Lakshmi v. Gopi & Ors

3.1 The defendants approached the High Court. In a judgment of only two paragraphs and three-and-a-half pages, of which more than one page is spent on extracting the reasoning of the Civil Court, the judgment of the Court below has been set aside. That apart, the judgment of the Civil Court has been termed to be entirely lacking in as much as the Court was unable to understand the controversy in issue and the judge has been directed to be sent for training.

“1. The dispute involved is pertaining to the due execution of a registered Will Ext.B[^1], for which one among the propounders gave oral evidence as DW[^1] and one of the attesting witnesses was examined as DW[^2]. During the cross-examination, nothing was brought out to discredit either the propounder or the attesting witness. The testator was also introduced before the Sub-Registrar for the purpose of its registration by two witnesses and one among the witness is none else, DW[^2]. In fact, no challenge was raised with respect to the competency of the testator. She died in a motor vehicle accident on 27/8/2011 and the Will was executed 12 years prior to the abovesaid alleged accident. But the trial court on some extraneous consideration found that there is failure to prove the due execution of the Will and hence granted a decree for partition. The relevant portion of the impugned judgment (paragraphs 17 to 22) are extracted below for reference: “17.The one attesting witness examined in his evidence has to satisfy the attestation of a Will by him and the other attesting witness in order to prove there was due execution of Will. To put in other words, if one attesting witness can prove execution of the Will in terms of clause (c) of Section 63 of Indian Succession Act viz, attestation by two attesting witnesses in the manner contemplated therein, the examination of other attesting witness can be dispensed with. The one attesting witness examined, in his evidence has to satisfy the attestation of a Will by him and the other attesting witness in order to prove there was due execution of the Will. 18. In the evidence of DW[^2] it is lacking that execution of the Will by Thankam was witnessed by him and the other attesting witness. Therefore, it cannot be found that the defendants proved execution of the Will by Thankam. 19. In the cross examination DW[^3] stated unequivocally that Thankam was illiterate and she could not write or read. A document can said to be duly executed only when it is shown that the executant signed the document of his own volition after fully knowing the content of the document and at the time of execution he was capable of forming a rational judgment as to its effect. In the instant case there is no evidence that the content of the Will was read over to Thankam before she affixed her signature. 20. The defendants have no case that Anthony, the other attesting witness, is dead or not subject to the process of the Court or not capable of giving evidence. No explanation as to why he was not examined before the court was offered. DW[^3] in his cross examination stated that Thankam did not have acquaintance with Anthony. 21. Another suspicion surrounding execution of the Will is that DW[^2] was asked by Thankam to be witness only on 22.3.1999. If that be so the Will might have been prepared on 22.3.1999. DW[^2] did not state that he saw the Will being prepared. 22. The learned counsel for the defendants submitted that the Will is a registered one. It is true that it was registered. The fact that the Will was registered does not relieve of the duty of the propounder to prove its due execution. On account of registration the only presumption which can be drawn is that acts for the registration was performed as being performed.” 2. It is illustrative of what is actually going on in our system. The trial court did not understand the actual dispute involved and the requirement in proof of a testament. Highly extraneous matters were taken to reject the due execution of Will in question such as no case was advanced that the Will was read over to the testator and no case was advanced as to whether the other attesting witness was alive or not. It is a judgment rendered by an officer in the cadre of Principal Sub Judge and that itself would show the seriousness of the laches on the part of the officer. Necessarily, proper training should be given to the officer concerned. The decree and judgment of the trial court are hence set aside and the suit is dismissed. The appeal will stand allowed accordingly. No costs. The Registry is directed to forward a copy of this judgment along with the impugned judgment to the Director (Academic), Kerala Judicial Academy for further action.” (emphasis supplied)

3.2 Aggrieved by the aforesaid, the plaintiff- appellant is in appeal before this Court.

3.3 Heard learned counsel for the parties.

“96. Appeal from original decree.—(1) Save where otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any Court exercising original jurisdiction the Court authorized to hear appeals from the decisions of such Court. (2) An appeal may lie from an original decree passed ex parte. (3) No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of parties. (4) No appeal shall lie, except on a question of law, from a decree in any suit of the nature cognisable by Courts of Small Causes, when the amount or value of the subject-matter of the original suit does not exceed ten thousand rupees.” The Court in first appeal is the final court of fact. The facts once determined by the Appellate Court are not open to challenge before the High Court, and even this Court does not undertake re-appreciation of evidence under Article 136 until and unless some glaring error such as complete misdirection is pointed out. In Arunachalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham[^4], O. Chinnappa Reddy J., while dealing with the criminal appeal expounded as follows, about the scope of Article 136 in general:

