Can time spent prosecuting a special leave petition be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act?

This civil miscellaneous petition is filed seeking to condone the delay of 86 days in filing the civil miscellaneous appeal under Section 42 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (in short “PML Act”), challenging the final order dated 03.02.2026 passed by the Appellate Tribunal under Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 (in short “SAFEMA”) at New Delhi, in FPA-PMLA-6611/ CHN/2023, by excluding the period from 13.04.2026 to 11.05.2026, during which SLP (Civil) Diary No.22485 of 2026, was pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India.

We heard the rival submissions and considered the materials available on record.

The short issue that arises for consideration is whether the petitioner can be allowed to claim the benefit under Section 14 of the Limitation Act by excluding the period from 13.04.2026 to 11.05.2026, during which SLP was pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court for the purpose of calculating the limitation for condonation of delay.

An appeal challenging the order of the Appellate Tribunal confirming the order of the Adjudicating Authority would lie to the High Court within a period of sixty days under the PML Act. For easy reference, Section 42 of the PML Act is extracted below: “42. Appeal to High Court - Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal to him on any question of law or fact arising out of such order: Provided that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days. Explanation- For the purposes of this section, “High Court” means (i) the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the aggrieved party ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain; and (ii) where the Central Government is the aggrieved party, the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the respondent, or in a case where there are more than one respondent, any of the respondents, ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain.”

The above provision makes it explicitly clear that an appeal challenging the order of the tribunal ought to be preferred within a period of 60 days from the date of communication of the order. Further, the proviso to Section 42 of the PML Act allows the High Court to entertain an appeal if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period of 60 days and may allow such appeal to be filed within a further period not exceeding 60 days. Thus, the High Court can condone a delay not exceeding 60 days. Thereby, a person aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Tribunal can file an appeal within 60 days or within the further condonable period of 60 days to be allowed by the High Court and no such appeal can be entertained by the High Court, after the expiry of this total 120 days.

Insofar as the applicability of the Limitation Act to the PML Act, it is useful to refer to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, which reads as under: “29. Savings: (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.”

Section 42 of the PML Act read with Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act makes it ostensibly clear that Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked to condone the delay beyond the 120 days limit prescribed by the special enactment. This Court dealt with a similar issue in the case of P. Shiva Kumar, GPA Holder of Advaith Consultancy v. Directorate of Enforcement and Another (2025 SCC OnLine Mad 16292), wherein after referring to decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it was concluded that the delay cannot be condoned beyond the maximum period provided under the law by relying Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The relevant portion reads as under: “8. From a conjoint reading of Section 42 of the PML Act and Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, the inevitable conclusion that could be drawn is that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be invoked to condone the delay beyond 120 days prescribed under Section 42 of the PML Act and the proviso thereto. The proviso to Section 42 of the PML Act by mandating that “allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days” adjures exclusion of the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

At this juncture, it is propitious to refer to a Supreme Court decision in the case of Ketan v. Parekh v. Special Director, Directorate of Enforcement [(2011) 15 SCC 30], wherein, while interpreting Section 35 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, which also uses the words “not exceeding sixty days” and is akin to Section 42 of the PMLA, it has been held as under: “17. The question whether the High Court can entertain an appeal under Section 35 of the Act beyond 120 days does not require much debate and has to be answered against the Appellants in view of the law laid down in Union of India v. Popular Construction Company, (2001) 8 SCC 470; Singh Enterprises v. CCE, (2008) 3 SCC 70; Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise v. Punjab Fibres Ltd, (2008) 3 SCC 73…” [emphasis supplied]

