Does Section 31(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act mandate delivery of a certified copy of the award?

Questioning the correctness of the order dated 10.12.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge in O.P.No.443 of 2020, dismissing the challenge to the arbitral award passed by the first respondent, the unsuccessful petitioner has filed this appeal.

The factual matrix giving rise to the present appeal is narrated hereunder: 2.1. On 19.5.2014, the appellant floated a tender for supply of PLB Pipes and accessories. The second respondent was declared as L1 bidder and two purchaser orders were issued to it. The supply and payment in respect of both the purchase orders was completed between 2014 and 2016 and there were no pending bills with the appellant and the last bill was paid on 31.3.2016. After the works under the contract were satisfactorily completed, the performance bank guarantee amount was also returned to the second respondent. 2.2. When things stood thus, the appellant received a notice dated 13.11.2018 from the Rajasthan Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, Jaipur [RMSEFC], to resolve the dispute regarding delayed payment. It is from that notice that the appellant cognized that the second respondent has raised a dispute before the RMSEFC alleging delay in payment of bills based on Section 15 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 [MSME Act]. 2.3. The aforesaid notice was received by the appellant on 26.11.2018, intimating that the hearing is scheduled on 28.11.2018. On 11.12.2018, the appellant received the claim statement and documents, from which it came to light that the second respondent alleged delayed payment in respect of 19 invoices and claimed interest to the tune of Rs.1,61,00,317/- from the appellant. 2.4. The appellant, thereafter, received a legal notice dated 2.3.2020 from the second respondent, enclosing a copy of the award dated 23.10.2019, demanding payment of Rs.2,37,29,229/- in line with the order passed by the RMSEFC. Albeit the appellant, vide letter dated 7.3.2020, addressed to the RMSEFC informed non-receipt of any notice of hearing or the final order dated 23.10.2019, the certified copy of the award was not furnished. 2.5. The efforts put in by the appellant to challenge the award before the learned Single Judge proved unavailing owing to non- receipt of the original award copy till 26.6.2020. In fact, the petition filed through e-mail on 4.6.2020 challenging the award was returned by the Registry on 5.6.2020. On receipt of the certified copy of the award on 26.6.2020, the appellant filed O.P.No.443 of 2020 on 8.7.2020 assailing the award dated 23.10.2019. 2.6. A learned Single Judge of this court, vide order dated 10.12.2020, dismissed the petition as barred by limitation. 2.7. Assailing the said order, the appellant filed the present appeal. 2.8. A Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, vide judgment dated 15.3.2024, allowed the appeal and set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction, concordant with the observations made in the orders even dated 15.3.2024 in W.A.Nos.1839 and 1792 of 2021 [between the same parties]. It was further held that once the appellant disputed the jurisdiction of the RMSEFC on the ground that they have not followed the procedure postulated under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 [A&C Act], the award passed by the RMSEFC is not at all an arbitral award and the parties were granted liberty to agitate the issues before the appropriate forum in accordance with law. 2.9. Impugning the said judgment, the appellant filed appeal before the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.4463 of 2025. The Supreme Court, vide order dated 28.3.2025, set aside the order passed by the Division Bench and restored the appeal to the file of this Court with a request to take an appropriate decision within a period of three months thereof, considering all contentions of the parties, barring the issue of territorial jurisdiction. The observations and directions of the Supreme Court read thus: “4. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, we are of the view that the appeal filed by the appellant under Section 37 of the Act, 1996 before the High Court should have been heard on its own merits rather than going into the issue of its maintainability. 5. The learned counsel appearing for Respondent No.2 fairly submitted that the matter may be remitted to the High Court with a direction to hear the OSA No.101/2021 on its own merits. 6. In such circumstances, referred to above, the impugned order of the High Court is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court. The OSA No.101/2021 is ordered to be restored to its original file. The High Court shall hear the parties on merits and take an appropriate decision in accordance with law within a period of three months from today. 7. It shall be open for the parties to raise all contentions available to them in law, excepting the issue of territorial jurisdiction. 8. The Appeal is disposed of in above terms.” 2.10. As a sequitur, the appeal was listed before us and was heard at length.

Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents available on record.

