Under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, how is a landlord's 'bona fide requirement' to be assessed?

East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 — s.13 — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — s.115 — Bona fide requirement — Revisional jurisdiction — Concurrent findings of fact — East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 — s.13 — Bona fide requirement — No mathematical formula — Held: Bona fide requirement is a felt need, real, sincere and honest, judged by placing oneself in the landlord's position; whether a landlord's decision falls within it turns on the facts of each case and cannot be determined by a mathematical formula. (¶8) East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 — s.13 — Bona fide requirement survives on the son — Held further: Where the requirement was pleaded for both the landlady and her son and concurrently found proved, the death of the landlady during the proceedings does not defeat it, the need attaching also to the son. (¶9) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — s.115 — Revisional jurisdiction — Concurrent findings — Held further: Revisional jurisdiction is limited and does not permit the High Court to reappreciate evidence or substitute its own view; it may interfere only where the findings are perverse or the material evidence has not been considered. The High Court, having reversed concurrent findings on a plausible view, exceeded its jurisdiction. Eviction restored. Appeal allowed. (¶10)

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3.1 At the outset, it is noted that the relationship of landlord-tenant is undisputed with the rental of the tenancy at Rs.112.50 per month. In response to the eviction petition, it was submitted that on 3rd June 2003, the respondent-tenant had tendered the rent as claimed with effect from 17 th July 1998 till 9th June 2003 (the entire period of unpaid rent) along with Rs. 1000 as interest and Rs. 1100 as cost, totalling to an amount of Rs. 8740/- which was accepted. On the ground of bona fide requirement, the same was denied as illusionary primarily on the ground that it was inconceivable to the respondent-tenant that an 80-year-old woman would like to run a business and also that she had another shop that was being rented out by her son Adarsh Mohan, and the entire litigation is at his behest, despite the fact that one of the 3 shops that have been constructed by the appellant- landlord was still vacant. 3.2. A total of 8 issues were framed by the RA. Below is a tabular representation thereof: Sr.No Issue Outcome 1. Whether the tendered arrears of In favour of the Respondent- rent made by the Respondents Tenant are invalid? 2. Whether the petitioner requires In favour of the Appellant- the shop in question in her Landlord personal capacity and instead of her son Madan Mohan? 3. Whether the petitioner and her In favour of the Appellant- son Madan Mohan are not in Landlord possession of any other non- 4 CR No. 1573 of 2011 dated 6th August 2018 residential property except this shop within Nabha limits?

3.4 The High Court, speaking through learned Single Judge, differed with the opinions summarised above. Taking note of Section 13 of the Act, and the pleadings of the parties, it was observed that despite the fact having been pointed out, Kamla Devi denied that one of her shops was lying vacant. In the witness box as well, she stated that Adarsh Mohan, was running his business from one of the shops and in the other one there was some garbage that had been stored. The Court further observed that both the RA and AA had misread the evidence to held that Adarsh Mohan had been using the third shop as a store – this, according to the learned Single Judge was not borne out of any record. She had, in fact, concealed the existence of the third shop and only in the evidence she stated that the third shop was being used by Adarsh Mohan. As such, she did not approach the Court with clean hands. The revision petition was allowed.

“44. Rent control legislation are quintessentially social legislation that were enacted in the 1940s and 1950s to protect and curb exploitation of tenants in view of the prevailing socio-economic conditions due to large scale immigration to towns and cities, increase in population, lack of housing facilities as landed property was owned by a few well- off and wealthy persons. The rent control legislation, therefore, interfered with the general freedom of contract and right of the landlord to seek eviction under the Transfer of Property Act. However, all such legislations invariably also provide for balancing the conflicting rights of the landlords. In several decisions, this Court has emphasised that there is a need for balancing the two rival interests as has been observed in Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of Maharashtra [Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 2 SCC 1] , Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal [Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, (2002) 5 SCC 397] , Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India [Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India, (2008) 5 SCC 287] and in the recent decision in Vinod Kumar v. Ashok Kumar Gandhi [Vinod Kumar v. Ashok Kumar Gandhi, (2019) 17 SCC 237]”

6.1 First and foremost, the existence of the landlord-tenant relationship is essential. While it is true that a landlord has the right to enjoy his own property, the law does not grant its refuge to any arbitrary action, and so a landlord simply by virtue of that status, cannot show someone the door without the due process of law. It is here that bona fide requirement comes in. Bona fide translates to ‘in good faith’ which then predicates the requirement that may be faced by a landlord. A co-ordinate Bench in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Mahesh Chand Gupta[^6], held thus:

“13… “The degree of intensity contemplated by “requires” is much more higher than in mere desire. The phrase “required bona fide” is suggestive of legislative intent that a mere desire which is the outcome of whim or fancy is not taken note of by the rent control legislation. A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contradistinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle him to seek ejectment of the tenant. Looked at from this angle, any setting of the facts and circumstances protruding the need of the landlord and its bona fides would be capable of successfully withstanding the test of objective determination by the court. The judge of facts should place himself in the armchair of the landlord and then ask the question to himself — whether in the given facts substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the positive, the need is bona fide. The failure on the part of the landlord to substantiate the pleaded need, or, in a given case, positive material brought on record by the tenant enabling the court drawing an inference that the reality was to the contrary and the landlord was merely attempting at finding out a pretence or pretext for getting rid of the tenant, would be enough to persuade the court certainly to deny its judicial assistance to the landlord. Once the court is satisfied of the bona fides of the need of the landlord for the premises or additional premises by applying objective standards then in the matter of choosing out of more than one accommodation available to the landlord his subjective choice shall be respected by the court. The court would permit the landlord to satisfy the proven need by choosing the accommodation which the landlord feels would be most suited for the purpose; the court would not in such a case thrust its own wisdom upon the choice of the landlord by holding that not one but the other accommodation must be accepted by the landlord to satisfy his such need. In short, the concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities of life. An approach either too liberal or too conservative or pedantic must be guarded against.” In Baldev Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini[^7], ‘bona fide requirement’ was discussed in the following terms with reference to the earlier decisions in Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan[^8]; Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India[^9], “14. The phrase “bona fide requirement” or “bona fide need” or “required reasonably in good faith” or “required”, occurs in almost all Rent Control Acts with the underlying legislative intent which has been considered and demonstrated innumerable times by various High Courts as also by this Court, some of which we would like to refer to. In Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander [(1988) 3 SCC 131] it is said that the bona fide need should be genuine and honest, conceived in good faith. It was also indicated that the landlord's desire for possession, however honest it might otherwise be, has inevitably a subjective element in it, and that desire, to become a “requirement” in law must have the objective element of a “need”, which can be decided only by taking all the relevant circumstances into consideration so that the protection afforded to a tenant is not rendered illusory or whittled down.” (emphasis supplied) 7. As can be seen from the above, the Court has actively engaged with the question of ‘bona fide requirement’ right from the advent of Rent Control legislations. Across the country and across numerous statutes, this requirement is found and defined. 8. Whether or not, in a particular set of circumstances a landlord’s decision to ask his tenant to vacate, falls within ‘bona fide requirement’ is not something that can be determined by a mathematical formula. As such, let us examine the facts of the present case.