Must the person against whom investigation is sought to be transferred to the CBI be impleaded and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard?
Constitution of India — Art.226 — Criminal investigation — Transfer of investigation from the CB-CID to the CBI — Temple property sale — Locus of the petitioners — Opportunity to the accused —
Criminal Procedure — Transfer of investigation — Hearing the accused —
Held: The person against whom the investigation is sought to be transferred must be impleaded as a party and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard; an order passed behind the back of a party is a nullity. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar, Divine Retreat Centre and D. Venkatasubramaniam, followed. (¶27, 29, 30, 31, 34)
Criminal Procedure — Transfer of investigation to the CBI — Exceptional power —
Held further: Transfer of investigation to the CBI is an extraordinary power to be used sparingly and in exceptional circumstances; investigation cannot be transferred merely because there is an alternate investigating agency, and the Court must record that a prima facie case is made out against the accused. Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India and Arnab Ranjan Goswami v. Union of India, followed. (¶8, 28, 32, 33, 34)
Criminal Procedure — Investigation proceeding on proper lines —
Held further: Where the investigating agency has examined witnesses, seized documents and electronic material and arrested key suspects, no case for transfer is made out. Writ petitions dismissed. (¶15, 16, 17, 39, 40)
Must the person against whom investigation is sought to be transferred to the CBI be impleaded and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard?
Yes. The person against whom investigation is sought to be transferred must be impleaded and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Relying on the guidelines in State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar, and on Divine Retreat Centre and D. Venkatasubramaniam, the Court held that an order directing investigation passed behind the back of a party is a nullity. The three decisions cited to show that the accused need not be heard were distinguished on their facts, each involving inter-State or exceptional situations. [¶24, ¶25, ¶26, ¶29, ¶30, ¶31]
Is the power to transfer an investigation to the CBI an extraordinary power to be used sparingly and in exceptional circumstances?
Yes. The power to transfer an investigation to the CBI is an extraordinary power to be used sparingly and in exceptional circumstances. Following Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India and Arnab Ranjan Goswami v. Union of India, the Court held that transfer is not a matter of routine. There cannot be transfer of investigation to an agency merely because there exists an alternate investigating agency, and transfer is warranted only where the case demands it and the present agency has failed to live up to its duty. [¶8, ¶32, ¶33, ¶34]
Must a Court transferring investigation to the CBI record that a prima facie case is made out against the accused?
Yes. A Court transferring investigation to the CBI must record that a prima facie case is made out against the accused. The Court cannot direct the CBI to investigate whether a person had committed an offence or not. The petitioners were still groping in the dark, suggesting that the accused or someone else could have committed the offence, and those were not circumstances compelling a transfer; the Court also doubted their locus and rejected their claims of ignorance of the sale. [¶28, ¶34, ¶37]
What did the High Court finally decide on the petitions to transfer the investigation to the CBI?
The writ petitions seeking transfer of investigation to the CBI were dismissed and the CB-CID was directed to proceed. The Court found that the investigating agency had examined 115 witnesses, seized documents, electronic devices and records, analysed call records and taken key suspects into custody, so the investigation was proceeding on proper lines. There was no order as to costs. [¶15, ¶16, ¶39, ¶40]
Prepared by the LexStreak Editorial Desk — verify against the judgment.
“8. It has been stated that three factors are relevant, namely, the incidents before the registration of the First Information Report; the incidents after the registration of the First Information Report; and why the Central Bureau of Investigation has suddenly become a favoured Investigating Agency. We make it clear that we have no qualms about the Central Bureau of Investigation. We have every respect for the officials therein, but there cannot be transfer of investigation to an agency merely because there exits an alternate investigating agency.”
“28. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that while transferring investigation, the Court should record that a prima facie case had been made out against the accused and further that the Court cannot direct CBI to investigate whether a person had committed an offence as alleged or not. In the instant case, the three Writ Petitioners are still groping around in the dark and state that those who have been arrayed as accused could have committed the offence or there could also be somebody else who could also have committed the offence. They are not circumstances to compel transfer of investigation.”
