Can an eligibility criteria prescribed in a tender be relaxed where the participant falls short of the required experience by 39 days?
Tamil Nadu Transparency in Tenders Act, 1998 — s.11 — Tender — Eligibility criteria — Rejection at the technical stage — Missing documents clause — Judicial review of tenders —
Tender — Eligibility criteria — Mandatory, not relaxable —
Held: An eligibility criteria prescribed in a tender is mandatory and can never be relaxed, since any relaxation would cause injustice to those who would have participated had they known that the eligibility criteria was flexible in nature. (¶36, 39)
Tender document — Uploading in a particular manner — No relaxation —
Held further: Where a tender document has to be uploaded in a particular manner, it should be uploaded only in that particular manner or not at all; non-submission of the income tax returns required for the preceding three financial years is fatal. (¶46, 47, 55)
Tender — Clause for obtaining missing documents — Scope —
Held further: A clause permitting missing documents to be called for applies only where a document mentioned in the list was not uploaded; it places no obligation on the tender inviting authority to advise a participant to upload documents which are mandatory in nature. (¶55)
Judicial review of tenders — No equity in commercial matters —
Held further: There can be no equity in commercial matters, and it is not for a participant to dictate how the bids are to be evaluated and examined; the rejection at the technical stage cannot be faulted. Writ Appeals dismissed. (¶48, 56, 57)
Can an eligibility criteria prescribed in a tender be relaxed where the participant falls short of the required experience by 39 days?
No. The eligibility criteria is mandatory and could never be relaxed by the tender inviting authority. Any relaxation would cause injustice to those who would have participated, had they known that the eligibility criteria was flexible in nature. The appellant can never claim that this short fall of 39 days in experience should be overlooked on the ground that the work was seasonal in nature. [¶36, ¶40, ¶41, ¶43]
Is the non-submission of an income tax return expressly required by a tender document fatal, where the document was available with the bidder but not uploaded?
Yes. When a particular thing has to be done in a particular manner, it has to be done in that particular manner or not at all; if a tender document has to be uploaded in a particular manner, it should be uploaded only in that particular manner and there cannot be any relaxation. It is not only the income tax returns which should have been filed, but also the audited balance sheet and profit and loss account for that financial year, and by non-submission the bid necessarily had to be rejected. [¶41, ¶46, ¶47, ¶55]
Does a tender clause providing for obtaining missing documents oblige the tender inviting authority to call for a mandatory document the bidder never mentioned?
No. The clause applies only where a particular document had been mentioned in the list of documents while uploading tender papers and had not been uploaded — that document alone could subsequently be uploaded by following the procedure. The clause does not give leverage to call upon a participant to upload the documents which are required to be uploaded, and there was certainly no obligation on the first respondent to go and advise every participant to upload documents which are mandatory in nature. [¶55]
Can an unsuccessful bidder require a tender to be cancelled on the ground that only a single tenderer was left after his own bid was rejected?
No. It is not for the participant to dictate as to how the bids are to be evaluated and examined; it is for the tender inviting authority to take a decision. Evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions, principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance, and there cannot be any equity in commercial matters. [¶48, ¶56]
What did the Court finally decide?
The Writ Appeals were dismissed with no order as to costs and the connected miscellaneous petitions closed. The Court held that the first respondent could never be faulted for having rejected the tender of the appellant at the technical stage: the appellant had failed to satisfy the experience criteria, had failed to upload the income tax returns for the financial year 2024-25, and had failed to file an appeal under Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Transparency in Tenders Act, 1998. [¶57, ¶58]
Prepared by the LexStreak Editorial Desk — verify against the judgment.
“36. This eligibility criteria is mandatory. Any relaxation would cause injustice to those, who would have participated, had they known that the eligibility criteria was flexible in nature.”
