Does enabling proclaimed offenders to stay and concealing their true identities amount to harbouring under Section 19 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act?

(Judgment of the court was delivered by Dr.ANITA SUMANTH,J.) This is an appeal challenging an order of rejection of bail passed by the Special Court for Exclusive Trial of Bomb Blast Cases. The appellant was arrested on 14.11.2024 for alleged offences under Sections 341, 294(b), 307, 120B, 143, 147, 148 and 302 read with 149 of IPC besides Sections 15 read with 16, 18, 18B, 19 and 20 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (‘UAPA’).

The appellant was A19 in Supplementary chargesheet dated 09.05.2025, and was remanded to judicial custody on 15.11.2024. The case of the prosecution is that A1 to A5, A17 and A18 were engaged in dawah and had conspired, along with other accused, to disturb the communal harmony, undermine the secular fabric of India.

On 05.02.2019, there were altercations between the accused and one Ramalingam (since deceased) who had intervened and objected to the activities of the accused. The prosecution alleges that said Ramalingam was attacked by the accused on 05.02.2019 at 23.35 hrs, and Ramalingam subsequently succumbed to the injuries. Investigation was entrusted to NIA and a charge sheet had been filed against the accused. Cognizance were taken by the Court and original CC Nos. 2 and 3 of 2019 had been reassigned as Special SC case Nos. 20 and 21 of 2022.

The specific overt act attributed to the appellant was that he had harboured three proclaimed offenders (‘PO’), A12, A13 and A15 in a location in the forests around Kodaikanal, Dindugal District, and in a cottage by the name of Poombarai Cottage in Kodaikanal.

The argument of the appellant represented by Mr.T.Mohan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Mr.I.Abdul Basith is that there is no incriminating evidence seized at any time during the proceedings to justify his arrest, and no case has been made out as against him. Though Poomparai Palace, the lodge in Kodaikanal, had been leased out by him and was under his management, the appellant is unaware of, and unconcerned with any conspiracy by those who had taken rooms in the lodge.

As Section 19 of the UAPA requires that the accused has harboured persons with the knowledge that they are terrorists, it is for the prosecution to establish such knowledge on the part of the appellant. Mere allegations would not suffice, and no materials have been placed on record to establish the same. Appellant would further argue that the three accused are yet facing trial for, among other offences, communally sensitive murder which does not come within the ambit of terrorist act under Section 15 of the UAPA. That apart, the proclaimed offenders are not terrorists named in the Second Schedule to the Act.

The appellant has been in custody since 15.11.2024 and there is no justification for his continued incarceration, particularly as no prima facie case has been made out by the prosecution against him. The order of rejection does not take into account any of the relevant defences put forth. The conclusions by the trial Judge are cryptic and unsupported by any reasoning whatsoever.

A Supplementary charge sheet has been laid as against the appellant on 09.05.2025 and the Special Court is yet to frame charges in Special S.C.No.1 of 2026. The Prosecution list has 59 witnesses. Moreover, the Prosecution has filed another Supplementary charge sheet as against A20 where 68 witnesses are to be examined. There is hence no progress in the matter, despite which the appellant continues to languish in jail.

The appellant relies on the following decisions: 1. Mohamed Ibrahim v. Union of India1 2. Mohamed Hasan Kudhoos v. Union of India2 1 Crl.A.423 of 2019 dated 06.09.2019 (ranked as A9) 2 Crl.A.No.423 of 2019 dated 06.09.2019 (ranked as A10) 3. S.Nijam Ali @ Nijam @ Anr v. Union of India3 4. Rahman Sadiq v. Union of India4 5. Shafeer C v. Union of India5 6. Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors.6 7. National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali7 8. Vernon v. The State of Maharashtra8 9. Union of India v. K.A.Najeeb9

Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab10

Javed Gulam Nabi Shaik v. State of Maharashtra11

Sheikh Javed Iqbal v. State of Uttar Pradesh12

Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement13

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. Of Nct of Delhi)14

Arvind Dham v. Directorate of Enforcement15

MD Heydaitullah v. National Investigation Agency16

In RE: Creation of Special Exclusive Courts17

Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency, Jammu18

Tasleem Ahmed v. State Govt. Of NCT19

Suhail Ahmad Thokar v. National Investigation Agency20 10. Per contra, Mr.AR.L.Sundaresan, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for prosecution would argue that the investigation has yielded several incriminating evidences, and the testimony of witnesses, including the protected witnesses, point to the guilt of the appellant. Hence, 3 SLP (Crl.) No.6392 of 2023 dated 10.05.2024 4 Crl.A.No.955 of 2023 dated 25.07.2024 5 SLP (Crl. No.(s)14614 of 2025 dated 05.12.2025 6 Manu/SC/0526/1994 7 AIR 2019 SC 1734 8 Manu/SC/0805/2023 9 AIR 2021 SC 712 10 2024 INSC 92 11 Manu/SC/0609/2024 12 Manu/SC/0716/2024 13 2024 INSC 595 14 2026 INSC 2 15 Manu/SC/0028/2026 16 SLP (Crl.)No.8799 /2025 dated 10.02.2026 17 Suo Motu Writ Petition (Criminal) No.1/2026 with SLP (Crl.) No.8799 of 2025 dated 24.03.2026 18 2026 INSC 503 19 Special Leave to Appeal (Crl) No.2867 of 2026 dated 22.05.2026 20 SLP (Crl.) No.83 of 2024 dated 22.05.2026 considering the gravity of the offence, bail sought by the appellant had been rightly rejected by the trial Court. If released, the appellant may abscond to frustrate the trial and hamper further investigation, and also tamper with the evidence. 11. We have heard both learned counsel and perused the material papers. Original charge sheet had been laid as against 18 accused on 02.08.2019. A Supplementary charge sheet was laid on 09.05.2025, and the appellant is arrayed as A19 in S.C.No.20 of 2020, pending before the Special Court. A4 died in jail and per the written note given to us by the appellant on 24.06.2026, A12 and A13 though initially absconding, have been apprehended. A15 is also stated to be in custody. 12. One Ramalingam, a native of Tanjavur District, had raised objections to the religious propagation and dawah being carried out by the accused, some of whom were holding posts in the Popular Front of India, and others stated to be sympathisers. The verbal altercations had escalated, and diffused by the members of the public. However, according to the Prosecution, the intervention and objection by Ramalingam had angered the accused, and on instructions from the leaders of the Popular front of India, they had proceeded to do jihad as against Ramalingam by chopping off his hands. The cuts inflicted led to Ramalingam’s subsequent demise. 13. According to the prosecution, the murder of Ramalingam was part of an organised plan by the accused to overthrow democracy and overawe the State. They have averred that the appellant and other accused, are either post holders or active members of the Popular Front of India (PFI) and its political organization, the Social Democratic Party of India (SDPL), and all accused were part of the conspiracy to destabilise society, create religious disharmony, and overthrow democracy. The appellant is stated to be the Town Secretary of the Popular Front of India. 14. The appellant has admittedly, taken on lease, and is managing a lodge by the name of Poombarai Cottage (‘cottage’) in Kodaikanal, Dindigul District. The allegation as against him is that he had harboured proclaimed offenders, A12, A13 and A15 in the cottage and also elsewhere. 15. The Prosecution has relied on witness testimony and evidence recovered from the digital devises seized from the appellant’s possession at the time of his arrest as well as call data records. Some of the testimony is from witnesses who are protected, and admittedly, the appellant has not challenged the order passed under Section 44 of the UAPA, holding them to be protected. 16. Section 43D states that there shall be a modified application of certain provisions of the Indian Penal Code for the purposes of the UAPA and one such modification relates to the grant of bail. Section 43D(5), as relevant to this case, reads as follows:- 43D. Modified application of certain provisions of the Code. — .......

Tracing such power to Article 21 the Constitution, the Supreme Court reconciles the Constitutional guarantee with the statutory embargo of Section 43D(5) of the UAPA concluding that statutory restrictions like Section 43D(5) would not, per se, oust the ability of constitutional Courts to grant bail, if fundamental rights had been violated. Those observations, at para 18 are as below:- 18. It is thus clear to us that the presence of statutory restrictions like Section 43D (5) of UAPA perse does not oust the ability of 23 Foot Note Supra (9) Constitutional Courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution. Indeed, both the restrictions under a Statue as well as the powers exercisable under Constitutional Jurisdiction can be well harmonised. Whereas at commencement of proceedings, Courts are expected to appreciate the legislative policy against grant of bail but the rigours of such provisions will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence. Such an approach would safeguard against the possibility of provisions like Section 43D (5) of UAPA being used as the sole metric for denial of bail or for wholesale breach of constitutional right to speedy trial.

