Under Article 300-A of the Constitution, does the obligation to pay compensation for acquired property survive even though it is not expressly stated in that Article?

Constitution of India — Article 300-A — Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — s.4 — Right to property — Delay and laches — Constitution of India — Article 300-A — Right to property — Survives as constitutional right, compensation inferred — Held: The right to property, though no longer a fundamental right after the Forty-Fourth Amendment, survives as a human right and a constitutional right under Article 300-A, and no person may be deprived of property save by authority of law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly stated in Article 300-A, can be inferred from it. (¶17, 18) Constitution of India — Delay and laches — Continuing cause of action, no fixed limitation — Held further: Delay and laches cannot bar a claim resting on a continuing cause of action or where the facts shock the judicial conscience, and no fixed period of limitation binds a constitutional court exercising its jurisdiction to do substantial justice. The Single Judge erred in rejecting the writ petition on delay alone, without examining whether just and fair compensation was ever paid. (¶25) Constitution of India — Article 300-A — Land acquisition compensation — Order set aside, matter remitted — Held further: The impugned order of the High Court is set aside, and the matter is remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration, with the Letters Patent Appeal restored to its file and the High Court requested to decide it within two months. Appeal allowed. (¶28, 29)

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CA 6351/2024 2024 INSC 415

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal No 6351 of 2024 (Arising out of SLP (C) No 10492 of 2023)

Dharnidhar Mishra (D) and Another Appellants

Versus

State of Bihar and Others Respondents

ORDER

1 Application for substitution to bring on record the legal heirs of the first

petitioner is allowed. Cause title be amended accordingly.

2 Leave granted.

3 This appeal arises from a order passed by the High Court of Judicature at

Patna dated 7 February 2023 in the Letters Patent Appeal No 997 of 2019 in

Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No 8408 of 2019 by which the Division Bench of

the High Court disposed of the Letters Patent Appeal by asking the appellant

herein to file an appropriate application before the concerned authority for

disbursement of the value of the land assessed at Rs 4,68,099.

CA 6351/2024

4 The facts giving rise to this appeal may be summarized as under:

In the year 1976, a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act

was issued for the purpose of construction of State Highway as notified by

the State of Bihar. The land owned by the appellant herein was included in

Section 4 notification referred to above. Sometime in 1977, the land of the

appellant was acquired. However, it is the case of the appellant that not a

single penny was paid to him towards compensation.

5 The appellant preferred an appropriate application addressed to the State

Government immediately after his land came to be acquired and possession

was taken over in the year 1977 for payment of compensation. It is the case

of the appellant that State did not even pass any award of compensation and

kept the matter in limbo.

6 Years passed by and the appellant kept on requesting the authorities to pass

an appropriate award and pay the amount towards compensation.

7 As the respondents did not pay heed to the say of the appellant, he was left

with no other option but to file a writ petition in the High Court of Patna. The

writ petition was heard by a learned Single Judge and by order dated 19 July

2019 rejected the same only on the count that the petition had been filed

after a period of forty-two years of the acquisition. While dismissing the writ

petition, the learned Single Judge also observed that the appellant had failed

to submit any paper or notification in connection with acquisition of his land

CA 6351/2024

for the purpose of payment of compensation.

8 Being dissatisfied with the order passed by the learned Single Judge rejecting

his writ petition, the appellant went in appeal. The appeal came to be

disposed of by a Division Bench in the following terms:

“A hard copy of the supplementary affidavit on behalf of the State has been filed across the Board.

Let it be taken on record.

In view of the categorical stand of the State that the land of the appellants had been consumed and that the State is ready to compensate the appellants, nothing remains in this appeal to be decided.

The appellants have been informed about the value of the land has been assessed at Rs 4,68,099/- .

All that the appellants have to do is to file an application before the concerned authority as to how the amount shall be apportioned between him and his son.

It is expected that the decision in that regard by the State Authority shall be taken without any delay as already the matter has become five decades old.

The appeal stands disposed of."