“41. We hold that the appellant can never claim that this short fall of 39 days in experience should be overlooked on the ground that the work was seasonal in nature. The appellant can also never claim that the non- submission of the income tax returns for the financial year 2024-25 was not fatal and should be overlooked by the first respondent. As a matter of fact, it is not only the income tax returns which should have been filed, but also, the audited balance sheet and profit and loss account for the said financial year. We hold that by non-submission of the said income tax returns and the supporting documents, the bid of the appellant necessarily had to be rejected.”
“47. Thus, if a tender document has to be uploaded in a particular manner, it should be uploaded only in that particular manner and there cannot be any relaxation.”
“55. This clause had been misread by the appellant. If, while uploading tender papers, there had been mention about a particular document and the same had not been uploaded, then that document which had been mentioned in the list of documents and not uploaded, alone could be subsequently uploaded by following the procedure under Clause-8. This clause does not give leverage to the first respondent to call upon a participant in the tender to upload the documents which are required to be uploaded. The fact that the document was in the possession of the participant to the tender process would be a fact known only to such participant. There was certainly no obligation placed for the first respondent to go and advise every participant to upload documents which are mandatory in nature. The appellant can never expect a beneficial service from the first respondent. It is the duty of the appellant to upload every document which is required. If they had mentioned a particular document in the list and had not actually uploaded that particular document, then the first respondent could seek clarification and ask the appellant to upload that particular document, but not otherwise. We hold that failure to upload the income tax returns for the financial year 2024-25, and also the audited balance sheet and the profit and loss account is fatal and the tender submitted by the appellant had been correctly rejected.”
“57. In view of the strict interpretation which has to be given in matters relating to tender and there being no equity in commercial matters, we hold that the first respondent can never be faulted for having rejected the tender of the appellant at the technical stage. The appellant had failed to satisfy the experience criteria. The appellant had failed to upload the income tax returns for the financial year 2024-25. The appellant had failed to file an appeal under Section 11 of the Act and had not stated in the affidavit that it was not an efficacious alternate remedy. The appellant can never seek indulgence of this Court.”
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(Judgment of this Court was delivered by C.V.KARTHIKEYAN, J.) All these Writ Appeals have been filed by the same appellant questioning the dismissal of the Writ Petitions filed by her, which Writ Petitions had been filed challenging the rejection of the bids submitted by her consequent to a tender notification, at the technical stage on the same grounds by the first respondent herein.
The first respondent had issued a tender Notification on 19.02.2026 inviting bids for handling and transportation of food grains and other notified commodities together with allied services at the warehouses specified in the tender documents. Bids were invited for 62 separate warehouses. The appellant had offered separate bids for four warehouses. All four separate bids were rejected on the following grounds: “1.Experience certificate was not submitted for the period from 01.12.2022 to 08.01.2023. 2. Proper Income Tax Return document for the Financial Year 2024–2025 was not uploaded. 3. The bidder furnished details of 15 own lorries to qualify for participation in four ‘A’ Grade warehouses. On verification, it was found that three of those lorries had permits restricted to a 30 km radius within Namakkal District and were therefore not roadworthy for transportation of stocks from Chinnasalem, Muthur, Tirunelveli and Salem Junction warehouses. 4. The bidder had paid only EPF administrative charges for December 2022 and January 2023 and had not made EPF contributions corresponding to the number of employees. Hence, the bidder was considered technically not qualified.”
Challenging the same, the appellant had filed four separate Writ Petitions in W.P.(MD)No.15453 to 15456 of 2026.
The learned Single Judge with respect to the first ground, namely, non-submission of experience certificate for the period from 01.02.2022 to 08.01.2023, held that the said ground was unsustainable.
With respect to the second ground, namely, non-production of income tax return for the financial year 2024-25, it was held that the appellant had failed to upload the income tax return for the financial year 2024-25, which document was specifically required under the tender condition and was an essential eligible condition. It was, therefore, held that this ground cannot be faulted.