The incarceration in Najeeb’s case was for a period of five years and on the question of likely period of resolution of the case, the Court notes that there were 276 witnesses left to be examined, charges had been framed belatedly, and despite opportunities given to NIA, there had been no inclination to screen or prune the ‘endless list of witnesses’.

The Court also notes that 13 of the co-accused who had been convicted, had been given a sentence of less than 8 years R.I., and thus a legitimate inference could be drawn that even if found guilty, K.A.Najeeb would have been given an equal sentence. Since at that time, he had served five years, two thirds of the anticipated incarceration, ‘he had paid heavily for his acts of fleeing from justice’.

The Prosecution has argued before us that the ratio in Najeeb would be applicable only in similar onerous conditions, and the circumstances in the present case were distinguishable, in that, apart from there being a prima facie case against the appellant, the period of incarceration was much shorter, and the trial is being expedited. They undertake to prune the list of witnesses to the minimum and proceed with the matter expeditiously. However, seeing as the single Special Court is presently burdened with 30 on-going trials, their urgency would have to be subject to the scheduled business of the Court.

In Gurwinder Singh's24 case, rendered on 07.02.2024, two Hon’ble Judges expressed the following opinion in regard to the interpretation of Section 43D(5) of the UAPA: 18. The conventional idea in bail jurisprudence vis-à-vis ordinary penal offences that the discretion of Courts must tilt in favour of the oft-quoted phrase - ‘bail is the rule, jail is the exception’ – unless circumstances justify otherwise - does not find any place while dealing with bail applications under UAP Act. The ‘exercise’ of the general power to grant bail under the UAP Act is severely restrictive in scope. The form of the words used in proviso to Section 43D(5) – ‘shall not be released’ in contrast with the form of the words as found in Section 437(1) CrPC - ‘may be released’ – suggests the intention of the Legislature to make bail, the exception and jail, the rule. 19. The courts are, therefore, burdened with a sensitive task on hand. In dealing with bail applications under UAP Act, the courts are merely examining if there is justification to reject bail. The ‘justifications’ must be searched from the case diary and the final report submitted before the Special Court. The legislature has prescribed a low, ‘prima facie’ standard, as a measure of the degree of satisfaction, to be recorded by Court when scrutinising the justifications [materials on record]. This standard can be contrasted with the standard of ‘strong suspicion’, which is used by Courts while hearing applications for ‘discharge’. In fact, the Supreme Court in Zahoor Ali Watali MANU/SC/0458/2019:2019:INSC:456 (2019) 5 SCC 1 has noticed this difference, where it said: 24 Foot Note Supra (10) “In any case, the degree of satisfaction to be recorded by the Court for opining that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true, is lighter than the degree of satisfaction to be recorded for considering a discharge application or framing of charges in relation to offences under the 1967 Act.” 20. In this background, the test for rejection of bail is quite plain. Bail must be rejected as a ‘rule’, if after hearing the public prosecutor and after perusing the final report or Case Diary, the Court arrives at a conclusion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations are prima facie true. It is only if the test for rejection of bail is not satisfied – that the Courts would proceed to decide the bail application in accordance with the ‘tripod test’ (flight risk, influencing witnesses, tampering with evidence). This position is made clear by Sub-section (6) of Section 43D, which lays down that the restrictions, on granting of bail specified in Sub-section (5), are in addition to the restrictions under the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law for the time being in force on grant of bail.

