Can the Government resume land assigned under the Government Grants Act, 1895 after its repeal where no resumption proceeding was pending?

(Judgment of this Court was delivered by C.V. KARTHIKEYAN, J.) All these Writ Appeals have emanated from a common order passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court, dated 09.05.2025 in four separate Writ Petitions, namely, W.P(MD)Nos.1399 of 2024, 1401 of 2024, 2772 of 2024 and 2860 of 2024, by which common order, the learned Single Judge had allowed the said Writ Petitions. Aggrieved, the respondent/State/Commissioner of Land Administration and also a private individual have filed the present Writ Appeals.

It is also to be noted that the said private individual had also filed two Civil Miscellaneous Petitions seeking leave of this Court to file Writ Appeals against the common order with respect to the Writ Petitions, in which he was not a party.

The entire issue surrounds assignment of 31.10 acres of lands at Tallakulam in Madurai on 29.11.1912 by the then Government in favour of the then existing American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Mission. The assignment was made on a request by Miss.E.M.Swift, who was attached to the said American Mission seeking assignment of 31.10 acres of land in Tallakulam for providing an industrial home for needy women. She stated that the object or rather the purpose for which such assignment was required was to put up an industrial home for women consequent to a number of women of all classes seeking applications for help and that in such a home they might be taught to earn their own living and receive practical helps which would be to their advantage. The land was required to fulfill such objects and that assignment was sought in favour of American Mission.

On 19.11.1912, a reference was made by the Board of Revenue (Land Revenue) enclosing a letter from the then Acting Collector of Madras addressed to the Secretary/Commissioner of Land Revenue and the said issue was discussed. It was noted that in Tallakulam, 9.75 acres were available in S.No.163-C, 1.60 acres of lands were available in S.No. 163-E and 13.75 acres of lands were available in S.No.163, which was totally, 25.10 acres and a further 6 acres of lands were available in S.No. 334, bringing the total area to 31.10 acres.

A decision had been taken that the said lands could be assigned, since there was consent to pay the value as prevailed and also to pay the assessment. This assessment was liable for periodical revision. It was also covenanted that the lands should be used only for industrial and charitable purposes and it was also further covenanted that if at any time, the purpose for which it had been assigned ceased to exit, then the Government could resume the lands. It was further provided that in the event of resumption, the compensation shall be paid to the value of the land at the time of resumption or acquisition.

Very interestingly, an opinion was put up by the Board of Revenue that it was sufficient to impose just the condition that the land should be assessed and that such assessment could be subjected to periodical review and the other conditions of assignment need not be insisted upon. But however, while passing the order of actual assignment on 29.11.1912, the conditions as stated above were included and formed part of the assignment.

The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions continued to hold the lands independent of any interference from anybody. There were applications made seeking permission to alienate the lands and permissions had also been granted. It was always subject to the primary condition that the lands should be used for the purpose of an institute towards providing skills for needy women.

Thereafter, in the year 1947, the Church of South of India came to be formed. The Church formed the Church of South India Trust Association, a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, to administer and manage movable and immovable assets of the Church.

The land which had been assigned in the year 1912 was never visited with any notice or communication from the Government authorities with respect to the usage of the land or with any allegation that the land was not put to the purpose for which it had been assigned or being put to usage for a purpose for which it had not been assigned.

Thereafter, on 31.12.1973, much after the formation of the Church of South India, the United Church Board for World Missionaries, a foreign missionary and the successor to the original assignee/American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions entered into an indenture for transfer of the lands to the Church of South India Trust Association. This transfer was as a transfer from one trust to another trust. This transfer was by way of a registered document registered as Doc.No.2297 of 1974 in the office of the Sub Registrar-II, at Madurai. The said transfer was a transfer simpliciter of the lands, which had been originally assigned, namely 31.10 acres of lands. The document did not mention any of the conditions under which the assignment had been originally granted in the year 1912. However, the transfer was affected and the lands became vested with the Church of South India Trust Association with absolute rights to deal with the property in the manner they thought fit and appropriate.

It is to be noted that no questions were raised by the official authorities about the transfer of lands or of the document by which the said transfer was effected though there was no mention of the conditions as originally imposed in the grant of the year 1912.

It must also be incidentally mentioned that the said grant was under the Government/Board of Revenue, which was a body under the Government Grants Act, 1895. It should also be mentioned that this grant of assignment was after the enactment of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. It should therefore be safely concluded that the grant was outside the scope of any of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. This should be understood in view of Section 2(d) of the Transfer of Property Act, which excluded from any transfer by operation of law and it cannot be denied that the assignment in the year 1912 was a transfer by operation of law/the Government Grants Act, 1895.