With respect to the third ground, namely, relating to permits of three lorries, it was found that the permits were State wide permits and it was therefore held that the rejection on this ground was unsustainable. With respect to the fourth ground, namely, non-payment of EPF contribution for the period between December 2022 and January 2023, it was held that the earlier contract was seasonal in nature and no worker had been engaged during that relevant period. It was, therefore, held that the rejection of the bid on this ground was unsustainable.
The learned Single Judge had also examined the impact of Clause-8 of the tender document, which provided an opportunity to upload a document, which had not been submitted. It was held by the learned Single Judge that this clause was intended to apply only when an omission to upload a document is rectified. It was held that non-submission of the income tax return for the financial year 2024-25 was fatal and Clause-8 cannot be invoked to seek further opportunity to upload an additional document after closure of the bidding process. The learned Single Judge had however observed that the bid amount quoted by the appellant was Rs. 57.80/- and the lowest bidder, whose bid had been accepted, had quoted Rs. 126/- and therefore, further noted the submission of the learned Additional Advocate General that a reasonable rate would be finalised after negotiation. The learned Single Judge had, therefore, dismissed all the four Writ Petitions necessitating the filing of four separate Writ Appeals, albeit, on the same ground.
Mr.G.Prabhu Rajaduai, learned Counsel for the appellant pointed out that the only ground of rejection which had been upheld was non-submission of the income tax return for the financial year 2024-25. The learned Counsel argued that the income tax return for the financial year 2024-25 was actually available with the appellant, but had not been uploaded due to oversight, as the person involved in uploading the documents had misunderstood the document required, as that of assessment year instead of financial year and had actually uploaded the income tax return for the assessment year 2024-25 which related to the financial year 2023-24. As a fact, the income tax return for the financial year 2024-25 had not been uploaded, even though it was available with the appellant.
The learned Counsel then pointed out Clause-8 of the tender document, which provided a window to upload documents, which had been failed to be uploaded. The learned Counsel then pointed out the counter affidavit filed in the Writ Petition, wherein, it had been stated that the first respondent had asserted the right of discretion to accept or reject a document which is uploaded, pursuant to a window provided under Clause-8. The learned Counsel argued that discretion should not be arbitrary but should be exercised with a view to ensure rectification of an error. The learned Counsel found fault with the first respondent for not having exercised the discretionary authority with due care to ensure the object of inserting Clause-8 was satisfied. The learned Counsel took the Court through Clause-8 and stated that a simple reading of the same would show that it was meant to upload documents, which had been missed out to be uploaded.
The learned Counsel placed reliance on the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(MD)No.25916 of 2026, dated 30.11.2023 in the case of M/s.Sai Hridham Infraa Private Limited -vs-. The Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu, Highways Department and others, wherein, the learned Single Judge had held that in a case of a single tender, a participant has no right to insist that the tender should be awarded in his favour. The Tender Inviting Authority is always at liberty to finalise the tender process, however, without arbitrariness. This judgment was pointed by the learned Counsel for the appellant to buttress his arguments that once the bid of the appellant had been rejected, the first respondent was left only with a single tenderer and therefore, the first respondent should have taken a conscious decision to cancel that tender and call for fresh tender. He further pointed out that the financial amount quoted by the sole tenderer, who alone was left, was far higher than the standard rate fixed by the first respondent and therefore, argued that by accepting that amount, loss had been caused to the State exchequer.
The learned Counsel for the appellant then relied on a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 933 in the case of Principal Chief Conservator of Forest and other – vs.- Suresh Mathew and others, wherein, it had been held that the Government was the protector of financial resources of the State and had every right to cancel or call for fresh tender to protect the financial interest of the State.
The learned Counsel had placed reliance on the said judgment to support his arguments that by accepting the sole tenderer, the State had incurred loss, since the bid offered was high. It was argued that this loss should be prevented and the Government had a duty to protect the financial resources of the State.