Having considered both Watali’s as well as Najeeb's cases and several others, the bail application of that appellant was rejected and the manner on which Najeeb was distinguished is thus:- 32. The Appellant’s counsel has relied upon the case of KA Najeeb (supra) to back its contention that the appellant has been in jail for last five years which is contrary to law laid down in the said case. While this argument may appear compelling at first glance, it lacks depth and substance. In KA Najeeb’s case this court was confronted with a circumstance wherein except the respondent-accused, other co-accused had already undergone trial and were sentenced to imprisonment of not exceeding eight years therefore this court’s decision to consider bail was grounded in the anticipation of the impending sentence that the respondent- accused might face upon conviction and since the respondent-accused had already served portion of the maximum imprisonment i.e., more than five years, this court took it as a factor influencing its assessment to grant bail. Further, in KA Najeeb’s case the trial of the respondent-accused was severed from the other co-accused owing to his absconding and he was traced back in 2015 and was being separately tried thereafter and the NIA had filed a long list of witnesses that were left to be examined with reference to the said accused therefore this court was of the view of unlikelihood of completion of trial in near future. However, in the present case the trial is already under way and 22 witnesses including the protected witnesses have been examined. As already discussed, the material available on record indicates the involvement of the appellant in furtherance of terrorist activities backed by members of banned terrorist organization involving exchange of large quantum of money through different channels which needs to be deciphered and therefore in such a scenario if the appellant is released on bail there is every likelihood that he will influence the key witnesses of the case which might hamper the process of justice. Therefore, mere delay in trial pertaining to grave offences as one involved in the instant case cannot be used as a ground to grant bail. Hence, the aforesaid argument on the behalf the appellant cannot be accepted.

Likewise, in Gulfisha Fatima25, the Court proceeded to pass a detailed order discussing the role of various accused before either rejecting or granting bail imposing appropriate conditions.

In Syed Iftikhar Andrabi26, delivered on 18.05.2026, two Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court, after discussing in detail earlier case law on the subject, summarise the position of law from paragraph 27.6 onwards extracted below:- 27.6. The position of law emerging from Najeeb and Sk. Javed Iqbal is therefore clear: Watali cannot be invoked to justify indefinite incarceration of the accused under the UAP Act. For the aforesaid reasons, the attempt in Gurwinder to read Watali as laying down a general rule of denial of bail notwithstanding the period of incarceration is difficult to reconcile with this 25 Foot Note Supra (14) 26 Foot Note Supra (18) Court’s own subsequent clarification of what the ratio in Watali actually meant. 27.7. We also note that the Bench in Gurwinder formulated the so-called ‘twin-prong test’ governing grant of 64 bail under the UAP Act. It held that the inquiry under Section 43-D(5) must proceed in two sequential stages: first, whether the accusation is prima facie true; and second, only if the first question is answered in favour of the accused, whether ordinary bail considerations, such as, flight risk, tampering with evidence, or influencing witnesses, justify release. If the first stage of this twin-prong test is satisfied against the accused, bail becomes absolutely impermissible. 27.8. With respect, this test flows neither from the text of Section 43-D(5) of the UAP Act nor from Najeeb. In fact, on the contrary, it is in teeth of Najeeb which categorically stated that Section 43-D(5) of the UAP Act provides no more than another possible ground, namely that the accusations against the accused are prima facie true, for the competent court to refuse bail, in addition to the well-settled considerations like possibility of tampering with evidence, influencing the witnesses, or the accused evading the trial by absconding etc. If this twin-prong test is accepted, the State need only satisfy a low prima facie threshold while the trial may continue for years with the result that pre-trial incarceration begins to acquire a post-trial punitive character and even then, no court could ever grant bail no matter the length of period of such incarceration because the case stood prima facie made out against the accused. A plain reading of Najeeb will show that it was trying to prevent precisely this possibility from arising when it cautioned that Section 43-D(5) must not become ‘the sole metric for denial of bail or for wholesale breach of constitutional right to speedy trial.’ 27.9. Therefore, the caution of Najeeb is that continued incarceration cannot go unabated by a mere discharge by the State of the prima facie standard under Section 43-D(5). The judgment explicitly held that Section 43-D(5) will ‘melt down’ where prolonged incarceration and delayed trial produce a violation of Article 21. The constitutional inquiry in Najeeb therefore operated independent of, and notwithstanding, the statutory embargo of Section 43-D(5) in the realm of constitutional principles. That being the case, the formulation of Gurwinder becomes difficult to follow. Once the three-Judge Bench in Najeeb recognised that constitutional courts retain the authority to intervene despite the existence of a prima facie case against 66 the accused where prolonged incarceration and delayed trial would breach Article 21, the statutory embargo of Section 43-D(5) could no longer be treated as the gateway through which the prayer of bail must first pass. 27.10. As a matter of law, nothing further need be said except that in any case, constitutional courts can always intervene to grant bail despite satisfaction of prima facie threshold under Section 43-D(5), and the section need not control the grant of bail if the accused person’s liberty is infringed for a prolonged period of time. The power of the constitutional court to grant such a prayer cannot in our view be diminished by exercise of legislative power. 27.11. The holding in Najeeb was never that mere passage of time automatically entitles the accused to bail. Instead, the larger Bench recognised that where incarceration becomes unduly prolonged and the trial is unlikely to conclude within a reasonable time, the continued application of Section 43-D(5) becomes constitutionally suspect given the mandate of Article 21. In that sense, 67 Najeeb articulated a constitutional limitation on the operation of the statutory embargo of Section 43-D(5).