The finding of fact, which has been recorded by the learned Single Judge, is to the effect that the copy of the award was received by the appellant on 4.11.2019 and, therefore, as provided under Section 34(3) of the A&C Act, limitation would commence from that day. Relying upon various judicial pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and other High Courts, including this Court, the learned Single Judge, while opining that period of limitation commences from the date of receipt of the copy of the award, i.e., 4.11.2019, and finding that the application under Section 34 of the A&C Act was filed on 9.7.2020, has finally concluded that not only the period of three months as provided under Section 34(3) of the A&C Act had expired, but even maximum condonable period of thirty days has expired much before the date of filing, i.e., 9.7.2020.

The submission of the appellant that the award received in the Despatch Section was found to be in Hindi and, therefore, it was thereafter internally processed, including segregation, handing over the same to the Hindi Section, instead of delivering it to the Legal Section, and then brought to the notice of Legal Section, was noted by the learned Single Judge.

The further ground raised by the appellant was that sudden announcement of VRS and requirement of immediate implementation created lot of chaos among BSNL employees and there being difficulty in obtaining services of Hindi Translation, etc., some delay occurred.

The other submission made that after receipt of letter dated 2.3.2020 from the supplier counsel by the BSNL on 5.3.2020, the whole matter got activated, certified copy of the impugned award was obtained from RMSEFC on 13.6.2020, was also taken note of in the impugned order by the learned Single Judge.

From the above case set up by the appellant, it is an admitted position on record that the award was received at the BSNL office on 4.11.2019, but thereafter it was subjected to various internal processes until the application under Section 34 of the A&C Act was filed on 9.7.2020.

The learned Single Judge, in the aforesaid factual premise, proceeded to examine the case in the light of Section 34(3) of the A&C Act and concluded that the application was barred by limitation.

The other submission made by the appellant that what was received on 4.11.2019 was only a photocopy was also taken into consideration by the learned Single Judge and relying upon various judicial pronouncements, it was finally concluded that delivery of a signed copy of the award to the party is sufficient compliance of the provision contained in Section 31(5) of the A&C Act.

Once there is a finding on fact that signed copy of the award was received by the appellant on 4.11.2019, applying the provisions, upon computation of the period of limitation of three months (not in days, but in units of month) and adding to the same another thirty days as the maximum period for which delay could be condoned, it is ostensible that even by invoking the condonation clause up to the maximum of thirty days and not thereafter, the application was required to be filed latest by 6.3.2020. Therefore, it is abundantly clear that even the application filed through email on 4.6.2020, followed by proper submission on 9.7.2020, was barred by limitation.

In view of series of decisions rendered by the Supreme Court and various High Courts, including this High Court, it is a well settled legal position that, in the matter of filing an application under Section 34 of the A&C Act, the period of limitation is three months. It is equally well settled that the maximum period for which delay could be condoned is thirty days, but not thereafter. On this aspect, we do not intend to burden our decision with the authorities settling the aforesaid legal position.

The submission that much time was consumed in getting the translated version of the award through the official process and on account of various other circumstances stated in the affidavit, the delay was required to be condoned, has to be rejected at the threshold. That only could constitute a cause for condoning the delay, if at all the law permitted condonation of delay beyond thirty days after the expiry of limitation of three months. In view of the settled legal position, all the causes shown to justify the delay, therefore, pale into insignificance.

One of the submissions of learned counsel for the appellant has been that it had received the certified copy of the award from RMSEFC only on 13.6.2020. This, according to learned counsel for the appellant, should be considered as the date of delivery of copy of the award to the party as mandated under Section 31(5) of the A&C Act. He hastened to add that supply of a photocopy of the award is not sufficient compliance of the mandate of Section 31(5) of the A&C Act, as it was not a certified copy. In support of the submission, various decisions, referred to above, have been relied upon.

In our considered opinion, the provision contained in Section 31(5) of the A&C Act, on its just, fair and logical interpretation, and in view of several judicial pronouncements, referred to herein below, does not mandate delivery of certified copy of the award. The legal requirement would be substantially complied with if a xerox/photocopy of the award signed by the arbitrator is duly supplied to the party.