“31. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had held and in our opinion, quite forcefully, that the person against whom the investigation is sought to be transferred necessarily has to be impleaded as a party and must be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard.”
“34. The dictum laid down is that the accused should be heard or rather should be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard and on examining his version and only when coming to a conclusion that the case is so sensational that it should be investigated only by the CBI and that the Investigating Agency which is now investigating the case had failed to live up to its duty, could there be transfer of investigation. None of these grounds have been made out by any of the three petitioners, whose very locus has been seriously questioned by the learned Public Prosecutor and, who in our opinion, also cannot not maintain the petitions either in their individual capacity or as public interest litigation. They are merely busy bodies, who seek to poke their nose into an ongoing investigation and we sincerely hope not for nefarious reasons.”
“39. In view of all these reasons, We would dismiss all the three Writ Petitions and direct the Investigating Agency to proceed further holding their head high and with confidence that they would come to the correct conclusion on completion of investigation.”
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(Order of the Court was made by C.V. KARTHIKEYAN, J.) All the Writ Petitions have been filed primarily seeking transfer of investigation of an FIR in Cr.No.151 of 2026 on the file of the Inspector of Police, Palani Adivaram Police Station, Palani, Dindigul District, which was subsequently transferred and re-registered as Cr.No.2 of 2026 on the file of the Inspector of Police, CB-CID South, Dindigul, to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).
W.P.(MD)No.21418 of 2026 had been filed by K.S.N.Venugopalu Senapathi, who had initially described himself as ex- MLA, but later, that particular designation or description or probably even a title had been erased by a whitener by himself or by the Counsel, in the nature of a public interest litigation under Article 226 of Constitution of India seeking the same relief. The petitioner also claims that alternatively, the Court should appoint a retired Judge of this Court to monitor the investigation.
The next Writ Petition is W.P.Crl.(MD)No.4127 of 2026, which had been filed by R.Uma Maheshwari Pradheep, who at present is the Chairperson of Palani Municipality and also claims to be the devotee not of Arulmigu Dhandayuthapani Swami Temple, Palani or the deity therein, but a devotee interested in protecting the properties of Arulmigu Dhandayuthapani Swamigal Maddam at Palani. She also claims that the aforementioned FIR registered, now under investigation by CB-CID, should be transferred to the Central Bureau of Investigation for further investigation. This Writ Petition has not been filed in the nature of a public interest litigation, but rather in her individual and personal capacity.
The third Writ Petition in W.P.Crl.(MD)No.4270 of 2026 filed again in the nature of a Mandamus. The petitioner therein is Annapoorani Sivakumar, who has described herself as a Trustee of Arulmigu Dhandayuthapani Swami Temple at Palani. She also seeks transfer of the investigation of the aforementioned FIR to the Central Bureau of Investigation for further investigation. This Writ Petition has again been filed not as a public interest litigation, but had been filed in her capacity as Trustee being directly responsible for the administration, protection and preservation of the properties endowed in favour of the said religious institution.
Even before traversing into the facts, as alleged by the petitioners in their respective affidavits or as asserted by the learned Senior Counsels/Counsels, the Court is wonderstruck by the fact that all the three petitioners are local residents of Palani. They held or are holding posts of responsibility. The first petitioner was a former MLA and incidentally also a former Trustee and whose family, as the learned Counsel stated with some pride, has the first honour to be bestowed on them as a matter of right to the exclusion of everybody else on Panguni Uthiram Festival. The second petitioner is the Chairperson of the local Municipality and the third petitioner is a Trustee of the Temple. The Court is wonderstruck because all three of them claim ignorance of the fact that a substantial large tract of property was the subject matter of a sale transaction and they were oblivious of any transaction relating to the same.
They can never claim that they are responsible local citizens interested in protecting the property if they claim ignorance of the transactions which took place not in their back yard but actually in their own front yard. They can never claim innocence of the transactions. They can never claim indulgence of this Court that they were never privity to any of the transactions relating to the sale or otherwise attempt to sale of the property. If they do so, they are not fit to hold the post, which today they hold or were holding before. Palani is a small town and information of purported sale of Temple property would spread like wildfire. Negotiations can never be done without the knowledge of local heavyweights and the petitioners claim to be local heavyweights.