In Chhatisgarh State Electricity Board v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission [(2010) 5 SCC 23], the Supreme Court held that outer limit for filing of an appeal is 120 days and there is no provision in the Electricity Act, 2003 empowering the Court to entertain an appeal after more than 120 days delay. The relevant observations are as under: “25. Section 125 lays down that any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Tribunal can file an appeal to this Court within 60 days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Tribunal. Proviso to Section 125 empowers this Court to entertain an appeal filed within a further period of 60 days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing appeal within the initial period of 60 days. This shows that the period of limitation prescribed for filing appeals under Sections 111(2) and 125 is substantially different from the period prescribed under the Limitation Act for filing suits, etc. The use of the expression “within a further period of not exceeding 60 days” in the proviso to Section 125 makes it clear that the outer limit for filing an appeal is 120 days. There is no provision in the Act under which this Court can entertain an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal after more than 120 days. …… 32. In view of the above discussion, we hold that Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked by this Court for entertaining an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal beyond the period of 120 days specified in Section 125 of the Electricity Act and its proviso. Any interpretation of Section 125 of the Electricity Act which may attract the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Section 29(2) thereof will defeat the object of the legislation, namely, to provide special limitation for filing an appeal against the decision or order of the Tribunal and proviso to Section 125 will become nugatory.” [emphasis supplied]

It needs to be emphasised that while interpreting the period of limitation as contemplated under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the proviso thereto which stipulates that “Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter”, the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Popular Construction Co. [(2001) 8 SCC 470], has held that applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to a petition filed under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is excluded.

We do not intend to burden our judgment with other authorities. Suffice it to say that the legal position in this regard has been very well settled that the delay cannot be condoned beyond the maximum period of condonation provided under the law, particularly when the law prohibits condonation by using an expression “not exceeding”.

In the instant case, the petition to condone the delay is filed seeking exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act for the period which was spent in prosecuting the case before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Consolidated Engineering Enterprises (supra) and Kalpraj Dharamshi (supra) to the effect that Section 14 of the Limitation Act would be applicable even to the special enactments. At this juncture, it is apposite to refer to Section 14 of the Limitation Act, which reads as under: “14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction- (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 2 of Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted by the court under Rule 1 of that Order, where such permission is granted on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the court or other cause of a like nature. Explanation - For the purposes of this section, (a) in excluding the time during which a former civil proceeding was pending, the day on which that proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended shall both be counted; (b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding; (c) misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction.”

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Consolidated Engineering Enterprises (supra), held that Section 14 of the Limitation Act is applicable to an application filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Thereby, Section 14 of the Limitation Act was made applicable to the special enactment also. However, to attract the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the Court held that the five conditions enumerated in the decision must coexist, noting that Section 14 of the Limitation Act will not assist a party guilty of negligence or inaction. Mere filing of an application in a wrong court is not enough and there must be due diligence. The relevant portions are extracted hereunder: “21. Section 14 of the Limitation Act deals with exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in a court without jurisdiction. On analysis of the said section, it becomes evident that the following conditions must be satisfied before Section 14 can be pressed into service: (1) Both the prior and subsequent proceedings are civil proceedings prosecuted by the same party; (2) The prior proceeding had been prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith; (3) The failure of the prior proceeding was due to defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature; (4) The earlier proceeding and the latter proceeding must relate to the same matter in issue and; (5) Both the proceedings are in a court. …… 31. To attract the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, five conditions enumerated in the earlier part of this judgment have to co-exist. There is no manner of doubt that the section deserves to be construed liberally. Due diligence and caution are essential prerequisites for attracting Section 14. Due diligence cannot be measured by any absolute standards. Due diligence is a measure of prudence or activity expected from and ordinarily exercised by a reasonable and prudent person under the particular circumstances. The time during which a court holds up a case while it is discovering that it ought to have been presented in another court, must be excluded, as the delay of the court cannot affect the due diligence of the party. Section 14 requires that the prior proceeding should have been prosecuted in good faith and with due diligence. The definition of good faith as found in Section 2(h) of the Limitation Act would indicate that nothing shall be deemed to be in good faith which is not done with due care and attention. It is true that Section 14 will not help a party who is guilty of negligence, lapse or inaction. However, there can be no hard-and-fast rule as to what amounts to good faith. It is a matter to be decided on the facts of each case. It will, in almost every case be more or less a question of degree. The mere filing of an application in wrong court would not prima facie show want of good faith. There must be no pretended mistake intentionally made with a view to delaying the proceedings or harassing the opposite party. In the light of these principles, the question will have to be considered whether the appellant had prosecuted the matter in other courts with due diligence and in good faith.”

Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Kalpraj Dharamshi (supra), after referring to earlier decisions on the subject, held that Section 14 of the Limitation Act applies to exclude the time spent in prosecuting bona fide proceedings with due diligence, even in respect of special enactments, particularly, the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and the Customs Act. The relevant portion of the said judgment is extracted hereunder: “67. Perusal of the aforesaid would therefore reveal, that the Court has clearly rejected the objection raised by the Revenue in M.P. Steel Corpn. [M.P. Steel Corpn. v. CCE, (2015) 7 SCC 58 : (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 510] which was raised relying on the judgment of this Court in Parson Tools & Plants [CST v. Parson Tools & Plants, (1975) 4 SCC 22 : 1975 SCC (Tax) 185]. This Court observed, that the time during which the applicant was prosecuting such application before the wrong court can be excluded, provided the proceeding in the wrong court was prosecuted bona fide, with due diligence. This Court distinguished the judgment in Parson Tools & Plants [CST v. Parson Tools & Plants, (1975) 4 SCC 22 : 1975 SCC (Tax) 185] on the ground, that the period provided for filing a revision under the U.P. Sales Tax Act was sufficiently long period of 18 months, beyond which it was the policy of the legislature not to extend limitation any further. Relying on the Consolidated Engg. Enterprises [Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Irrigation Deptt., (2008) 7 SCC 169], it has been observed, that there is a vital distinction between extending time and condoning delay. It was further observed, that like Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, the period provided in Section 128 of the Customs Act did not lay down a long period for preferring an appeal. As such, it would be unduly harsh to exclude the principles contained in Section 14 of the Limitation Act. Relying on Consolidated Engg. Enterprises [Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Irrigation Deptt., (2008) 7 SCC 169] it was observed, that there is a difference between exclusion of a certain period altogether under principles of Section 14 and condoning the delay. It has been observed, that when a certain period is excluded by applying the principles contained in Section 14, there is no delay to be attributed to the appellant and the limitation period provided by the statute concerned, continues to be the stated period and not more than the stated period. It was therefore held, that the principle of Section 14, which is a principle based on advancing the cause of justice would certainly apply to exclude time taken in prosecuting proceedings which are bona fide and pursued with due diligence but which end without a decision on the merits of the case.”

After referring to Consolidated Engineering Enterprises (supra) and reiterating the conditions required to be satisfied for invoking Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that where a litigant, acting bona fide and with due diligence, prosecutes proceedings before a wrong forum under a mistaken understanding of the appropriate remedy, the period so spent is liable to be excluded. This principle applies equally where the proceedings are prosecuted before a quasi-judicial tribunal. The proper approach, as emphasised by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, is one which advances the cause of justice. Section 14 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to the special enactments. The relevant portion reads as under: “65. In Consolidated Engg. Enterprises [Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Irrigation Deptt., (2008) 7 SCC 169], it has been observed, that while considering the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, proper approach will have to be adopted and the provisions will have to be interpreted, so as to advance the cause of justice, rather than abort the proceedings. It has been observed, that an element of mistake is inherent in the invocation of Section 14. The section, in fact, is intended to provide a relief against the bar of limitation in cases of mistaken remedy or selection of a wrong forum. It has been observed, that the legislature has enacted Section 14 to exempt a certain period covered by a bona fide litigious activity. It has been held, that the equity underlying Section 14 should be applied to its fullest extent and time taken diligently pursuing a remedy, in a wrong court, should be excluded. It could thus be seen, that this Court has in unequivocal terms held, that when a litigant bona fide under a mistake litigates before a wrong forum, he would be entitled for exclusion of the period, during which he was bona fide prosecuting such a wrong remedy. Though strictly, the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act would not be applicable to the proceedings before a quasi-judicial tribunal, however, the principles underlying the same would be applicable i.e. the proper approach will have to be of advancing the cause of justice, rather than to abort the proceedings.”