The lands which had been vested with the Church of South India Trust Association came to be held by them continuously without any interference by any of the statutory authorities. The revenue records were mutated in the name of the Church of South India Trust Association. The land was assessed to tax in the name of the Church of South India Trust Association. Buildings were constructed and planning permissions had been obtained in the name of the Church of South India Trust Association. Properties which had been let out for lease by the Church of South India Trust Association. For all practical purposes, the said Association exercised ownership of the lands without that right being called into question by stating the original conditions attached with the initial assignment. No authority had interfered with any of the transactions made by the Trust Association.

Thereafter, the Church of South India Trust Association, holding that the lands absolutely vested with it, had created powers of attorney to deal with the properties. It should also be mentioned that in the meanwhile, the lands had been surveyed and resurvey numbers had also been assigned. Even at the time of conducting survey, no questions were raised regarding the particular usage of the lands. No questions were asked whether it was being put to the purpose for which it had been originally assigned.

By the powers of attorney granted, the power agents conveyed the lands to third parties. Again, no questions were asked when those documents were registered. In this manner, the lands in S.No.163-G, measuring 13.75 acres, which had been surveyed and assigned as Re.S.Nos.881B1A, 88/1B1B, 88/1B1C, 88/1B2A and 88/1B2B and Town S.Nos.6/3, 6/6, 6/2, 6/4 and 6/5, respectively, measuring. 0.04, 0.07, 12.55, 0.27 and 0.37 acres respectively, were the subject matter of sale and a total extent of 6.74 acres was sold to third parties by registered sale deeds in Doc.No.569/2008, 928/2008 and 929/2008 on the file of the Sub Registrar, Tallakulam. Again, no objections had been raised for the sale of the said lands. Documents presented for registration were registered. These lands were again sold to different parties.

Quite apart from sale deeds being executed, the revenue records were also mutated. Planning permissions to put up buildings were also approved. Properties with buildings were also assessed with tax. The properties were dealt with as properties without any conditions attached to the same and the authorities who should have stepped in, had not stepped in and did not raise any objections. They had acquiescenced to these transactions. They had acquiescenced to the transfer and mutation of the names in the revenue records. They had acquiescenced by granting permission for construction of buildings.

One D.Devasahayam, claiming to be extremely interested in the affairs of the Church filed W.P.(MD)No.24352 of 2022 in the nature of a Public Interest Litigation seeking a direction against the second respondent/Commissioner of Land Administration at Chennai to resume the aforementioned properties in S.No.163C measuring 9.75 acres, in S.No.163B measuring 1.60 acres, in S.No.163G measuring 13.75 acres and in S.No.334 measuring 6 acres, totally 31.10 acres in Tallakulam, which were the lands originally assigned in the year 1912. He claimed that he had given a representation on 22.08.2022 and since it was not addressed in the manner he wanted it to be addressed, he filed the above Writ Petition.

We should pause at this moment to add that it was the prerogative of the Government to resume the lands. It was the prerogative of the Government to resume the lands if the Government was of the opinion that the lands had been put to use for purposes for which it had not been assigned. Till this date, the Government has not taken any step on its own motion. This is a significant fact.

The Writ Petition came to be examined by a Coordinate Division Bench of this Court and by order, dated 13.12.2022, it had directed examination of the said representation by conducting an enquiry and verifying whether the conditions stipulated in the assignment order had been violated and to pass appropriate orders on merits and in accordance with law after affording due opportunities to all necessary parties. A time limit of twelve (12) weeks had been stipulated.

In compliance with the direction issued, the Commissioner of Land Administration passed the order impugned in the Writ Petitions. Challenging the same, the developers of the plots as well as the Church of South India filed Writ Petitions in W.P.(MD)No.1399, 1401, 2772 and 2860 of 2024, dated 09.05.2025. A learned Single Judge vide order, dated 09.05.2025, had allowed the Writ Petitions. Aggrieved, the present Writ Appeals have been filed.

