reflects the land’s potential for being used other than
for agricultural purposes. Moreover, the acquired land’s strategic
location near the Bus Stand, Grain Market and Main Bazaar,
besides being located near Palwal-Sohna-Rewari State Highway, as
well as its proximity to the Industrial Township at Bhiwadi, and
nearby schools and colleges, further supports the assertion that
the land possesses immense potentiality.
On the face of these distinctive factors lies the challenge of
ascertaining the appropriate extent of deduction to be made. As
already established, judicial precedents dictate that the amount of
deduction to be applied towards developmental charges can range
from anywhere between 20% to 75%. On the one hand, we must
acknowledge and recognise the stark disparity between the size of
the land covered by the sale exemplar and the acquired land. On
the other hand, it is incumbent that we take note of the various
27 | P a g e advantageous factors associated with the acquired land at the time
of issuance of the Section 4 notification. A balanced approach in
adjudicating this particular issue is therefore necessary.
Considering these militating aspects, we cannot justify applying
deduction at either extreme end of the spectrum. A prudent course
of action might be to steer a middle path, aiming for a range
approximately between 46% to 50%.
Having said that, even if we were to apply the higher end of
deductions from this middle course, at 50%, the compensation to
be granted to the Appellants would still surpass the amount
initially determined by the LAC and would in fact, be closer in
range to the rate granted by the Reference Court.
Alternatively, and only to bolster our above arrived
conclusion, even if the principle of averaging were applied, the
most suitable sale instances for this purpose, as discussed earlier,
would be Ex. P2 to Ex. P8 and Ex. P10, which are noted to be in
close proximity to the acquired land. Upon evaluation, the average
price of these lands is Rupees 1,49,71,733 per acre, which exceeds
the sale consideration shown in most comparable sale examples.
This leaves no room for doubt that the compensation awarded by
the Reference Court, at the rate of Rupees 92,62,500 per acre, was 28 | P a g e neither excessive nor beyond the fair and just value of the acquired
land.
However, considering the totality of the circumstances and
recognizing that the subject land has not been acquired for
profiteering or commercial purposes, but primarily for the
development of a residential area, we find it appropriate to rely on
the valuation reflected in the best exemplar, Ex. P/5, as a fair and
reasonable basis for compensation.
Thus, upon careful consideration, we are of the considered
opinion that the High Court erred in reducing the valuation of the
land and affirming the figures granted by the LAC. As
demonstrated by our analysis above, the evaluation conducted by
the Reference Court was nearly accurate and aligned with the
evidence of the sale deeds and potentiality, despite the fact that
the sale exemplar Ex. P76, on which it relied upon, may not have
been ideal, given the circumstances and its commercial nature.
E. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, these appeals are allowed, the
impugned leading judgment dated 23.08.2022 of the High Court,
as well as all other judgments following the said leading judgment
29 | P a g e which are under challenge in this batch of appeals, are hereby set
aside, and the compensation amount granted by the Reference
Court is hereby restored.
The compensation amount, if already not paid, wholly or
partly, as per the award of the Reference Court, shall be paid to
the Appellants and other land-owners along with all the statutory
benefits including interest, within eight weeks.
All the matters stand disposed of in the aforementioned
terms.
………..………………… J. (SURYA KANT)
…………………………… J. (K.V. VISWANATHAN)
NEW DELHI DATED: 21.10.2024
30 | P a g e