“4. … Article 136 of the Constitution of India invests the Supreme Court with a plentitude of plenary, appellate power over all Courts and Tribunals in India. The power is plenary in the sense that there are no words in Article 136 itself qualifying that power. But, the very nature of the power has led the Court to set limits to itself within which to exercise such power. It is now the well established practice of this Court to permit the invocation of the power under Article 136 only in very exceptional circumstances, as when a question of law of general public importance arises or a decision shocks the conscience of the Court. But, within the restrictions imposed by itself, this Court has the undoubted power to interfere even with findings of fact, making no distinction between judgments of acquittal and conviction, if the High Court, in arriving at those findings, has acted “perversely or otherwise improperly”. ...” In an appeal arising out of the Land Acquisition Act 1894, a coordinate bench in Mahesh Dattatray Thirthkar v. State of Maharashtra[^5] spoke as follows:

“27. It is not in dispute that power under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is exercisable not only against a judgment of reversal on facts but also in cases of concurrent findings of fact and such powers are wide enough. … A reading of this observation of this Court, as quoted hereinabove and considering the expressions used in Article 136 of the Constitution, it would not be difficult to understand that this Court in its discretion may grant leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India which would be apparent also in cases of judgment of reversal and affirmance in civil proceedings. 28. It is true that the aforesaid observation was made by this Court while dealing with a criminal case but the scope of Article 136 of the Constitution of India cannot be different in civil or criminal proceedings. It is also true that this Court while exercising its power under Article 136 of the Constitution of India will not readily interfere with the findings of fact given by the High Court but it can interfere with such findings of fact if the High Court acts perversely or otherwise improperly.” In similar terms was Mangla Ram v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.6, which stated:

“16. … We are conscious of the fact that in an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution, ordinarily this Court will not engage itself in reappreciation of the evidence as such but can certainly examine the evidence on record to consider the challenge to the findings recorded by Tribunal or the High Court, being perverse or replete with error apparent on the face of the record and being manifestly wrong.”

“Order 41 Rule 31. Contents, date and signature of judgment.— The judgment of the Appellate Court shall be in writing and shall state— (a) the points for determination; (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled; and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed and dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein.” The scope of the first appeal and its essentials have time and again engaged the attention of this Court. From a perusal of those judgments, the following principles/aspects can be deduced:

(i) First appeals must be decided in accordance with the provisions of CPC;

(ii) In a first appeal, which is a valuable right of the party, it is open for the whole case to be re-heard, on both facts and law. Anything less than this, has been stated to be unjust to the litigant;

(iii) The judgment of the Court must - (a) reflect application of mind; and (b) support its conclusion by reasons.

(iv) When the Court agrees with the judgment impugned in appeal, the entire factual matrix need not be laboriously restated and general agreement nonetheless accompanied by some reasons thereto, shall suffice. However, this cannot overshadow the duty of the Court itself. It cannot therefore pass a cryptic order in either situation.

(v) In a case of reversal, the Court must give due consideration to the appraisal of evidence by the Trial Court, and on its own evaluation, should it arrive at a different conclusion, reasons therefor must be stated;

(vi) The First Appellate Court is a final Court of facts. In a sense, it is also the final Court of law also, unless the question presented on second appeal is a substantial question of law;

(vii) The First Appellate Court must deal with all the issues and evidence led by parties in arriving at its findings; and

(viii) In ordinary circumstances, the First Appellate Court shall frame points for determination. However, not doing so will not vitiate the judgment itself so long as reasons are recorded. [See: Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari[^7]; Madhukar v. Sangram[^8]; H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith[^9]; B.V. Nagesh v. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy[^10]; SBI v. Emmsons International Ltd.11; SBI v. Emmsons International Ltd.12; K. Karuppuraj v. M. Ganesan[^13]; Kurian Chacko v. Varkey Ouseph[^14]; Somakka v. K.P. Basavaraj[^15]; Mahender Pal Chabra v. Subhash Aggrawal[^16]; Kiranmal Zumerlal Borana Marwadi v. Dnyanoba Bajirao Khot[^17]; Laliteshwar Prasad Singh v. S.P. Srivastava[^18]

