What is the constitutional distinction between an elected public representative and a selected public servant affirmed in this case?
Coram: Justice Surya Kant · Justice Ujjal Bhuyan
Constitution of India — Art. 226 — Panchayati Raj — Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 — Removal of Sarpanch — Natural justice — Elected representative v. public servant — Women in governance — Panchayati Raj — Elected representative is not subordinate to bureaucracy — Held: An elected public representative is constitutionally distinct from a selected public servant; administrative authorities cannot, on a self-styled supervisory power, treat an elected Sarpanch as their subordinate or disregard the democratic legitimacy conferred by election. (¶12) Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 — Removal on a flimsy pretext violates natural justice — Held further: An elected Sarpanch cannot be singled out and removed for delay in development works that were the shared responsibility of several officials and agencies; proceedings launched on a flimsy pretext, denying her a hearing, are atrocious and unsustainable. (¶11, 13) Constitution of India — Art. 226 — Writ lies despite alternative remedy; reinstatement and costs — On facts, held: Under Article 226 the High Court had wide discretion to entertain the writ despite an alternative remedy where the Executive brazenly weakened grassroots democracy; the removal orders are quashed, the Sarpanch reinstated, and costs of ₹1,00,000 imposed with an inquiry into the erring officials. (¶16, 17)
What is the constitutional distinction between an elected public representative and a selected public servant affirmed in this case?
The Court held that an elected representative such as a Sarpanch derives democratic legitimacy from election and is not subordinate to bureaucrats; administrative authorities cannot assert a self-styled supervisory power to equate an elected representative with a public servant holding a civil post.
Can an elected Sarpanch be removed for delay in development works that were the shared responsibility of several officials?
No. The Court held it was atrocious to hold the Sarpanch solely accountable for delays that depended on engineers, contractors, material supply and multiple officials, and that removing her on such a flimsy pretext, without evidence of her own default, was untenable.
Does removing an elected representative without an opportunity to be heard violate the principles of natural justice?
Yes. The Court held that accepting bald allegations without scrutiny and removing the elected Sarpanch without hearing her was a hasty, lackadaisical misuse of authority that blatantly disregarded well-established principles of natural justice.
Under Article 226 of the Constitution, can a High Court entertain a writ petition despite the availability of an alternative remedy?
Yes. The Court reiterated that Article 226 confers wide discretion to entertain a writ even where alternative remedies exist, particularly where the Executive has brazenly misused its power to weaken democratic values at the grassroots level; dismissal on that technical ground was wrong.
What relief did the Supreme Court grant to the removed Sarpanch?
The Court quashed the removal order and the High Court's order, allowed the appellant to continue as Sarpanch for the rest of her term, and directed the State to pay her ₹1,00,000 costs and hold an inquiry against the officials responsible for her harassment, with liberty to recover the costs from them.
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REPORTABLE 2024 INSC 901 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.12326 OF 2024 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 7279 OF 2024)
Sonam Lakra … Appellant
Versus
State of Chhattisgarh and Ors. … Respondents
ORDER
Leave granted.
The appellant in this case is a 27yearold woman, with a seemingly strong
commitment towards improving democracy at the grassroots level. Motivated
by this vision, she contested the elections in 2020 for the position of
Sarpanch of the Sajbahar Gram Panchayat in District Jashpur, Chhattisgarh,
the village that she belongs to. She was subsequently declared elected with a
substantial margin.
Having assumed the office of Sarpanch, the appellant undertook several
measures towards development of the village, with the objective of bettering
the quality of lives of its inhabitants. Pursuantly, after significant effort by the
appellant, the Zila Panchayat, Jashpur sanctioned 10 construction projects
for the Sajbahar village under the aegis of the Mahatma Gandhi Rural
Industrial Park Scheme (RIPA). These construction works involved the
development of industrial infrastructure, along with amenities such as roads
and schools, which would not only improve the wellbeing of the villagers but
also aid in making the village economically selfsufficient. However, the Chief
Executive Officer of the Janpad Panchayat, despite lacking technical
expertise regarding the time required for such projects, issued a Work Order
on 16.12.2022, mandating completion of the development works within the
limited duration of three months. This order for reasons best known to the
Chief Executive Officer was belatedly served to the Gram Panchayat on
21.03.2023, which ironically marked the end of the stipulated threemonth
period since the date of issuance of the work order.
Subsequently, the delay in execution was unjustly attributed to the
appellant, resulting in a ShowCause Notice issued on 26.05.2023, followed
by a chargesheet. In her response, the appellant clarified that there was no
delay in the construction work. Despite her explanation, bureaucratic high
handedness led to her removal from office on 18.01.2024.
Aggrieved, the appellant sought relief from higher authorities and the High
Court but faced rejection at every turn. Undeterred, she initiated the present
proceedings. On 05.04.2024, this Court stayed the orders of the Sub
Divisional Officer (Revenue), Pharsabahar, and the High Court, reinstating
the appellant as Sarpanch and directing that she be allowed to perform her
duties without any obstruction.
The respondentState of Chhattisgarh has filed a counteraffidavit, containing
mechanical contentions that “sufficient opportunity was afforded to the
appellant to present her case” and that an inquiry was conducted in
compliance with the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj
Adhiniyam, 1993, and the Chhattisgarh Panchayats (Appeal and Revision)
Rules, 1995. The State further alleges that the appellant failed to submit the
Work Completion Reports on five occasions.
Be that as it may, we have heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully
perused the material placed on record.
This appears to be a classic case of administrative imperiousness, resulting
in the removal of an elected Sarpanch—a young woman dedicated to serving
her remote village in Chhattisgarh. Rather than recognizing her commitment
and supporting her vigor for the village's development, the authorities
unjustly penalized her for baseless and unwarranted reasons.