In the case of Union of India v. Tecco Trichy Engineers and Contractors (supra), on facts, it was found that the Chief Engineer had signed on behalf of the Union of India the agreement entered into with the respondent therein. In the arbitral proceedings, the Chief Engineer represented the Union of India and notices, during proceedings of arbitration, were served on the Chief Engineer. The Chief Engineer was found to be directly concerned with the arbitration, as the subject matter of arbitration relates to the department of the Chief Engineer and he had direct knowledge of the arbitral proceedings and the question involved before the arbitrator. It was also found, on facts, that the General Manager of the Railways had only referred the matter for arbitration as required under the contract, but he cannot be said to be aware of the question involved in the arbitration, nor the factual aspect in detail, on the basis of which the arbiral tribunal decided the issue before it, unless they were brought to his notice by the officer dealing with the arbitration and who was in-charge of those proceedings. On such factual premise, it was held that service of arbitral award on the General Manager by way of receipt in his inwards office cannot be taken to be sufficient notice so as to activate the department to take appropriate steps in respect of and in regard to the award passed by the arbitrator to constitute the starting point of limitation for the purposes of Section 34(3) of the A&C Act. It was further held that the service of notice on the Chief Engineer on 19.3.2001 would be the starting point of limitation to challenge the award in the court. It was in that context that the following pertaining observations were made:

The other decision in the case of The State of Maharashtra and others v. ARK Builders Private Limited (supra) also does not come to the aid of the appellant. The issue which arose for consideration in the case was whether the period of limitation for making an application under Section 34 of the A&C Act for setting aside an arbitral award is to be reckoned from the date a copy of the award is received by the objector by any means and from any source, or it would start running from the date a signed copy of the award is delivered to him by the arbitrator. On facts, in that case, on 20.3.2003, the arbitrator gave a copy of the award signed by him to the claimant, in whose favour the award was made. No copy of the award was, however, given to the objector, the other party to the proceedings, because the said party had failed to pay the costs of arbitration. The claimant, in whose favour the award was passed, submitted a copy of the award in the office of the Executive Engineer on 29.3.2003. Thereafter, a decision was taken to challenge the award before the appropriate forum, but for want of copy of the award from the arbitrator, the application could not be made. Finally, on a request made, a copy of the award was received from the arbitrator. The xerox/certified copy of the award was received from the arbitrator on 19.1.2004 and only thereafter, on 28.1.2004, an application under Section 34 of the A&C Act was filed. Taking into consideration the submissions of learned counsel for the parties; the statutory scheme postulated under Sections 31(5) and 34(3) of the A&C Act; and the decision in the case of Union of India v. Tecco Trichy Engineers and Contractors (supra), it was held that the period of limitation prescribed under Section 34(3) of the A&C Act would start running only from the date a signed copy of the award is delivered to/received by the party making the application for setting it aside under Section 34 of the A&C Act. It was held that if the law prescribes that a copy of the order/award is to be communicated, delivered, dispatched, forwarded, rendered or sent to the parties concerned in a particular way and in case the law also sets a period of limitation for challenging the order/award in question by the aggrieved party, then the period of limitation can only commence from the date on which the order/award was received by the party concerned in the manner prescribed by the law. The background in which the aforesaid decision was rendered is that the duly signed copy of the award was received from the Arbitrator on 19.1.2004. Therefore, what was under consideration before the Court on the facts of that case was as to whether the ordinary copy of the award supplied by the claimant would trigger commencement of period of limitation as provided under Section 34(3) of the A&C Act. What was taken into consideration was the statutory prescription as engrafted under Section 31(5) of the A&C Act that an arbitral award shall be made in writing and shall be signed by the members of the arbitral tribunal and delivered to each party. Therefore, the consideration of the court was in the context whether a “signed copy” was supplied to the other party. On facts, having found that signed copy was delivered on 19.1.2004, the observations were made as below:

In the case of Anilkumar Jinabhai Patel (D) Through LRs v. Pravinchandra Jinabhai Patel and others (supra), what was held by the Supreme Court by placing reliance on the decisions in Union of India v. Tecco Trichy Engineers and Contractors (supra), and The State of Maharashtra and others v. ARK Builders Private Limited (supra), was that the limitation period under Section 34(3) of the A&C Act would only commence on the date when the signed copy of the award is delivered to the party. Again, that decision turned on the factual premise that the copy of the award supplied was signed copy of the award or not.