However, keeping those musings aside, arguments have been advanced seeking to transfer the investigation, not on the basis that the Central Bureau of Investigation would be doing a better investigation or that it is a more favoured investigation agency, but rather appear to be slanted to prevent the CB-CID from investigating further into the matter.
It has been stated that three factors are relevant, namely, the incidents before the registration of the First Information Report; the incidents after the registration of the First Information Report; and why the Central Bureau of Investigation has suddenly become a favoured Investigating Agency. We make it clear that we have no qualms about the Central Bureau of Investigation. We have every respect for the officials therein, but there cannot be transfer of investigation to an agency merely because there exits an alternate investigating agency.
It had been contended that a sale deed, of which all the three petitioners claim ignorance, though surprisingly the vendor is a local person and the three petitioners can never claim that he is a stranger to them, had been presented for registration on 27.03.2026. The vendor apparently had no right to execute the sale deed. We would however not enter into a discussion on that fact, particularly because the rights of inter se are now the subject matter of two civil suits which are now pending before the competent civil Courts.
But even otherwise, we have to fall back to our observations in the earlier litigation, which came up before us in W.A.(MD)No.1010 of 2026, in which we pronounced orders on 15.07.2026, observing that the sale deed was a very strangely written document. So far as the consideration, which is a backbone of any transaction, was concerned, it proudly proclaimed that the consideration was paid by way of four separate negotiable instruments/cheques but did not disclose the bank on which the cheques had been drawn. The amounts of each cheque were stated. It is not known whether the account from which the cheques were drawn had sufficient balance or whether the cheques when presented would be honoured or whether the cheques were only a ruse to exhibit payments of consideration, when no consideration had actually flowed.
The second aspect in that sale deed which struck us was that the purchasers did not include an indemnity clause, if ever the sale deed came to be imputed on any ground. They had no recourse to fall back on after allegedly making a payment of nearly about Rs.2,00,00,000/- by way of negotiable instruments. The sale deed had been declared as void by us, but the purchasers can ever claim back the consideration which they purportedly paid to the vendor. These observations only reinforce our view that the entire transaction is sham and a fraud played by both vendor and the purchasers on each other and on everybody else.
It does indeed surprise us that three Writ Petitioners claim ignorance of the execution of the sale deed. This particular sale deed was executed on 27.03.2026 and was presented before the Sub Registrar Office on 01.04.2026. A refusal check slip was endorsed on the same day/01.04.2026. Again, we would not enter into any discussion on the same, since we had occasion to examine that particular refusal check slip which was also considered by a learned Single Judge of this Court, when that refusal check slip was put to challenge in W.P.(MD)No.10239 of 2026 and an order was passed on 10.04.2026. The Writ Appeal, flowing from the order in that particular Writ Petition had been considered by us in W.A.(MD)No.1010 of 2026 and as aforestated, we had pronounced orders on 15.07.2026. We are informed that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had not reversed our finding but had only placed a caveat that the declaration made by us that the document presented for registration and ultimately registered was void would be subject to the outcome of the civil suits which are pending.
The First Information Report came to be registered by Adivaram Police Station, Palani in Cr.No.151 of 2026. The investigation was transferred to the CB-CID on 14.07.2026 who took over the investigation on 15.07.2026 and re-registered the FIR in Cr.No.2 of 2026. Investigation is now underway.
The learned Public Prosecutor was emphatic in his submission and asserted that CB-CID have not been in deep slumber as is projected. A status report has been presented before us by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Crime Branch-CID, Madurai Range, the Investigating Officer, who, our opinion, has an onerous task to perform. He would have been trained in the nuances of investigating an offence. But now, he has to embark on a journey to examine the trace of title of a property, which venture somebody trained in civil law would happily wade into. At any rate, the investigating officer had treaded into this particular aspect of determining the trace of title of the said property. We hope that he had properly traced the title and examined the earlier judicial proceedings and any other aspect.