Based on the principles laid down in the aforesaid decision, it is clear that the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act extends even to special enactments, provided the applicability of Sections 4 to 24 is not expressly barred. However, to avail of the benefit under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the applicant must satisfy the five conditions as set out in Consolidated Engineering Enterprises (supra).

Keeping the above principles in mind, we proceed to analyse the facts of the present case. The matter arises from FIR No.11/2019, registered by the CBI, Bangalore, against M/s.Surana Industries Ltd. and 8 others for offences punishable under Section 120-B read with Sections 420, 468, and 471 of IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Since the predicate case involves scheduled offences, the Enforcement Directorate registered an ECIR, subsequent to which several properties were attached.

The petitioner/appellant claims to have purchased 67 windmills, which came to be attached. The provisional attachment order was confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority vide its order dated 27.01.2023. Challenging this order, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 26 of the PML Act. While the appeal was pending before the Appellate Tribunal, the petitioner approached this Court in W.P.No.12964 of 2025, seeking certain directions, including permission to constructively run the windmills by taking possession.

This Court observing that the directions sought in the writ petition would nullify the attachment order itself, granted the petitioner liberty to apply for an early hearing before the Appellate Tribunal and disposed of the writ petition. The order reads thus: “While the appeal in the matter of challenge to the order of confirmation of attachment of alleged proceeds of crime, including property of petitioner, is pending consideration, learned counsel for petitioner would submit that the attachment of properties, which include wind power unit, is seriously and adversely affecting petitioner, who is a bona fide purchaser. 2. It is submitted that even if the property remains under attachment, this Court may direct appointment of Receiver or evolve a mechanism to ensure that the wind power unit is brought back into operation, so that energy may be produced and the entire power generation unit may not be reduced to a waste. 3. Any direction to operate the wind mill, which is under attachment, would amount to nullifying the order of attachment. 4. Since a statement has been made that the predicate offence itself has been quashed, we are of the view that this aspect needs to be examined as a subsequent event. At least this may give petitioner an occasion to seek urgent and out-of-turn hearing before the Appellate Tribunal. 5. We give liberty to petitioner to move an application for out-of-turn hearing before Appellate Tribunal, particularly on the ground that the predicate offence itself has been quashed in proceedings before the Karnataka High Court. If a prayer is made for expeditious hearing, we request the Appellate Tribunal to hear the appeal at the earliest. 6. Petition is disposed. There shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, the interim application is closed.”

Admittedly, the petitioner did not file any application for an early hearing before the Appellate Tribunal as permitted by this Court. However, the appeal was immediately taken up for hearing by the Appellate Tribunal. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioners in the appeal and considering the materials on record, the Appellate Tribunal, vide its final order dated 03.02.2026, dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order of the Adjudicating Authority.

The petitioner, who had approached this Court for certain directions that were negatived, subsequently participated in the hearing before the Appellate Tribunal, which ultimately dismissed the appeal on 03.02.2026. Despite being fully aware that an appeal against the order of the Appellate Tribunal must be preferred before this Court within a statutory period of 60 days, the petitioner chose not to do so. Instead, even when the final order of the Appellate Tribunal dated 03.02.2026 had been delivered and was readily available, the petitioner chose to file an appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP (Civil) Diary No.22485 of 2026, challenging only the order of this Court dated 08.01.2026 in W.P.No.12964 of 2025.