A prima facie examination of the case trajectory reveals a calculated effort by
members of the Gram Panchayat, hand in glove with administrative
authorities, to obstruct the appellant’s initiatives. These individuals sought to
undermine her credibility with unfounded accusations of misconduct and,
when these stratagems failed, resorted to sabotaging development projects.
This concerted campaign ultimately led to her unjust removal as the duly
elected Sarpanch. It is cause for concern that at every step, the appellant
faced relentless obstacles and received little to no support in her endeavors.
The first instance of hindrance in this appeal can be pinpointed to the Work
Order dated 16.12.2022, which required completion of the project within
three months but was served to the appellant only after the stipulated period
had elapsed. Subsequently, on 25.05.2023, once the construction work had
begun, the SubDivisional Officer, Rural Engineering Services, Pharsabahar—
who also bore responsibility for overseeing the project—expressed his
dissatisfaction over the alleged delay in completing the work under the RIPA
scheme, and even went so far as to request that action be taken against the
appellant.
When proceedings commenced at the District Administration level, not only
were the bald allegations against the appellant accepted without scrutiny, but
she was also denied the fundamental opportunity to be heard. It is deeply
troubling to witness administrative officials misusing their authority and
blatantly disregarding wellestablished principles of natural justice. It is
incomprehensible how the SubDivisional Officer (Revenue), Pharsabahar,
issued the order dated 18.01.2024, directing the removal of an elected
representative in such a lackadaisical and hasty manner. It is even more so
intriguing that a junior official like a SubDivisional officer has been
empowered to determine the fate of an elected Sarpanch.
The administrative authorities, with their colonial mindset, have regrettably
failed yet again to recognize the fundamental distinction between
an elected public representative and a selected public servant. Invariably,
elected representatives like the appellant are often treated as subordinate to
bureaucrats compelled to comply with directives that serve to encroach upon
their autonomy and impinge their accountability. This misconceived and self
styled supervisory power is asserted with an intention to equate elected
representatives with public servants holding civil posts, completely
disregarding the democratic legitimacy conferred by election.
What further muddies these already murky waters is the selective
accountability imposed on the appellant for the alleged delay in completing
the development works. This is despite the fact that responsibility for these
projects was shared among multiple stakeholders, including the Sub
Divisional Officer, Rural Engineering Services, the Deputy Engineer, the
Technical Officer, the CEO of the Janpad Panchayat, and the Executing
Agency. It is selfevident that construction projects require coordinated efforts
from engineers, contractors, timely supply of materials, and are subject to the
vagaries of weather etc. Holding the Sarpanch solely accountable for delays,
without evidence of her failing in allocating work or performing a duty specific
to her elected position, is totally atrocious. We are convinced that these
proceedings were initiated on a flimsy pretext, so as to remove the appellant
from office under false and untenable grounds.
It deeply concerns us that there is a recurring pattern of similar cases, where
administrative authorities and village panchayat members collude to exact
vendettas against female Sarpanches. Such instances highlight a systemic
issue of prejudice and discrimination. More recently, in Civil Appeal No.
10913/2024, titled ‘Manisha Ravindra Panpatil v. The State of
Maharashtra’, decided on 27.09.2024, we observed that cases involving
female Sarpanches often reveal a pervasive pattern of unfair treatment across
various levels of administrative functioning. Alarmingly, the removal of an
elected female representative, especially in rural and remote areas, is
frequently treated as a casual matter, wherein disregarding principles of
natural justice and democratic processes is treated as a timehonored
tradition. This entrenched bias is particularly disheartening and demands
serious introspection and reform.
In this context, we must emphasize that as a nation striving to become an
economic powerhouse, it is distressing to witness such incidents occurring
consistently and being normalized, so much so that they bear striking
similarities even in geographically distant regions. Administrative authorities,
being custodians of actual powers and affluent enough, should lead by
example, making efforts to promote women’s empowerment and support
femaleled initiatives in rural and remote areas. Instead of adopting
regressive attitudes that discourage women in elected positions, they must
foster an environment that encourages their participation and leadership in
governance.
In this regard, we are also of the view that the High Court ought not to have
dismissed the appellant’s appeal vide order dated 29.02.2024, on mere
technical grounds, citing availability of alternative remedies. It is trite law
that the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution has the vast discretion to entertain a writ petition, even if
alternate remedies may exist, especially in cases where the Executive has
blatantly and brazenly misused its power to weaken democratic values at the
grass root level.
The impugned orders passed by the SubDivisional Officer (Revenue),
Pharsabahar, District Jashpur, Chhattisgarh dated 18.01.2024, as well as
that of the High Court dated 29.02.2024 are, thus, quashed. The appellant
shall continue to hold the Office of Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Jashpur,
Chhattisgarh till the completion of her term.
Furthermore, considering the harassment faced by the appellant, compelling
her to engage in unavoidable litigation, we direct the respondentState to pay
her costs amounting to ₹1,00,000 (Rupees One Lakh) within four weeks. The
Chief Secretary, State of Chhattisgarh, is directed to release the said amount
to the appellant within the stipulated time and thereafter conduct an inquiry
against the delinquent officers/officials responsible for her harassment. The
State is at liberty to recover the cost amount from such erring officials in
accordance with the principles of natural justice.
The appeal stands disposed of accordingly.
As a result, pending interlocutory applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
………………………J. (SURYA KANT)
………………………J. (UJJAL BHUYAN)
NEW DELHI; NOVEMBER 14, 2024.
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