The learned Counsel then relied on a judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.Nos.47323 and 47327 of 2025, dated 12.02.2026 in the case of M/s.URC Construction (P) Limited -vs.- Chennai Metro Rail Limited and another, wherein again, the learned Single Judge had reiterated that the Tender Evaluation Committee had every right to cancel the tender and proceed with a fresh tender, since the price was neither competitive nor viable. The learned Single Judge had held that the first respondent in that case had exercised statutory right vested in them under the Act.
The learned Counsel for the appellant then placed reliance on the judgment of this Court reported in (2005) 4 MLJ 262 in the case of MSS Wakf Board College and others -vs.- Haji M.Mohamed Ali Jinnah and others, wherein, a Division Bench of this Court had held that it was not open to raise an objection relating to jurisdiction at the appellate stage, when the said issue had not been raised before the learned Single Judge. It had also been held that when an objection relating to existence of alternate remedy had not been raised before the learned Single Judge, it cannot permitted to raise at the appellate stage.
This judgment was pointed by the learned Counsel for the appellant, since an argument had been presented by the learned Additional Advocate General that the appellant should have resorted to file an appeal questioning rejection of his tender, as provided under Section 11 of the Act.
Pointing out the ratio laid down in the aforementioned judgment, the learned Counsel for the appellant stated that the rejection of the tender of the appellant was arbitrary and on unsustainable grounds and therefore, he argued that the Writ Appeals should be allowed and the financial bid of the appellant should be examined and if it is lower than the bid offered by the successful tenderer, whose bid had been accepted, then, the appellant should be granted the contract.
Mr.B.Saravanan, learned Additional Advocate General, however, disputed the said contentions. The learned Additional Advocate General pointed out that when there were mandatory pre-conditions in a contract with an instrumentality of a State and there were minimum qualifying requirements to be furnished along with the application, necessary documents should be furnished to assess whether the tenderer, who had submitted a bid, had fulfilled the requirements and if they do not, they should be excluded from consideration.
In this connection, the learned Additional Advocate General placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (1990) 2 SCC 488 in the case of G.J.Fernandez -vs.-State of Karnataka and others, wherein, reference was made to an earlier judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (1979) 3 SCC 489 (Ramana Dayaram Shetty -vs.- International Airport Authority of India, wherein, a principle had been formulated, as follows:
“10....... It is a well-settled rule of administrative law that an executive authority must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its actions to be judged and it must scrupulously observe those standards on pain of invalidation of an act in violation of them. .......”
It had been further held as follows:
“34.It is, therefore, obvious that both having regard to the constitutional mandate of Article 14 as also the judicially evolved rule of administrative law, Respondent 1 was not entitled to act arbitrarily in accepting the tender of Respondents 4, but was bound to conform to the standard or norm laid down in para 1 of the notice inviting tenders which required that only a person running a registered IInd Class hotel or restaurant and having at least 5 years' experience as such should be eligible to tender. It was not the contention of the appellant that this standard or norm prescribed by Respondent 1 was discriminatory having no just or reasonable relation to the object of inviting tenders, namely, to award the contract to a sufficiently experienced person who would be able to run efficiently a IInd Class restaurant at the airport. Admittedly the standard or norm was reasonable and non-discriminatory and once such a standard or norm for running a IInd Class restaurant should be awarded was laid down, Respondent 1 was not entitled to depart from it and to award the contract to Respondents 4 who did not satisfy the condition of eligibility prescribed by the standard or norm.
The learned Additional Advocate General argued that in the instant case, quite apart from not furnishing income tax return for the financial year 2024-25, as required, the appellant had also not satisfied the essential condition that the participant should have minimum experience of three years in similar type of handling and contract works. It was pointed out that the appellant did not have the requisite three years experience and fell short by 39 days.
The learned Additional Advocate General pointed out that relaxing the experience requirement of the appellant would cause injustice to others, who had not applied only because they also did not have the requisite experience of three years.