The SLP has been admittedly filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 13.04.2026. In fact, even prior to the filing of SLP before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the 60 day limitation period for filing an appeal under Section 42 of the PML Act, before this Court had expired on 04.04.2026. Despite this, the petitioner chose not to file an appeal before this Court along with an application to condone the delay in challenging the order. Instead, the petitioner proceeded with the SLP simply against the order of this Court alone, which had merely granted liberty to the petitioner to move the Tribunal for an early hearing.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court, by order dated 11.05.2026, dismissed the SLP as withdrawn, granting liberty to challenge the final order dated 03.02.2026 passed by the Appellate Authority in appropriate proceedings. The relevant portion reads as under: “1. After arguing for some time, Mr. Gaurav Agarwal, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner seeks permission to withdraw the special leave petition; he also seeks leave to challenge the final order passed by the Appellate Authority dated 03th February, 2026 in appropriate proceedings. 2. Permission is granted. 3. The special leave petition is dismissed as withdrawn, with liberty as prayed.”

Even after the SLP was dismissed on 11.05.2026, the petitioner casually filed an appeal under Section 42 of the PML Act only on 29.06.2026, along with the above application seeking condonation of delay by excluding the time from 13.04.2026 to 11.05.2026. It is true that an application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act should be liberally considered to advance the cause of justice and to avoid defeating the proceedings on technicalities, as held in the aforesaid decision. However, the parameters set out in Consolidated Engineering Enterprises (supra) must be met to attract the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

It is to be noted that the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal was not the subject matter of challenge either before this Court or before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The petitioner had approached this Court only seeking permission to operate the windmills and for certain other directions. While dealing the relief prayed, this Court directed the petitioner to seek an early hearing before the Appellate Tribunal. This order alone was challenged by the petitioner before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which was ultimately dismissed as withdrawn.

The final order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal dated 03.02.2026, was never the subject matter of challenge. The benefit under Section 14 of the Limitation Act will accrue only when the prior and subsequent proceedings are prosecuted by the same party with due diligence, good faith and fail due to a defect of jurisdiction, provided both proceedings relate to the same matter in issue. As referred to above, the proceedings prosecuted before this Court and subsequently challenged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court ultimately sought permission to operate the windmills. What is now challenged in the appeal before this Court is the final order confirming the attachment. Therefore, the petition fails to satisfy this primary condition, as set out in Section 14 of the Limitation Act and the decision in Consolidated Engineering Enterprises (supra).

The fact remains that when this Court had permitted the petitioner to seek early hearing before the Appellate Tribunal, even in the absence of any such request, the Appellate Tribunal has, by a final order dated 03.02.2026 confirmed the attachment. The petitioner did not prosecute the proceedings with due diligence and in good faith, but consciously ignored to file an appeal under Section 42 of the PML Act, resorting only to challenge the orders passed by this Court in SLP which only allowed the petitioner to seek an early hearing.

The conduct of the petitioner in not filing an appeal within the prescribed 60 days and thereafter, filing an SLP before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, that too, only challenging the order passed by this Court, unmindful of the final orders passed by the Appellate Tribunal and even after the SLP was dismissed on 11.05.2026 giving liberty to challenge the order dated 03.02.2026, the petitioner took his own sweet time and filed the appeal along with the petition to condone delay only on 29.06.2026 which is after a period of 49 days, reveals that the petitioner was not prosecuting the case with due diligence and good faith. When the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal was never the subject matter of challenge before any Court, the contention that the petitioner is entitled to have the period from 13.04.2026 to 11.05.2026 excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act does not arise and is entirely misplaced.