It is seen that he had examined the financial transaction which we stated as the consideration part in the sale dead. This sham attempt at projecting consideration having flowed had been emphasized by the learned Public Prosecutor. The Investigating Officer had also examined the electronic communications, the role of private persons and the conduct of officials of the Registration Department, the HR & CE Department and the Revenue Department. During the investigation, the team had also conducted search at 16 locations across six Districts through 16 Special Teams. They had seized 207 documents, 12 mobile phones, 3 laptops and 8 other electronic devices including one hard disk, one DVR and 6 CPUs. They had also discovered and recovered and seized a sum Rs.2,13,800/-. They have also seized audio records. Six mobile phones have been secured for investigation by issuing production memos.
We must again emphasize that though investigation had been handed over to the CB-CID on 14.07.2026, they could swing into action only on and from 15.07.2026, which date is hardly about 40 days prior to this date. As of now, they have examined 115 witnesses, which would show that they have been at the job everyday, on and from the date when they commenced the investigation. These witnesses include officials of the Registration Department, HR & CE Department, Revenue Department and also persons connected with the transactions and also independent witnesses. They have also seized 49 records from the Registration Department, 36 records from the Revenue Department, 23 banking records and 62 Call Detail Records /IPDR. All these collected materials will have to be analysed. We hold that it definitely should not be the object of any litigation or any Court to hamper or slow down investigation or put a cloud over any investigation process. No Court can state that the investigation is not going on the correct line, when the Investigating Officer had recorded statements of witnesses; had seized material objects; and now has the duty to analyse the materials seized and the statements recorded.
Apart from the records mentioned above, the investigation team have also seized 55 records relating to the property, its administration and previous proceedings. They have also seized CCTV footages from the Registration Offices and also from relevant locations. They have also collected Call Detail Records/IPDRs of various individuals whom they have categorised as suspects and also of all other connected persons. Now they are involved in analysing the communications between the persons involved. The banking records and financial transactions relating to the sale consideration, which evidently are not found in the sale deed in precise terms and the flow of money are also under investigation. We would only wish them well, as they had to start from zero without even knowing the bank from which the cheques had been drawn. The electronic materials which had been seized necessarily will have to be subjected to forensic examination. Their authenticity will have to be examined. It has to be further examined, whether they had been damaged or whether they would reveal any electronic finger print. We hold that investigation is proceeding on proper lines and should continue.
It is also seen that when they were able to get clearance from various Court proceedings relating to bail and anticipatory bail, they had taken into custody the key suspects. The Court proceedings relating to further bail applications are still pending, but the investigating agency is in the process of collecting evidence from the accused persons. The accused persons who had been taken into judicial custody have also been taken into Police custody between 05.08.2026 and 07.08.2026 for further investigation. They have also arrested the Sub Registrar, who had registered the document. They have also arrested a stranger individual whose name the learned Public Prosecutor, divulged as Jeyaprakash, who according to the learned Public Prosecutor, had a very decent avocation, called facilitator, and who facilitated or coordinated the registration process from the preparation of the sale deed till its registration and had also the temerity to exercise influence on the concerned officials. He had been taken into custody on 07.08.2026.
An Advocate, Anwardeen, whom the learned Public Prosecutor asserted was involved in ensuring that this particular property was sold and had also earlier attempted to sell it in the year 1998 and who had been involved quite directly in the present sale transaction was also arrested. However, subsequently, owing to whatever reason he had, he unfortunately expired. We would not go further into that particular aspect.
The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner in W.P.Crl. (MD)No.4127 of 2026 pointed out this unfortunate death as a coincidence and stated that coincidences were galore and that another accused, the Sub Registrar, who actually registered the document/Justin Manikandan, complained of giddiness and chest pain and had to be admitted to Government Medical Hospital. However, thank the Lord, he has been discharged from hospital on 14.08.2026. He and Jeyaprakash had been taken into Police custody on 19.08.2026 and subsequently handed back to judicial custody. It is thus seen that there cannot be any quarrel over the fact that the investigation is progressing.
The learned Senior Counsel also forwarded a list of questions and wanted the Court to answer them. We unfortunately decline to do so, as we are neither the Investigating Officers in this particular case nor has investigation been entrusted to us. We are only examining whether the present Investigating Agency is discharging its duty.
