Sujata Bora v. Coal India Limited & Ors.

"Lack of physical sight does not equate to a lack of vision." — Stevie Wonder

1. An advertisement was published by Coal India Limited (CIL) for recruitment of Management Trainees in 2019. The appellant applied for the post under the Visually Handicapped (VH) category and was selected for the interview. By a communication of 1st July 2021 she was called for document verification and the Initial Medical Examination (IME). She appeared for the IME in September 2021 but was declared unfit on the ground that she suffered not only from visual disability but also from residuary partial hemiparesis. Aggrieved, she filed WPA No. 970 of 2023 before the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta.

2. A learned Single Judge, after analysing the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act) and the relevant notifications, found that CIL, being a Public Sector Corporation, could not refuse appointment in the multiple-disability category and was bound to suitably modify the recruitment notifications; the IME result of 23.09.2021 declaring the appellant unfit was quashed. As she had approached the Court after completion of the recruitment process, she was permitted to participate in the ensuing 2023 process in the reserved category, her candidature to be considered from the IME stage, and if found eligible to be appointed. By an interim order dated 27.03.2023, one post was kept vacant in the cadre of management trainee.

3. CIL carried the matter to the Division Bench, which set aside the Single Judge's judgment on the ground that the writ petition and the interim order came after the expiry of the panel, so directing consideration in the same or next recruitment process was not tenable.

4. The appellant approached this Court, which by orders dated 28.11.2025, 12.12.2025 and 18.12.2025 directed the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS), New Delhi to constitute a Board of experts, co-opting Dr. Satendra Singh, who has long worked on disability rights, to assess whether the appellant's disability is functional and meets the benchmark.

5. The orders directed AIIMS to assess whether the appellant (claiming 60-70% visual disability, disputed by CIL at 30%) fell within "person with benchmark disability", emphasising that what mattered was whether the disability was functional, and that one Board member should be Dr. Satendra Singh. AIIMS initially indicated that confirming benchmark multiple disability (in view of right-side facial paralysis) required an opinion from the PMR/multiple-disability department and further neurological investigation.

6. In pursuance, the appellant was medically examined by a Committee of doctors appointed by AIIMS for assessment of disability.

7. A report dated 1st January 2026 was received, according to which the appellant suffers 57% disability, which is above the benchmark disability of 40%.

8. The Division Bench on facts was not justified in setting aside the judgment of the Single Judge merely because the panel had expired. The appellant at the first instance was wrongly denied her employment pursuant to the 2019 notification. The learned Single Judge moulded the relief in view of the passage of time and directed her to be considered from the IME stage for the 2023 recruitment; by interim order one post was also kept vacant.

9. Today the situation is, the report from AIIMS finds her with 57% disability, rendering her eligible for the appointment under the reserved quota.

10. We had an opportunity to interact with the appellant, and we have found her to be a lady of grit and determination. She wants to excel in her field and work hard.

11. We heard Mr. Prashant Shrikant Kenjale for the appellant and Mr. Vivek Narayan Sharma for CIL.

12. We are of the view that the appellant qualifies for the appointment to the post of Management Trainee.

## CONCEPT OF REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION

13. This Court in a series of judgments has highlighted the concept of "reasonable accommodation" — enshrined in the RPwD Act and emanating from Article 41 read with Articles 14 and 21. In Omkar Ramchandra Gond v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 775, the Court held that Section 2(y) of the RPwD Act defines "reasonable accommodation" as necessary and appropriate modification and adjustment, without imposing a disproportionate or undue burden, to ensure persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise of rights equally with others, and that the concept must be given a broad, purposive interpretation that furthers the objective of the RPwD Act and Article 41.

14. Reiterating Omkar in Anmol v. Union of India, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 387, the Court held that flexibility in answering individual needs is an essential component of reasonable accommodation; there cannot be a "one size fits all" approach.

15. In Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Services, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3130, the Court explained that reasonable accommodation is not only statutorily prescribed but rooted in the fundamental rights of persons with disabilities under Part III; it is a "gateway right" without which a person with disability is forced to navigate a world that excludes them by design, and its failure constitutes discrimination. The benchmark standard applies only where expressly stipulated; under Section 2(s), a person with disability need not qualify any benchmark.