7.1 In the context of the Central Excise and Salt Act 1944, a coordinate Bench in Travancore Rayon Ltd. v. Union of India[^19], held that when an executive authority exercises judicial functions, reasons are absolutely necessary:

“11. … Necessity to give sufficient reasons which disclose proper appreciation of the problem to be solved, and the mental process by which the conclusion is reached, in cases where a non- judicial authority exercises judicial functions, is obvious. When judicial power is exercised by an authority normally performing executive or administrative functions, this Court would require to be satisfied that the decision has been reached after due consideration of the merits of the dispute, uninfluenced by extraneous considerations of policy or expediency. The Court insists upon disclosure of reasons in support of the order on two grounds: one, that the party aggrieved in a proceeding before the High Court or this Court has the opportunity to demonstrate that the reasons which persuaded the authority to reject his case were erroneous; the other, that the obligation to record reasons operates as a deterrent against possible arbitrary action by the executive authority invested with the judicial power.” (emphasis supplied)

7.2 Y.V. Chandrachud CJ, writing for a Constitution Bench in State of Punjab v. Jagdev Singh Talwandi[^20], held that when a detenue under the National Security Act 1980 is released, the subjective satisfaction of the concerned authority must be displayed by recording reasons:

“30. We would like to take this opportunity to point out that serious difficulties arise on account of the practice increasingly adopted by the High Courts, of pronouncing the final order without a reasoned judgment. It is desirable that the final order which the High Court intends to pass should not be announced until a reasoned judgment is ready for pronouncement. Suppose, for example, that a final order without a reasoned judgment is announced by the High Court that a house shall be demolished, or that the custody of a child shall be handed over to one parent as against the other, or that a person accused of a serious charge is acquitted, or that a statute is unconstitutional or, as in the instant case, that a detenu be released from detention. If the object of passing such orders is to ensure speedy compliance with them, that object is more often defeated by the aggrieved party filing a special leave petition in this Court against the order passed by the High Court. That places this Court in a predicament because, without the benefit of the reasoning of the High Court, it is difficult for this Court to allow the bare order to be implemented. The result inevitably is that the operation of the order passed by the High Court has to be stayed pending delivery of the reasoned judgment.” (emphasis supplied)

7.3 In the context of Section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, this Court in Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar[^21], where the findings of the Trial Court were reversed by the High Court in appeal, observed that:

“19. … non-reasoned conclusions by appellate courts are not appropriate, more so, when views of the lower court are differed from. In case of concurrence, the need to again repeat reasons may not be there. It is not so in case of reversal. Reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion. Without the same, it becomes lifeless.”

7.4 In Omar Usman Chamadia v. Abdul[^22], a co- ordinate Bench took exception to the approach of the High Court in not passing a reasoned order on account of the fact that the counsel appearing in a matter did not press for the same. The effect thereof, was that this Court did not have the benefit of the reasons of the High Court and, therefore, had to decide the matter on the basis of the material available on record.

7.5 A revision petition preferred by the Assistant Commissioner, Income Tax, came to be dismissed of by the High Court by way of what can be termed as a ‘catchall statement’ and nothing further. On appeal, this Court set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter for fresh hearing observing as follows in CCT v. Shukla & Bros.23:

“24. Reason is the very life of law. When the reason of a law once ceases, the law itself generally ceases (Wharton's Law Lexicon). Such is the significance of reasoning in any rule of law. Giving reasons furthers the cause of justice as well as avoids uncertainty. As a matter of fact it helps in the observance of law of precedent. Absence of reasons on the contrary essentially introduces an element of uncertainty, dissatisfaction and give entirely different dimensions to the questions of law raised before the higher/appellate courts. In our view, the court should provide its own grounds and reasons for rejecting claim/prayer of a party whether at the very threshold i.e. at admission stage or after regular hearing, howsoever concise they may be. 25. … Reasons for an order would ensure and enhance public confidence and would provide due satisfaction to the consumer of justice under our justice dispensation system. It may not be very correct in law to say, that there is a qualified duty imposed upon the courts to record reasons.” (emphasis supplied)

7.6 In Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan[^24] this Court after considering a number of judicial pronouncements culled out the following principles whereby it has been underscored that both judicial and quasi-judicial authorities must give reasons in their orders:

“47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds: (a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts. (h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. (k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or “rubber-stamp reasons” is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process. (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor [(1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731-37] .) (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain [(1994) 19 EHRR 553] EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford [2001 EWCA Civ 405 (CA)] , wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, “adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions”. (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of “due process”.