The learned Additional Advocate General further relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2020) 16 SCC 489 in the case of Silppi Constructions Contractors -vs.- Union of India and another, wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had referred an earlier judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2016) 16 SCC 818 in the case of Afcons Infrastructure Limited -vs.- Nagpur Metro Rail Corporation Limited, wherein, it had been held that the author of the tender document is the best person to understand and appreciate its requirements and interpret the documents. It had been further observed that the authority may give an interpretation that is not acceptable to the Constitutional Courts, but that by itself is not a reason for interfering with the interpretation given.
The learned Additional Advocate General pointed out that the appellant had failed to satisfy the requisite experience and had failed to upload the income tax return for the financial year 2024-25, which was a mandatory pre-condition.
The learned Additional Advocate General further placed reliance on the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in (2001) 2 SCC 451 in the case of W.B.State Electricity Board -vs.- Patel Engineering Company Limited and other, wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Paragraph No.23 had observed that the claim that uploading of document beyond mistake or error is unintentional cannot be accepted, since it was expected that the appellant should have been vigilant in checking the documents before they are submitted.
The learned Additional Advocate General submitted that therefore, the appellant cannot place reliance on Clause-8 of the tender document to justify that they can submit necessary documents, even after they had submitted the entire documents in the first instant.
The learned Additional Advocate General also pointed out that as directed by the learned Single Judge, the first respondent has entered into a negotiation with the lowest bidder and there has been nearly 20% reduction in the bid amount quoted by the lowest bidder. It was therefore, contended that the appeals should be dismissed and the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant should be rejected.
Mr.S.Srinivasa Raghavan, learned Counsel for one of the bidders, who had been impleaded as a further respondent, stated that the successful bidder had commenced work and is actively involved in handling and transportation of foodgrains and therefore, pointed out that much hardship would be caused to the said respondent, if the tender were to be interfered at this stage. He also sought dismissal of the Writ Appeals.
We have carefully considered the arguments advanced and perused the materials available on record.
The appellant herein has filed these appeals against the common order of the learned Single Judge, dated 17.06.2026, dismissing the Writ Petitions filed questioning the order of the first respondent, by which order, the bid offered by the appellant had been rejected at the technical stage. The appellant herein had participated in four separate bids for handling and transportation of foodgrains and other allied notified commodities for four separate warehouses consequent to a tender notification, dated 19.02.2026, whereby, e-tender was invited under two bids system from professionally competent and financially sound contractors. The period of contract was for two years. It is to be noted that the tender was an e-tender and there was no provision for interfacial contact prior to or during the precess of uploading the documents towards the tender. It had, in fact, been provided in Clause-3.(v), which relates to Assistance to Tenderers, which as follows:
“a)The queries and replies shall be submitted by e-mail only to the e-mail ID indicated in the Tender Form. Any queries relating to the tender document and the terms and conditions contained therein shall be addressed to the Tender Inviting Authority. b)Any queries relating to the process of online submission of Tender or queries relating to e-procurement Portal in general shall be addressed to the 24X7 e-procurement Portal Helpdesk.”
It is, thus, seen that any query or reply should be communicated only through electronic mail and any query relating to process of online submission of tender should also be addressed only to the 24x7 helpdesk provided in the portal.
It is also to be noted that when the documents are uploaded, they would be encrypted to ensure the secrecy of the data. The clause relating to submission of tender is Clause 3.(iv), and sub clause-f is as follows: 3. (iv)Submission of Tender ..... f)All the documents submitted by the Tenderers would be encrypted using PKI encryption techniques, to ensure the secrecy of the data. The date encrypted cannot be viewed by unauthorized persons till the time of opening of the Tender. The confidentiality of the Tender is maintained using the second Socket Layer 128 bit encryption technology. Date storage encryption of sensitive fields is to be done.”
It had been further provided in sub-clause g) and h), as follows:
“g)The uploaded tender documents can be readable only after the tender is opened. h)After uploading the Tender successfully and timely, the portal will give a message confirming with the details of Tender No. and the date & time of submission with all other relevant details.”