One aspect which has to be examined is whether an order to transfer investigation could be passed without hearing the accused. This is a very important question which had not been addressed nor taken up for consideration.
On behalf of the petitioner in W.P.Crl.(MD)No.4127 of 2026, three separate judgments had been cited, wherein according to them, it had been held that the accused need not be heard.
The first is a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2018) 7 SCC 365 in the case of E.Sivakumar -vs.- Union of India. A careful examination of the facts would show that it related to a multi- State crime involving high officials of the State and Centre relating to illegal manufacture and sale of gutkha and paan masala containing tobacco and/or nicotine. It was an inter-State crime. The network of the accused was wide. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that to investigate such an inter-State crime, it would only be appropriate that it is entrusted to an organization which cuts across State boundaries and has longer arms to investigate offences beyond the jurisdiction of a particular State. That is a significant distinguishing factor. So far as that case was concerned, the accused are known. They have not been impleaded.
The second judgment is the one reported in (2014) 4 SCC 626 in the case of Dinubhai Bogabhai Solanki -vs.- State of Gujarat. Examination of the facts of that particular case reveal that it had been filed by the father of a murdered RTI and social activist, who was trying to expose alleged illegal activities of politicians across the State. The relief sought was to transfer the investigation from the State Police to the Central Bureau of Investigation. The Supreme Court held that it was a cry for justice made by a person whose son was brazenly murdered. In such a situation, holding that the accused would only be interested in somehow or the other employing delaying tactics and in ensuring that investigation does not even commence, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had taken upon themselves to answer the cry for justice and to transfer the investigation. Again, the facts are distinguishable.
The third judgment which had been cited is the one reported in (2009) 6 SCC 65, in the case of Narender G. Goel -vs.- State of Maharashtra and another, which related to the murder of a Canadian citizen at Mumbai. The dead body was sent back to Canada, where a second autopsy was performed and genetic material was preserved. At the request of the husband of the deceased, the Chief Coroner at the Province of Ontario in Canada had written to the Commissioner of Police in Mumbai that they are ready to assist the Mumbai Police with the help of genetic material preserved by them. A petition was also filed in the High Court seeking a direction to the Mumbai Police to seek such assistance taking recourse to Section 166-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court declined. The matter then went to the Supreme Court. Section 166-A Code of Criminal Procedure is a very rarely used provision, which is a letter of request to the competent authority for investigation in a country or place outside India. Once the territorial borders have to be cut across by the Investigating Agency, it was held appropriate that the Central Investigating Agency takes over investigation. It was not concentrated on one particular State or as in this case to one particular District and within a town in that particular District to within a local area in that particular town. Again, the facts are distinguishable.
The judgment which is more relevant and for some reason had not been cited across the Bar is the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2011) 14 SCC 770 (State of Punjab -vs.- Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar and others). The facts are quite interesting, but let us not enter into a discussion on the facts. But among other aspects, the Hon'ble Supreme Court issued guidelines as to when CBI enquiry can be directed, which are as follows:
“VI. When CBI enquiry can be directed 71. In Minor Irrigation and Rural Engg. Services, U.P. v. Sahngoo Ram Arya [(2002) 5 SCC 521 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 775 : AIR 2002 SC 2225] this Court placed reliance on its earlier judgment in Common Cause v. Union of India [(1999) 6 SCC 667 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1196] and held that before directing CBI to investigate, the court must reach a conclusion on the basis of pleadings and material on record that a prima facie case is made out against the accused. The court cannot direct CBI to investigate as to whether a person committed an offence as alleged or not. The court cannot merely proceed on the basis of “ifs” and “buts” and think it appropriate that inquiry should be made by CBI. 72. In Divine Retreat Centre [(2008) 3 SCC 542 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 9] this Court held that the High Court could have passed a judicial order directing investigation against a person and his activities only after giving him an opportunity of being heard. It is not permissible for the court to set the criminal law in motion on the basis of allegations made against a person in violation of the principles of natural justice. A person against whom an inquiry is directed must have a reasonable opportunity of being heard as he is likely to be adversely affected by such order and, particularly, when such an order results in drastic consequence of affecting his reputation. 