Finding a cleavage of opinion between various judgments, ultimately they followed the ratio of the judgment in Najeeb’s case and granted bail to that accused.

Vide order dated 22.05.2026, yet another Bench of the Supreme Court found a cleavage in the opinions expressed in various benches of the Court and referred the matter to the Hon’ble The Chief Justice for placing before an appropriate Bench to resolve the dissonance.

The most recent pronouncement has been rendered by three Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court on 22.05.2026, incidentally, the same date as the judgement in Suhail Ahmad Thokar27. Bail has been granted to that accused. The allegation as against him was that he was involved in providing refuge to members of a proscribed organisation, a charge similar to the one in the present case. That accused had been in incarceration since 20.10.2021, and bail had been granted by the Supreme Court after incarceration of 4 years and 8 months.

The Bench has also noted that the conclusion of trial may take some time, and that some of his co-accused had been enlarged on bail. While allowing the appeal, the Court granted liberty to the NIA Court to impose such conditions as it may deem appropriate, such as ensuring weekly presence of the appellant or other conditions in order to ensure his attendance and co-operation with the ongoing trial.

Pending the reference to Hon’ble The Chief Justice of India, a decision regarding the grant of bail in cases attracting Section 43D(5) would thus, as on date, rest on (i) the role of the accused in the prosecution’s case as outlined by the prima facie evidence placed before the Court, (ii) the period of incarceration as on date of consideration and (iii) the tempo with which the trial is proceeding and likely time for its completion. All the aforesaid parameters 27 Foot Note Supra (20) are to be set in the context of the protection guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

Coming to the first point, it is admitted that the accused was managing a lodge in Kodaikanal. Section 19 of the UAPA which is invoked as against the appellant requires the accused to voluntarily and knowingly harbour or conceal or attempt to harbour or conceal any person knowing that such person is a terrorist.

A12, A13 and A15 have been declared as proclaimed offenders (‘PO’) vide an order of the Special Court dated 05.07.2021.There have been changes to the array of the accused since the filing of the original charge sheet, and hence, and in the interests of clarity, we refer to all accused including the three POs who the appellant is stated to have harboured, per their array in original charge sheet dated 02.08.2019, A12 - Mohammed Ali Jinna, A13 - Abdul Majith and A15 – Shahul Hameed.

One more thing, the names of A12 and the appellant are substantially the same except for an ‘h’ in ‘Jinnah’ (the appellant) which does not feature in the surname of A12 which is ‘Jinna’. There are instances where the two names have been mixed up both in the charge sheets and in the order of the Special Court.

It is admitted that A12 and A15 had stayed in the lodge, one of them as the manager. The Prosecution has relied on the call-details to say that there was close inter-connectivity between the appellant and the three proclaimed offenders. The mobile numbers used by the POs are stated to have been registered in the name of the appellant.

The Prosecution also alleges that there was no co-operation extended by the appellant to facilitate the investigation of the POs especially as the mobile numbers that the POs had been using were in his name and they had been found to be switched off.

We have examined the testimony of the witnesses, including unredacted depositions of the protected witnesses L.Ws 7, 8, 9, 15, 16, 19, 28, 44 and 46, that have been placed before us. All protected witnesses know the appellant well. They speak to their knowledge about the proclaimed offenders as well.

They have been shown two photographs, one, a wanted photograph issued by the NIA containing the pictures of five individuals, and the second, a photograph of four individuals. Both photographs contain individual photographs of the proclaimed offenders. Some of the protected witnesses have been shown a separate photograph of the appellant and have identified him as well.

The testimony reveal that the appellant was in frequent touch with the POs in several locations. Some of the witnesses refer to the appellant expressing reticence in sharing their details and identities with the witnesses. In many instances, the witnesses refer to pseudonyms or false identities that the appellant had shared with them. It was only in the course of the investigation when they saw the photographs that they claim to have come to know of their real names. This is a cause for some concern as it indicates that the appellant had wanted to keep their identities secret.