Thus, the process of uploading documents has to be done only through electronic mode and the appellant can never place any arguments that the appellant was singled out to be rejected at the technical stage.
The eligibility criteria had also been given in Clause-5 relating to production of income tax returns, in which it had been very clearly stated as follows:
“Certified copies of the ITR for preceding three financial years (2022-2023, 2023-2024 and 2024-2025) along with audited balance sheet and profit and loss A/C of the relevant year should be uploaded.”
It is thus seen that the income tax returns for the preceding three financial years should be submitted along with the audited balance sheet and profit and loss account of the relevant years.
This eligibility criteria is mandatory. Any relaxation would cause injustice to those, who would have participated, had they known that the eligibility criteria was flexible in nature.
In this connection, reference could be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (1997) 6 SCC 574, in the case of State of Rajasthan -vs.- Hitendra Kumar Bhatt, wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court examined the case of the respondent therein, who had applied for recruitment consequent to an advertisement issued by the Zila Parishad, Dungarpur. The Court noted that the applicants should have practical/technical qualifications of BSTC or its equivalent, recognized by the State Government, on the date of submission of application. The respondent did not possess such qualification on the date of submission of application. He, however, had appeared for the B.Ed., examination, but the result had not been declared. The results were declared only later. The interviews were held after the date of the declaration of that result. But since the respondent did not possess the qualification, he was not called for interview. He filed a Writ Petition and the High Court of Rajasthan in an interim order directed that he must be called for interview. He was, therefore, interviewed and on the basis of the direction of the High Court, he was also included in the list of selected candidates. He was appointed on provisional basis subject to the outcome of the Writ Petition. His appointment had also been confirmed. Thereafter, the Writ Petition was dismissed. The respondent therein filed an appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court, which was allowed. Questioning that judgment, the State filed a further appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:
“6.Looking to the clear terms of the advertisement which we have referred to above, the respondent was not eligible for consideration. It is submitted by the respondent before us that since he has been continued and has now been confirmed we should not disturb his appointment. He has requested that his case should be considered sympathetically. The fact, however, remains that the appellants have taken the correct stand right from the beginning. The respondent's application was not considered and he was not called for an interview. It was on account of interim orders which were obtained by the respondent that he was given appointment and continued. He was aware that his appointment was subject to the outcome of his petition. One cannot, therefore, take too sympathetic a view of the situation in which the respondent finds himself. A cut-off date by which all the requirements relating to qualifications have to be met, cannot be ignored in an individual case. There may be other persons who would have applied had they known that the date of acquiring qualifications was flexible. They may not have applied because they did not possess the requisite qualification on the prescribed date. Relaxing the prescribed requirements in the case of one individual may, therefore, cause injustice to others.” (Emphasis supplied)
The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a requirement relating to qualification cannot be ignored, particularly when others would have applied had they known that the prescribed qualification could be relaxed. It had been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that relaxing the prescribed qualification for one candidate may cause injustice to others.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court had also very categorically observed that there would be other persons, who would have applied, had they known that the eligibility criteria was flexible. They would not have been applied, only because they did not meet the requisite eligible criteria. Applying the principle laid down, we hold that the acceptance of the appellant's tender would have caused much grave injustice to several others.
It had also been contended that the appellant did not have the requisite qualification of experience of three years. The appellant fell short of 39 days.
We hold that the appellant can never claim that this short fall of 39 days in experience should be overlooked on the ground that the work was seasonal in nature. The appellant can also never claim that the non- submission of the income tax returns for the financial year 2024-25 was not fatal and should be overlooked by the first respondent. As a matter of fact, it is not only the income tax returns which should have been filed, but also, the audited balance sheet and profit and loss account for the said financial year. We hold that by non-submission of the said income tax returns and the supporting documents, the bid of the appellant necessarily had to be rejected.