At this juncture, it is useful to refer to a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bakhtawar Singh and Another v. Sada Kaur and Another [(1996) 11 SCC 167], wherein it was held as under: “9. As regards the exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act it was essential for its application to show that the proceedings related to the same matter in issue and the plaintiff prosecuted the suit in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature is unable to entertain it. As discussed above the plaintiffs/ appellants have miserably failed to show as to what was the defect of jurisdiction or any other cause of like nature by reason of which the earlier suit was not entertainable or competent. That being so, the benefit of the provisions of Section 14 cannot be legitimately extended to the suit of the plaintiffs. In these facts and circumstances the plaintiffs' suit has rightly been dismissed as barred by limitation.” (emphasis supplied)

Next, it is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that since the Hon'ble Supreme Court had given liberty to challenge the final order of the Appellate Authority dated 03.02.2026 in appropriate proceedings, the time to file automatically stands extended. We are unable to agree with this contention, in view of the fact that the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dismissing the SLP as withdrawn, had only given liberty to challenge the final order in appropriate proceedings. If any appeal is ultimately filed, it would be subject to limitation.

It is well settled that the period of limitation does not get extended by the orders of the Court merely by giving liberty, which is subject to its own limitation. In this regard, it is useful to refer to a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Arifa and Others v. Abhiman Apartment Co Operative Housing Society Ltd. and Others [(2025) 10 SCC 700], wherein it was observed as under: “8. In the impugned judgment [Abhiman Apartment Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. Kasim Sab Peersab Nadaf, 2023 SCC OnLine Kar 1578] reversing the judgment and decree of the trial court, the High Court has categorically found that the suit was barred by limitation. The specific averment regarding the cause of action, as stated in the plaint was extracted, which was the date on which the High Court had dismissed the second appeal and reserved such liberty. The limitation would commence from the date of execution of the agreements, the first two of which were in the year 1998. Though the two sale deeds in favour of the Society were thus executed, when the first suit was pending, the plaintiff did nothing to challenge the said conveyance. In the earlier suit the defendant in the written statement had specifically pleaded about the conveyances and the plaintiff admitted his knowledge of all the conveyances while verifying the “record of rights”. No cause of action can be claimed on the liberty reserved, which is only on just exceptions including limitation, which in any event has to go by the period prescribed in the statute of limitation. The High Court has further found that there can also be no resort to Section 14 of the Limitation Act, since the suit already laid was not before a wrong forum but was not properly framed. Even when a suit is withdrawn with leave of the Court to file a fresh suit, under Order 23 Rule 1CPC limitation applies with full force as per Rule 2 of Order 23. ... ... 11. We perfectly agree with the findings in the impugned judgment [Abhiman Apartment Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. Kasim Sab Peersab Nadaf, 2023 SCC OnLine Kar 1578] regarding limitation and res judicata and cannot but observe that the liberty granted by the High Court in the second appeal was akin to flogging a dead horse; which cannot give a fresh lease of life to either the cause of action; to save limitation or the grounds on which the declaration and consequential relief has been prayed for in the present suit; which grounds were already adjudicated in the earlier suit and found against the plaintiff by three courts.” (emphasis supplied)

When an appeal is filed along with a petition to condone the delay, it is for the petitioner to show sufficient cause and satisfy the legal provisions for the delay to be condoned. When Section 42 of the PML Act allows the appeal to be filed only within a period of 60 days, which could be extended by another 60 days by this Court on showing sufficient cause, the argument sought to be advanced that in view of the liberty granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the period of limitation stood automatically extended is totally misplaced.

From the perusal of the materials on record, it is evident that while the Appellate Tribunal has passed the final orders on 03.02.2026, which has been communicated on the same day even as per the affidavit of the petitioner, the appeal has been filed before this Court only on 29.06.2026. The time calculated from 04.02.2026 to 29.06.2026 comes to 146 days. When the appeal ought to have been filed on or before 04.04.2026 and the further period of 60 days granted for condonation of delay also expired on 04.06.2026, the appeal filed on 29.06.2026, being well beyond the maximum statutory period of 120 days, is not maintainable.

As referred to above, the petitioner is not entitled to seek the benefit of exclusion under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, as the period in question does not satisfy the conditions set out in the statutory provisions or the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

In view of the above, this CMP seeking condonation of delay stands dismissed. As a sequel, C.M.A.SR.No.106394 of 2026 stands rejected. There shall be no order as to costs.