Under Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963, how is the three-month limitation period under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to be computed from the date an arbitral award is received?

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — s.34(3) — Limitation Act, 1963 — ss.4, 5, 12(1) — Limitation for setting aside arbitral award — Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — s.34(3) — Limitation Act, 1963 — s.12(1) — Computation of three-month period — Held: Under Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act, the date of receipt of the award is excluded while computing the three-month period under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act; the period runs from the next day and is measured in calendar months, not ninety days. (¶7) Limitation Act, 1963 — s.5 — Condonation of delay excluded — Held further: Section 5 of the Limitation Act, permitting condonation of delay, is wholly excluded from Section 34 applications by the language of its proviso, following Union of India v. Popular Construction Co. (¶8) Limitation Act, 1963 — s.4 — 'Prescribed period' — Excludes condonable 30 days — Held further: The 'prescribed period' for Section 4 of the Limitation Act is only the three-month period under Section 34(3), not the further condonable 30 days under its proviso; Section 4 does not apply once the three months have already expired before the court closes. (¶9) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — s.34(3) — Petition time-barred — Appeal dismissed — On facts, held: The three months expired on 30 September 2022, before the pooja vacation began, so Section 4 did not apply; the further 30-day condonable period also expired a day before the petition was filed, and the appeal is dismissed. (¶9)

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(3) of Section 34. Sub­section (3) of Section 34 reads thus:

“(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.”

“4. Expiry of prescribed period when court is closed.—Where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day when the court re­opens. Explanation.—A court shall be deemed to be closed on any day within the meaning of this section if during any part of its normal working hours it remains closed on that day.” (underline supplied) The meaning of “the prescribed period” is no longer res integra. In the case of Assam Urban Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Subash Projects & Mktg. Ltd. 2, in paragraphs nos. 13 and 14, the law has been laid down on the subject. The said paragraphs read thus:

“13. The crucial words in Section 4 of the 1963 Act are “prescribed period”. What is the meaning of these words? 14. Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act defines: “2. (j) ‘period of limitation’ [which] means the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the Schedule, and ‘prescribed period’ means the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act; Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act when read in the context of Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act, it becomes amply clear that the prescribed period for making an application for setting aside an arbitral award is three months. The period of 30 days mentioned in the proviso that follows sub­section (3) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is not the “period of limitation” and, therefore, not the “prescribed period” for the purposes of making the application for setting aside the arbitral award. The period of 30 days beyond three months which the court may extend on sufficient cause being shown under the proviso appended to sub­section (3) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act being not the “period of limitation” or, in other words, the “prescribed period”, in our opinion, Section 4 of the 1963 Act is not, at all, attracted to the facts of the present case.” (underline supplied) Even in this case, this Court was dealing with the period of limitation for preferring a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. We may note that the decision in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh and Another v. Himachal Techno Engineers and Another[^1] which is relied upon by the appellant, follows the aforesaid decision. 10. In the facts of the case in hand, the three months provided by way of limitation expired a day before the commencement of the pooja vacation, which commenced on 1st October 2022. Thus, the prescribed period within the meaning of Section 4 of the Limitation Act ended on 30 th September 2022. Therefore, the appellants were not entitled to take benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act. As per the proviso to sub­section (3) of Section 34, the period of limitation could have been extended by a maximum period of 30 days. The maximum period of 30 days expired on 30 th October 2022. As noted earlier, the petition was filed on 31 st October 2022. 11. Thus, looking from the angle, the High Court was right in holding that the petition filed by the appellants under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act was not filed within the period specified under sub­section (3) of Section 34. Hence, we find no merit in the appeal, and it is, accordingly, dismissed. ….…………………….J. (Abhay S. Oka) …..…………………...J. (Pankaj Mithal) New Delhi; July 08, 2024.