In the tender document, with respect to experience, it had been provided as follows: Experience i. The Tenderer must have minimum 3 years For Grade A, (2022-23, 2023-24 and 2024-25) experience in B & C combination of similar type of Handling and Warehouses Transport Contract works without any specific adverse complaints. ii. The experience certificate should be obtained from the TNWC/FCI/CWC/TNCSC/PSU/ Government Department, Public Limited Company/Private Limited Company. iii. The scanned copies of the experience certificate should be uploaded. iv. Experience certificate in the prescribed proforma as per the Appendix-iii shall be uploaded.
This requirement of prior experience is mandatory and could never be relaxed by the first respondent. The appellant can also not seek relaxation of the same.
It had been stipulated as follows in Appendix-iii:
“PROFORMA FOR INFORMATION OF WORK EXPERIENCE CERTIFICATE TO BE FURNISHED BY THE TENDERER FROM EACH CONCERNED PARTIES.”
It had been further provided as follows:
“Remarks:- All certificate issued by concerned Department should contain atleast above requisite information for considering experience as per terms of tender. (Signature of the Issuing Authority) Duly Stamped “
It is to be noted that when a particular thing has to be done in a particular manner, it has to be done in that particular manner or not at all. This proposition had been asserted again and again by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. To illustrate one judgment, we would refer to a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 774 in the case of Shri Khereshwar Mahadev VA Dauji Maharaj Samiti, Aligarh -vs.- State of Uttar Pradesh and others, wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had reiterated the proposition albeit in A different context. The principLE of law has to be applied in all contexts. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:
“15.Apart from that it is settled law that when a law requires a particular thing to be done in a particular manner, it has to be done in that manner alone or not at all. .......”
Thus, if a tender document has to be uploaded in a particular manner, it should be uploaded only in that particular manner and there cannot be any relaxation.
We further hold that there cannot be any equity in commercial matters. It had been pointed out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jagdish Mandal -vs.- State of Orissa, reported in (2007) 14 SCC 517, as follows:
“22............ When the power of judicial review is invoked in matters relating to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind. A contract is a commercial transaction. Evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions. Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance. If the decision relating to award of contract is bona fide and is in public interest, courts will not, in exercise of power of judicial review, interfere even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. The power of judicial review will not be permitted to be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest, or to decide contractual disputes. The tenderer or contractor with a grievance can always seek damages in a civil court. Attempts by unsuccessful tenderers with imaginary grievances, wounded pride and business rivalry, to make mountains out of molehills of some technical/procedural violation or some prejudice to self, and persuade courts to interfere by exercising power of judicial review, should be resisted. Such interferences, either interim or final, may hold up public works for years, or delay relief and succour to thousands and millions and may increase the project cost manifold. ......” (Emphasis supplied)
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Caretel Infotech Limited -vs.- Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited, reported in (2019) 14 SCC 81, had held as follows:
“37. ...... In view of Government and public sector enterprises venturing into economic activities, this Court found it appropriate to build in certain checks and balances of fairness in procedure. It is this approach which has given rise to scrutiny of tenders in writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It, however, appears that the window has been opened too wide as almost every small or big tender is now sought to be challenged in writ proceedings almost as a matter of routine. This in turn, affects the efficacy of commercial activities of the public sectors, which may be in competition with the private sector. This could hardly have been the objective in mind. An unnecessary, close scrutiny of minute details, contrary to the view of the tendering authority, makes awarding of contracts by Government and Public Sectors a cumbersome exercise, with long drawn out litigation at the threshold. .............” (Emphasis supplied)
In Tata Cellular -vs.- Union of India reported in (1994) 6 SCC 651, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held, with respect to examining an administrative decision particularly with respect to tenders and decision taken to reject tenders, as follows:
“94.The principles deducible from the above are: 1. The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. 2. The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. 3. The court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible. 4).....”