The fact that multiple witnesses speak about the false identities with which the appellant had identified the POs prima facie indicates consistency among their testimonies, and is one aspect that would bring the matter within the ambit of harbouring.

L.Ws 7, 8 and 9 speak to their knowledge about the witness and the fact that he had brought two of the proclaimed offenders to live in the forest ranges. The appellant had assisted in housing them temporarily in shelters, was regularly providing for their needs, and some of the L.Ws had obtained SIM cards for them at the instance of the appellant. These witnesses too had been given false names of the POs.

Section 212 of the IPC, dealing with harbouring of offenders, refers to harbouring or concealing a person who one has reason to believe, or knows has committed an offence, with the intention of screening him from legal punishment, and Section 19 of the UAPA mirrors that understanding.

What emanates from a reading of the depositions, including the unredacted testimony, is that the appellant not only knew the POs well, but had also enabled their stay in two locations, the forest ranges and the cottage. As far as the cottage is concerned, the appellant appears to have camouflaged their true identities from the guests and enabled their phone connections. Earlier, they had been taken to stay in the forest ranges, accommodation made ready for them, and steps taken by the appellant to protect them and facilitate their stay away from public gaze. In our view, this, prima facie, amounts to harbouring.

The specific argument advanced is that Section 19 can be invoked only in the case of harbouring of terrorists and since, in this case, the POs are, as of now, only charged with commission of terrorist activities, the charge against the appellant is premature and cannot be sustained till, and only if, the primary charge against the POs is sustained finally.

It is correct that the PO’s are under trial for alleged offences branding them as terrorists and as having engaged in terrorists acts. It is also correct that they are not named as terrorists under the Fourth Schedule to the Act. However, we are of the considered view that the aforesaid factual position cannot enure to the benefit of the appellant at this stage, as it would, as a sequitur, defeat the purpose of Section 43D(5).

Coming to the second point being, the period of incarceration, the appellant has been in custody since 14.11.2024, one year and nine months as on date. In the following cases where bail was granted at the intervention of the Courts, the period of incarceration suffered by those accused is, Mohamed Ibrahim, 7 months, Mohamed Hasan Kudhoos, 7 months, in S.Nijam Ali 5 years and 2 months, Rahman Sadiq for 3 years, Shafeer C, 1 year and 4 months, Najeeb, over 5 years, Javed Gulam Nabi Shaik, 4 years and Manish Sisodia, 17 months.

Hence, the length of the period served is one of the factors to decide the grant of bail and, there is no minimum period to serve as a yardstick for application of the principles in Najeeb’s case.

As to the progress in the trial, original and supplementary charge sheets have been filed in this case on 02.08.2019 and 09.05.2025. The witness list has been pruned to 59 witnesses. There is merit in the grievance of the appellant relating to delay in completion of trial. We have, in Crl.A.No.328 of 2025 referred to the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Re:Creation of Special Exclusive Courts and directed the State and Central Governments to constitute two exclusive Special Courts, listing that matter on 24.09.2026 for reporting compliance. We hope that this serves to alleviate this legitimate grievance of the appellant.

The appellant has sought parity with A10 in the charge sheet who was granted bail by this Court on 06.09.2019. We have perused that judgement carefully. The overt act attributed to that accused is set out in paragraph 17 of that decision extracted below: 17. On perusal of the same it is seen that the appellant had came to know about the happening and the occurrence much later. This appellant was not in consultation in any manner and had no knowledge prior to the occurrence. According to the prosecution, the appellant was contacted and was asked to provide shelter to the party cadres. The appellant had reached karaikal on 06.02.2019 early morning at about 06.00 a.m, by that time A6 and A7 already reached the office of the PFI/SDPI. Thereafter at about 08.30 a.m the other accused A8 and A13 to A15 had reached the appellant. The appellant made accommodation in a hut and on the same day they had left. This is the only overtact against the appellant. The locked hut was not searched, the owner of the hut was not examined. The other place is the political office place, which is a common place. Other than this there is no material against the appellant. In view of the above the petitioner is ordered to be enlarged on bail.

On a comparison of the overt acts of that accused with the present appellant, we find the same distinguishable. We thus conclude that no benefit may enure to this appellant from that case.

This appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs. (A.S.M.,J.) (S.M.,J.) 07.09.2026