16. In Ch. Joseph v. Telangana SRTC, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1592, the Court held that retirement on medical grounds must be a measure of last resort, only after the employer exhausts all reasonable avenues for redeployment; the failure to explore alternate employment is a substantive illegality.

17. In Rajive Raturi v. Union of India, (2024) 16 SCC 654, the Court explained that the duty to provide reasonable accommodation is an ex nunc duty, enforceable from the moment an individual with an impairment needs it, and seeks to achieve individual justice taking the dignity, autonomy and choices of the individual into account.

## FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF STATE POLICY

18. In Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625, the Court (per Chandrachud, C.J.) held that Parts III and IV together constitute the conscience of the Constitution and are like two wheels of a chariot; the harmony and balance between fundamental rights and directive principles is an essential feature of the basic structure.

19. Justice Douglas of the U.S. Supreme Court in Barsky v. Board of Regents observed that the right to work is the most precious liberty that man possesses.

20. It is the most precious liberty because it sustains and enables a person to live, and the right to life means something more than mere animal existence. Article 39(a), a Directive Principle, provides that the State shall direct its policy towards securing that citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means of livelihood.

21. Article 41 secures the right to work, to education and to public assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, and in other cases of undeserved want.

22. Article 37 provides that the Directive Principles, though not enforceable by any court, are fundamental in the governance of the country; the principles in Articles 39(a) and 41 must be regarded as equally fundamental in interpreting fundamental rights.

## INTERSECTIONALITY OF DISABILITY WITH GENDER

23. In the present case, we are also concerned with the intersectionality of disability with gender justice. Here is a single woman who has the urge to succeed notwithstanding her disability. Technicalities like expiry of the panel, or the interim order reserving a vacancy having been passed after the expiry of the panel, cannot come in the way of doing complete justice, especially when the denial of employment in 2019 was no fault of hers.

24. In Jane Kaushik v. Union of India, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2257, the Court discussed intersectionality, emphasising that addressing barriers from only one axis of discrimination may not ensure substantive equality where a person faces multiple axes (such as disability and gender together); reasonable accommodation of persons placed at the intersection of various grounds of discrimination cannot be unidimensional.

## CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND DISABILITY RIGHTS

25. The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2011) provide that the responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights includes respecting the rights of individuals belonging to groups requiring particular attention, including persons with disabilities.

26. The ILO Global Business and Disability Network has concluded that the rights of persons with disabilities are human rights; enterprises have an obligation to respect these rights and address adverse impacts, approaching disability from a non-discrimination angle and not exclusively as a diversity or inclusion issue.

27. Thus, it is abundantly clear that rights of persons with disabilities have to be viewed from the prism of Corporate Social Responsibility in order to protect and further such rights. True equality at the workplace can be achieved only with the right impetus given to disability rights as a facet of Corporate Social Responsibility.

28. Disability inclusion is a vital component of the "Social" dimension in the Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) framework; companies and investors should view disability inclusion not just as a compliance issue but as a strategic advantage.

29. The appellant qualified for the interview in 2019 selection and was denied employment due to no fault of hers. Her disability exceeded the benchmark disability and only because the notification advertising the vacancies did not provide for "multiple disability" and the appellant applied as a visually handicapped candidate, she was denied employment.

30. Keeping in mind the above principle we direct that a supernumerary post be created.

31. We are sure that the Chairman of Coal India will provide a suitable position/posting commensurate with the ability of the appellant, and in such circumstances, she be provided a suitable desk job with a separate computer and keyboard, as per universal design as defined under section 2(ze) of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.

32. We request the Chairman of Coal India Ltd. to post the appellant at North Eastern Coalfields, Coal India Ltd., having an office at Margherita, Tinsukia, Assam.

33. We clarify that we have passed this order, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, keeping in mind Article 41 read with Article 14 & 21 of the Constitution.

34. We make it clear that we have passed this order additionally in exercise of our power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.

35. We place on record our sincere gratitude to Mr. Vivek Narayan Sharma, the learned counsel appearing for Coal India Ltd., for using his good offices and bringing about a very happy end to this litigation.

36. We also express our deep and sincere gratitude towards all the doctors who examined the appellant and the Director of AIIMS, New Delhi.

37. For the reasons stated above, we set aside the order of the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta in MAT 2325/2023. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.