It is also to be noted that Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Transparency in Tenders Act, 1998 provides an appellate remedy. The said provision is as follows:
“11. (1) Any Tenderer aggrieved by the order passed by the Tender Accepting Authority under section 10 may appeal to the Government within ten days from the date of receipt of order and the Government shall dispose the appeal within fifteen days from the date of receipt. (2) In disposing of an appeal under sub-section (1), the Government may, after giving the party an opportunity of making his representations, pass such order thereon as they may deem fit. (3) The order of the Government on such appeal shall be final. 4. The Government may, pending the exercise of their powers under this section pass such interlocutory orders as they may deem fit.”
There was no averment made in the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petitions that Section 11 of the Act does not provide an efficacious alternate remedy, particularly, since the appellant claimed that she was in possession of income tax return for the financial year 2024-25.
The learned Counsel for the appellant placed his arguments primarily on Clause-8 of the E-tender, which clause is as follows:
“8.Procedure to be followed for obtaining missing documents and specified clarification: a)An icon for clarification and missing documents shall appear on “Bid details” page (in front of each of the bidder's name) at Corporation's end after opening of Technical / Financial bid. b)Corporation shall click on clarification and missing documents icon for the desired bidder and enter the details of clarifications and missing documents within the prescribed time. c)After entering the details of clarification and missing documents sought by the Corporation, same icon is to be clicked at bidder's end for replying to the particular clarification and missing documents sought by the Corporation. The system will also send the alert to the bidder at his registered e-mail address about the clarification and missing documents sought by the Corporation. d)Bidder will click on clarification icon and will reply to the same and upload the required clarification and missing document (optional) in support of clarification sought and also submit missing document, if any, within the prescribed time bidder cannot ask for any clarification from the Corporation. e)Once the prescribed time expires the reply button clarification and missing documents screen from bidder side shall also disappear automatically. f)After expiry of prescribed time, Corporation shall download the clarification and missing documents submitted by the bidder. g)Bidder to refer clarification and missing document manual available on tntenders.gov.in or seek assistance from the Help desk.”
It had been argued by the learned Counsel for the appellant that for obtaining missing documents and for specific clarifications, a procedure had been stipulated in the e-tender and that the respondents should have been resorted to the same.
This clause had been misread by the appellant. If, while uploading tender papers, there had been mention about a particular document and the same had not been uploaded, then that document which had been mentioned in the list of documents and not uploaded, alone could be subsequently uploaded by following the procedure under Clause-8. This clause does not give leverage to the first respondent to call upon a participant in the tender to upload the documents which are required to be uploaded. The fact that the document was in the possession of the participant to the tender process would be a fact known only to such participant. There was certainly no obligation placed for the first respondent to go and advise every participant to upload documents which are mandatory in nature. The appellant can never expect a beneficial service from the first respondent. It is the duty of the appellant to upload every document which is required. If they had mentioned a particular document in the list and had not actually uploaded that particular document, then the first respondent could seek clarification and ask the appellant to upload that particular document, but not otherwise. We hold that failure to upload the income tax returns for the financial year 2024-25, and also the audited balance sheet and the profit and loss account is fatal and the tender submitted by the appellant had been correctly rejected.
The argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant that there was only one tenderer left and therefore, the tender should be cancelled has to be rejected, as it is not for the participant to dictate, as to how the bids are to be evaluated and examined. It is for the first respondent to take a decision. We hold that the judgments relied on this aspect by the learned Counsel for the appellant would not take the appellant any forward or advance the case of the appellant.
In view of the strict interpretation which has to be given in matters relating to tender and there being no equity in commercial matters, we hold that the first respondent can never be faulted for having rejected the tender of the appellant at the technical stage. The appellant had failed to satisfy the experience criteria. The appellant had failed to upload the income tax returns for the financial year 2024-25. The appellant had failed to file an appeal under Section 11 of the Act and had not stated in the affidavit that it was not an efficacious alternate remedy. The appellant can never seek indulgence of this Court.
In view of these reasons, the Writ Appeals fail and stand dismissed. No order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.
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