9 Mr. Dharnidhar Jha, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant

submitted that the State conceded to the fact that the land of the appellant

had been acquired and was put to use for the purpose the same was

acquired. He would submit that if the State thought fit to acquire the land of

his client, then it was obligatory on the part of the State to pass an

appropriate award determining the amount towards compensation. He would

CA 6351/2024

submit that it is not the case that the appellant herein was lethargic in

asserting his rights, but rather kept on requesting the authorities concerned

to determine the amount towards compensation and pay the same.

10 On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the State of Bihar

submitted that no error, not to speak of any error of law could be said to

have been committed by the High Court in passing the impugned order. He

would submit that it is not in dispute that the land of the appellant was

acquired for a public purpose, but at the same time, it was the duty of the

appellant to pursue the matter further for the purpose of getting appropriate

compensation determined in accordance with law.

11 Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone

through the materials on record, the only question that falls for our

consideration is whether the High Court committed any error in passing the

impugned order.

12 We take notice of the fact that the Single Judge of the High Court thought fit

to reject the writ petition only on the ground of delay and in appeal, the

appellate court disposed of the appeal asking the appellant herein to file an

application before the concerned authority for disbursement of the amount of

compensation.

13 We take notice of two things: First, the High Court in its impugned order has

stated that the appellant herein has been informed about the value of the

CA 6351/2024

land assessed at Rs 4,68,099. We fail to understand on what basis this figure

has been arrived at; at what point of time this amount came to be assessed;

and the basis for the assessment of such amount. Secondly, the order of the

High Court could be said to be a non-speaking order. Although at this stage,

the learned counsel appearing for the State of Bihar submitted that it was an

order obtained with the consent of the parties, yet there is nothing to

indicate that any consent was given by the appellant herein to pass such an

order.

14 The first thing that the High Court should have enquired with the State is as

to why in the year 1977 itself, that is the year in which the land came to be

acquired, the award for compensation was not passed. The High Court

should have enquired why it took forty-two years for the State to determine

the figure of Rs 4,68,099. The High Court should also have asked the State

the basis of the determination of the amount towards compensation. It is a

well settled position of law that after the award towards compensation is

passed, if the owner of the land is not satisfied with the quantum, he can

even file an appeal for the enhancement of the same. The High Court

proceeded on the footing that the amount of Rs 4,68,099 has been assessed

and it is now for the appellant to file an appropriate application and get the

amount disbursed in his favour.

15 We are not convinced but rather disappointed with the approach of the High

Court while disposing of the appeal.

CA 6351/2024

16 There are many issues arising in this litigation and the High Court should

have taken little pains to ask the State why it made the appellant run from

pillar to post. It is sad to note that the appellant passed away fighting for his

right to receive compensation. Now the legal heirs of the appellant are

pursuing this litigation.

17 In 1976, when the land of the appellant came to be acquired the right to

property was a fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III of the

Constitution. Article 31 guaranteed the right to private property, which could

not be deprived without due process of law and upon just and fair

compensation.

18 The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution

(Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human

right in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article 300-A of the

Constitution. Article 300-A provides that no person shall be deprived of his

property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of

his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The

obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300-

A, can be inferred in that Article. [See: K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of

Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1]

19 In Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai reported in

(2005) 7 SCC 627, this Court held that:

CA 6351/2024 “6. … Having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300- A of the Constitution, the State in exercise of its power of “eminent domain” may interfere with the right of property of a person by acquiring the same but the same must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation therefor must be paid.” (Emphasis supplied)

20 In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy reported in (2008) 15 SCC 517,

this Court held that:

“21.If the right of property is a human right as also a constitutional right, the same cannot be taken away except in accordance with law. Article 300-A of the Constitution protects such right. The provisions of the Act seeking to divest such right, keeping in view of the provisions of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, must be strictly construed .” (Emphasis supplied)

21 In Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. reported in (2011) 9 SCC

354, this Court recognised the right to property as a basic human right in the

following words:

“30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by different political thinkers that some amount of property right is an indispensable safeguard against tyranny and economic oppression of the Government. Jefferson was of the view that liberty cannot long subsist without the support of property. “Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist” was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the view that property itself is the seed-bed which must be conserved if other constitutional values are to flourish, is the consensus among political thinkers and jurists.” (Emphasis supplied)

22 In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat reported in 1995 Supp (1) SCC

596, this Court held as follows:

CA 6351/2024 “48. … In other words, Article 300-A only limits the powers of the State that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. There has to be no deprivation without any sanction of law. Deprivation by any other mode is not acquisition or taking possession under Article 300-A. In other words, if there is no law, there is no deprivation.” (Emphasis supplied)

23 In Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC reported in (2013) 1 SCC 353, this Court held

that the State must comply with the procedure for acquisition, requisition, or

any other permissible statutory mode. The State being a welfare State

governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is

provided by the Constitution.

24 This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar reported in (2011) 10 SCC

404 held that the right to property is now considered to be not only a

constitutional or statutory right, but also a human right. Human rights have

been considered in the realm of individual rights such as right to shelter,

livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights have gained a multi-

faceted dimension.

25 We regret to state that the learned Single Judge of the High Court did not

deem fit even to enquire with the State whether just and fair compensation

was paid to the appellant or not. The learned Single Judge rejected the writ

petition only on the ground of delay. As held by this court in Vidya Devi v.

The State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. reported in (2020) 2 SCC 569, delay

and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action or if the

circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the court. The condition of

CA 6351/2024

delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously

and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of the case. As held by this

Court, it would depend upon the breach of fundamental rights, and the

remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is no period of

limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction

to do substantial justice.

26 In a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, a constitutional

court would exercise its jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not

defeat it. [See: P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., (1975) 1 SCC 152]

27 In Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC reported in (2013) 1 SCC 353, this Court while

dealing with a similar fact situation, held as follows:

“11. There are authorities which state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for educational facilities and other categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true that there are a few authorities that lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right has been violated, under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different scenario altogether. The functionaries of the State took over possession of the land belonging to the appellants without any sanction of law . The appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode.” (Emphasis supplied)

CA 6351/2024

28 In such circumstances referred to above, we are of the view that we should

set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court and remit the matter

for fresh consideration.

29 In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned

order passed by the High Court is set aside and the matter is remitted to the

High Court for fresh consideration. Letters Patent Appeal No 997 of 2019 is

restored to its original file. The High Court shall hear both the sides and pass

an appropriate order in accordance with what has been observed by this

Court in this order. We request the High Court to decide the matter within a

period of two months from today.

30 Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

..…....…........……………….…........J. [J B Pardiwala]

..…....…........……………….…........J. [Manoj Misra]

New Delhi; May 13, 2024 CKB

CA 6351/2024

ITEM NO.61 COURT NO.17 SECTION XVI

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Civil Appeal No.6351/2024

DHARNIDHAR MISHRA (D) & ANR. Appellant(s)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. Respondent(s)

(With IA No.88293/2024 - APPLICATION FOR SUBSTITUTION and IA No.102966/2023 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.)

Date : 13-05-2024 These matters were called on for hearing today.

CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE J.B. PARDIWALA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ MISRA

For Appellant(s) Mr. Dharnidhar Jha, Sr. Adv. Mr. Jayesh Gaurav, Adv. Ms. Diksha Ojha, Adv. Mr. Ishwar Chandra Roy, Adv. Mr. Ranjan Nikhil Dharnidhar, AOR

For Respondent(s) Mr. Anshul Narayan, Adv. Mr. Prem Prakash, AOR

UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R

1 Application for substitution to bring on record the legal heirs of the first petitioner is allowed. Cause title be amended accordingly.

CA 6351/2024

2 Leave granted.

3 The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed reportable order.

4 Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

(CHETAN KUMAR) (RAM SUBHAG SINGH) A.R.-cum-P.S. Court Master (Signed Reportable Order is placed on the file)