In the case of Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd v. Navigant Technologies Private Limited (supra), what was held was that the A&C Act requires delivery of a signed copy of the arbitral award to the parties and it is only from that date the period of limitation for filing objections under Section 34 of the A&C Act would commence. The proposition of law laid down therein was that there was no finality in the award, except after it is signed, because signing of the award gives legal effect and finality to the award and, therefore, the date on which a signed copy of the award is provided to the parties is the crucial date in arbitral proceedings under the A&C Act.

It is profitable to refer to a recent judicial pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Motilal Agarwala v. State of West Bengal and another⁷. The factual foundation as laid in the aforesaid case for decision making was that, upon filing of an application under Section 34 of the A&C Act, for the purposes of reckoning the period of three months of limitation provided under the A&C Act, the date of receipt of xerox copy of the award by the authorised representative of the State was taken as the date of commencement of the period of limitation and the stand taken by the State was that till 12.2.2014, it had no idea at all about the passing of the arbitral award and it was only when execution proceedings were initiated application under Section 34 of the A&C Act was preferred on 20.3.2014. The question which arose for consideration was whether receipt of a xerox copy of the award by the Assistant Engineer, who was not a party to the arbitration proceedings, could be treated as proper delivery of award in terms of the mandate of Section 31(5) of the A&C Act. It was held that delivery of a copy of the award to the Assistant Engineer, who was not a party to the arbitration and who was not in a decision making capacity to take further recourse on the award, would not be a valid service of award. Relying upon the statutory scheme of Section 31(5) read with Section 34(3) of the A&C Act and the decisions rendered in the cases of Union of India v. Tecco Trichy Engineers and Contractors (supra) and Benarsi Krishna Committee v. Karmyogi Shelters Private Limited⁸, it was authoritatively held as under:

On the other hand, delivery of a xerox/photocopy of the award to the party, including delivery by email, would be sufficient compliance of the provisions of Section 31(5) of the A&C Act. It is to be noted that the language of Section 31(5) of the A&C Act is that a signed copy of the award shall be delivered to each party. The legal requirement is of delivery of a signed copy. In the absence of there being any other expression either prefixed or suffixed to the aforesaid provision, much less found in any other provision of the A&C Act dealing with form and contents of the arbitral award, it cannot be said that the legal mandate is that only a certified signed copy must be delivered to each party. The legislative intent behind the said provision is to ensure the authenticity of the award. The delivery of signed copy, be it photocopy or email copy, satisfies the legal intent.

In the present age of technology, we find no reason to restrict the meaning of the expression “signed copy” as contained in Section 31(5) of the A&C Act only to certified copy. It is relevant to note that the words employed in Section 31(5) of the A&C Act are “signed copy” and not “signed award”. The purpose of qualifying the word “copy” with “signed” is for the sake of authentication of the copy. A copy could mean a document prepared from the original, which is accurate or true and full reproduction of the original.

In Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. Union of India⁹, it has been held as below:

The aforesaid line of reasoning has been adopted in various decisions, viz., (i) Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board v. Lakhvinder Singh¹⁰; (ii) National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation of Indian Ltd v. R.Piyarelall Import and Export Ltd¹¹; and (iii) Continental Telepower Industries Ltd v. Union of India¹².

As an upshot of the above discussion, we have no hesitation to hold that delivery of a photocopy of the arbitral award on the appellant on 4.11.2019, even if it was not a certified copy of the award or not delivered directly to the appellant by the arbitrator, it being a signed copy of the award, is sufficient compliance of the mandate of Section 31(5) of the A&C Act. Therefore, the period of limitation commenced from that day. If that be so, it is crystal clear that the date on which the application under Section 34 of the A&C Act was presented before the Court – whether through email or digital mode – was clearly barred by limitation. Ergo, the order passed by the learned Single Judge is just and in accordance with law and warrants no interference. Appeal, being sans substratum, is dismissed. The parties shall bear their respective costs. (MANINDRA MOHAN SHRIVASTAVA, CJ) (SUNDER MOHAN,J) 04.11.2025