73. In D. Venkatasubramaniam v. M.K. Mohan Krishnamachari [(2009) 10 SCC 488 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 358] this Court held that an order passed behind the back of a party is a nullity and liable to be set aside only on this score. Therefore, a person against whom an order is passed on the basis of a criminal petition filed against him, he should be impleaded as a respondent being a necessary party. 74. This Court in Disha v. State of Gujarat [(2011) 13 SCC 337 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 628 : AIR 2011 SC 3168] after considering the various judgments of this Court, particularly, in Vineet Narain v. Union of India [(1996) 2 SCC 199 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 264] , Union of India v. Sushil Kumar Modi [(1998) 8 SCC 661 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 84] , Rajiv Ranjan Singh ‘Lalan’ (8) v. Union of India [(2006) 6 SCC 613 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 125] , Rubabbuddin Sheikh v. State of Gujarat [(2010) 2 SCC 200 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1006] and Ashok Kumar Todi v. Kishwar Jahan [(2011) 3 SCC 758 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 75] held that the Court can transfer the matter to CBI or any other special agency only when it is satisfied that the accused is a very powerful and influential person or the State authorities like high police officials are involved in the offence and the investigation has not been proceeded with in proper direction or the investigation had been conducted in a biased manner. In such a case, in order to do complete justice and having belief that it would lend credibility to the final outcome of the investigation, such directions may be issued. 75. Thus, in view of the above, it is evident that a constitutional court can direct CBI to investigate into the case provided the court after examining the allegations in the complaint reaches a conclusion that the complainant could make out prima facie, a case against the accused. However, the person against whom the investigation is sought, is to be impleaded as a party and must be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. CBI cannot be directed to have a roving inquiry as to whether a person was involved in the alleged unlawful activities. The court can direct CBI investigation only in exceptional circumstances where the court is of the view that the accusation is against a person who by virtue of his post could influence the investigation and it may prejudice the cause of the complainant, and it is necessary so to do in order to do complete justice and make the investigation credible. (Emphasis supplied)
The Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that while transferring investigation, the Court should record that a prima facie case had been made out against the accused and further that the Court cannot direct CBI to investigate whether a person had committed an offence as alleged or not. In the instant case, the three Writ Petitioners are still groping around in the dark and state that those who have been arrayed as accused could have committed the offence or there could also be somebody else who could also have committed the offence. They are not circumstances to compel transfer of investigation.
The Supreme Court had also stated in para 72, in what could be called the Divine Retreat Centre case (Divine Retreat Centre v. State of Kerala [(2008) 3 SCC 542 ) referred supra, that a judicial order directing investigation could be directed only after giving the accused an opportunity of being heard.
Again, in D.Venkatasubramanian, referred supra, and reported in (2009) 10 SCC 488, as referred in para 73 cited supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that an order passed behind the back of a party is a nullity and liable to be set aside on that score alone. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had reinforced the dictum that a person against whom an order is passed on the basis of a criminal petition should be impleaded as a respondent/necessary party.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court had held and in our opinion, quite forcefully, that the person against whom the investigation is sought to be transferred necessarily has to be impleaded as a party and must be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The parameters under which the investigation could be transferred had again come up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a later judgment in the case of Vishal Tiwari (Adani Group Investigation) -vs.- Union of India, reported in (2024) 4 SCC 115, wherein the power to transfer investigation to another agency or to an SIT/Special Investigating Team, which is also one of the relief sought by the petitioners herein, had been examined by the Hon'ble Supreme. It was held as follows:
“D.The plea to transfer the investigation from SEBI to another agency or to an SIT (i)The power to transfer an investigation is exercised in extraordinary situations 31. The petitioners seek the transfer of the investigation from SEBI to CBI or an SIT. The question that falls for decision is whether a case has been established by the petitioners for the court to issue such a direction. 32. This Court does have the power under Article 32 and Article 142 of the Constitution to transfer an investigation from the authorised agency to CBI or constitute an SIT. However, such powers must be exercised sparingly and in extraordinary circumstances. Unless the authority statutorily entrusted with the power to investigate portrays a glaring, wilful and deliberate inaction in carrying out the investigation the court will ordinarily not supplant the authority which has been vested with the power to investigate. Such powers must not be exercised by the court in the absence of cogent justification indicative of a likely failure of justice in the absence of the exercise of the power to transfer. The petitioner must place on record strong evidence indicating that the investigating agency has portrayed inadequacy in the investigation or prima facie appears to be biased. 33. Recently, in Himanshu Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh [Himanshu Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2023) 12 SCC 592 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 884] , this Court, speaking through one of us (J.B. Pardiwala, J.) relying on a judgment of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in K.V. Rajendran v. CBCID [K.V. Rajendran v. CBCID, (2013) 12 SCC 480 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 578] reiterated the principle that the power to transfer an investigation to investigating agencies such as CBI must be invoked only in rare and exceptional cases. Further, no person can insist that the offence be investigated by a specific agency since the plea can only be that the offence be investigated properly. The Court held as follows : (Himanshu Kumar case [Himanshu Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2023) 12 SCC 592 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 884] , SCC paras 51-52 & 54-55) “51. Elaborating on this principle, this Court further observed : (K.V. Rajendran case [K.V. Rajendran v. CBCID, (2013) 12 SCC 480 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 578] , SCC p. 487, para 17) ‘17. … the Court could exercise its constitutional powers for transferring an investigation from the State investigating agency to any other independent investigating agency like CBI only in rare and exceptional cases. Such as where high officials of State authorities are involved, or the accusation itself is against the top officials of the investigating agency thereby allowing them to influence the investigation, and further that it is so necessary to do justice and to instil confidence in the investigation or where the investigation is prima facie found to be tainted/biased.’ 52. The Court reiterated that an investigation may be transferred to CBI only in “rare and exceptional cases”. One factor that courts may consider is that such transfer is “imperative” to retain ‘public confidence in the impartial working of the State agencies.’ This observation must be read with the observations made by the Constitution Bench in Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights [State of W.B. v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, (2010) 3 SCC 571 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 401] , that mere allegations against the police do not constitute a sufficient basis to transfer the investigation. *** 54. It has been held by this Court in CBI v. Rajesh Gandhi [CBI v. Rajesh Gandhi, (1996) 11 SCC 253 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 88], that no one can insist that an offence be investigated by a particular agency. We fully agree with the view in the aforesaid decision. An aggrieved person can only claim that the offence he alleges be investigated properly, but he has no right to claim that it be investigated by any particular agency of his choice. 55. The principle of law that emerges from the precedents of this Court is that the power to transfer an investigation must be used “sparingly” and only “in exceptional circumstances”. In assessing the plea urged by the petitioner that the investigation must be transferred to CBI, we are guided by the parameters laid down by this Court for the exercise of that extraordinary power.” (emphasis supplied)
The Hon'ble Supreme Court had even earlier examined in detail the case laws relating to transfer of investigation to CBI and one of them is another interesting case of an individual whose name everybody hears day in and day out, Arnab Ranjan Goswami -vs.- Union of India, reported in (2020) 14 SCC 12, wherein, after referring to a series of judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: "42.The transfer of an investigation to CBI is not a matter of routine. The precedents of this Court emphasise that this is an “extraordinary power” to be used “sparingly” and “in exceptional circumstances”. Speaking for a Constitution Bench in State of W.B. v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, (2010) 3 SCC 571 D.K. Jain, J. observed:
“70. ... despite wide powers conferred by Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, while passing any order, the courts must bear in mind certain self-imposed limitations on the exercise of these constitutional powers. The very plenitude of the power under the said articles requires great caution in its exercise. Insofar as the question of issuing a direction to CBI to conduct investigation in a case is concerned, although no inflexible guidelines can be laid down to decide whether or not such power should be exercised but time and again it has been reiterated that such an order is not to be passed as a matter of routine or merely because a party has levelled some allegations against the local police. This extraordinary power must be exercised sparingly, cautiously and in exceptional situations where it becomes necessary to provide credibility and instil confidence in investigations or where the incident may have national and international ramifications or where such an order may be necessary for doing complete justice and enforcing the fundamental rights. Otherwise CBI would be flooded with a large number of cases and with limited resources, may find it difficult to properly investigate even serious cases and in the process lose its credibility and purpose with unsatisfactory investigations.” 43. This principle has been reiterated in K.V. Rajendran v. CBCID, (2013) 12 SCC 480 Dr B.S. Chauhan, J. speaking for a three- Judge Bench of this Court held:
“13. ... This Court has time and again dealt with the issue under what circumstances the investigation can be transferred from the State investigating agency to any other independent investigating agency like CBI. It has been held that the power of transferring such investigation must be in rare and exceptional cases where the court finds it necessary in order to do justice between the parties and to instil confidence in the public mind, or where investigation by the State police lacks credibility and it is necessary for having “a fair, honest and complete investigation”, and particularly, when it is imperative to retain public confidence in the impartial working of the State agencies.” 46. The principle of law that emerges from the precedents of this Court is that the power to transfer an investigation must be used “sparingly” and only “in exceptional circumstances”. .... 47. ..... The line of interrogation either of the petitioner or of the CFO cannot be controlled or dictated by the persons under investigation/interrogation. In P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2019) 9 SCC 24, R. Banumathi, J. speaking for a two- Judge Bench of this Court held that:
“66. ... there is a well-defined and demarcated function in the field of investigation and its subsequent adjudication. It is not the function of the court to monitor the investigation process so long as the investigation does not violate any provision of law. It must be left to the discretion of the investigating agency to decide the course of investigation. If the court is to interfere in each and every stage of the investigation and the interrogation of the accused, it would affect the normal course of investigation. It must be left to the investigating agency to proceed in its own manner in interrogation of the accused, nature of questions put to him and the manner of interrogation of the accused.” This Court held that so long as the investigation does not violate any provision of law, the investigating agency is vested with the discretion in directing the course of investigation, which includes determining the nature of the questions and the manner of interrogation. In adopting this view, this Court relied upon its earlier decisions in State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma [State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 and Dukhishyam Benupani v. Arun Kumar Bajoria, (1998) 1 SCC 52, in which it was held that the investigating agency is entitled to decide “the venue, the timings and the questions and the manner of putting such questions” during the course of the investigation." (Emphasis supplied)
The dictum laid down is that the accused should be heard or rather should be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard and on examining his version and only when coming to a conclusion that the case is so sensational that it should be investigated only by the CBI and that the Investigating Agency which is now investigating the case had failed to live up to its duty, could there be transfer of investigation. None of these grounds have been made out by any of the three petitioners, whose very locus has been seriously questioned by the learned Public Prosecutor and, who in our opinion, also cannot not maintain the petitions either in their individual capacity or as public interest litigation. They are merely busy bodies, who seek to poke their nose into an ongoing investigation and we sincerely hope not for nefarious reasons.
A series of judgments had been cited across the Bar, but we are confident that we had cited the relevant judgments on the issue.
One further fact which had been stated by the Writ Petitioner in W.P.Crl.(MD)No.4127 of 2026, is that as a Trustee, the petitioner is a victim. We do not agree with that proposition. As a Trustee, the petitioner had failed to protect the properties. As a Trustee, the petitioner had failed to even sense that there was a transaction in the winds. She should have exercised more diligence. She had failed to upload the trust kept in her. She cannot play the victim card, as she claims to be directly involved with the Trust and its properties.
We reject claims of innocence by the three Writ Petitioners. We reject claims of ignorance. We reject claims of bona fide intent. We refuse to grant any indulgence.
None of the three petitioners can proclaim that they are victims of any fraud. Investigation is still ongoing. We would not express any further opinion on the same.
In view of all these reasons, We would dismiss all the three Writ Petitions and direct the Investigating Agency to proceed further holding their head high and with confidence that they would come to the correct conclusion on completion of investigation.
In the result, the Writ Petitions stand dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed. [C.V.K., J.] [R.S.V., J.]
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