At this juncture, it would only be appropriate to go a little backward in time to point out one development, namely, the passing of the Repealing and Amending (Second) Act of 2017, by the Parliament by which 131 Acts and 9 Ordinances promulgated by the Governor General of India before independence had been repealed. The Acts which had been repealed were mentioned in the Schedule-I to the Amending Act and the Acts in which minor amendments had been brought in had been included in Schedule-II. When the Repealing and Amending Bill 2017 and the Repealing and Amending (Second) Bill 2017 were moved in the Lok Sabha, the Minister of State in the Ministry of Law and Justice and the Minister of State in the Ministry of Corporate Affairs had putforth the Bill for consideration before the House. They stated that the Bill had been introduced to repeal certain enactments, which were in Schedule-I of the Bill and to amend certain other enactments which were in Schedule-II.

They stated that they commended the Government for bringing forward the repeal and the amendments claiming that the Bill was appropriate and valid and there was much logic in it. It was stated that by the said Bill, redundant Acts were sought to be wiped out from the statute books. It was stated that the laws had become obsolete and were no longer required in independent India. It was stated that after the Constitution had come into force governing the laws and the judicial system, the Acts mentioned in Schedule-I were no longer required to be on the record books.

As a matter of fact, one of the Members pointed out an alliteration stating that within about 20 days from the date on which the Bill was moved, in Tamil Nadu, the festival of Bogi was to be celebrated and at that festival, all things in the house that are unused, unnecessary and irrelevant are collected and burnt in a bonfire. It was stated that similarly, the enactments mentioned in Schedule-I are unused, unnecessary, irrelevant and required to be burnt or rather repealed once and for all. The Bill was passed unanimously in both the Houses of the Parliament.

During the discussion in the Rajya Sabha over the Bill, one Member of the Parliament, while supporting the Bill, though belonging to the opposition, stated that it was required and was in line with a legal doctrine which he called the Doctrine of destitute.

This doctrine is actually the doctrine of desuetude. The jurisprudential meaning of the word desuetude is “long and continued non use of a law rendering it invalid” at least in the sense that Courts will no longer tolerate punishing its violators or transgressors.

An interesting article had been published in (2004) 4 SCC (Jour) 21 by Justice Jitendra N.Bhatt, at that time, a Judge of the Gujarat High Court, who later was appointed as Chief Justice of the Patna High Court. The article was called “Dynamics and Dimensions of Doctrine of Desuetude”. The learned Judge was actually recommended at one point of time to be the Chief Justice of Nauru, a country near Fiji. His knowledge was so valued. In his article, he had stated that when there is prolonged non enforcement of a statute with community acquiescence, it amounts to desuetude. He had further stated that it would include statutes enacted half a century earlier and never used. The Government Grants Act, 1895, had been put to use in the year 1912 in the assignment of the lands. Thereafter, the encumbrances created by the private individuals were never questioned, implying directly that the Government had not enforced the conditions imposed. The conditions had attained a natural extinction leading to natural death.

It was also pointed out in the said article that the doctrine of desuetude would be applicable to declare a rule which had become null as obsolete and void. It was stated that the repeal of a statue by desuetude is like repeal by a “sunset clause”. A sunset clause would be a part of a statutory rule or regulation. While examining the applicability of the said doctrine, the Author also wondered as to why it was not put in use to repeal statutes enacted far before independence and were not put to use at all for any practical purposes.

Very significantly, the Repealing and Amending (Second) Act 2017, while repealing the laws as given in Schedule-I had not thought it fit to introduce amendments to the said Acts which were repealed or to even introduce a substitute Act or any other Act of similar nature. The Acts which were repealed were simply wiped away from the records. They no longer were deemed to be existing. Among them, was the Government Grants Act 1895.

There was a savings clause in the Amending Acts, 2017, therein, which was as follows:

Even before examining the import of this clause, it would be instructive to cite a judgement of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court reported in (2000) 2 SCC 536 in the case of Kolhapur Canesugar Works Limited and another -vs.- Union of India and others. The Constitution Bench examined the repeal and deletion of an Act in entirety and answered the question whether, in such circumstances, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act could be applied to revive any of the clauses of the Act, which had been so completely repealed without any substitute Act being brought into force.

The Constitution Bench held that a repeal of a statute or deletion of a provision totally obliterates it from the statute books and the proceedings pending thereunder stand discontinued. It was also held in that case the proceedings for recovery of an erroneously granted rebate, which had been initiated, but was pending on that date, namely, the date of repealing the statute, stood lapsed. It was also held that an order of recovery passed in that proceeding after the said date was non est. It was therefore categorically held that by repealing of the Act mentioned in Schedule-I, the Parliament/the legislature intended to convey a simple concept, that the Acts stood obliterated. It was as if they had never been enacted. There cannot be any other interpretation.

Thereafter, the Constitution Bench examined the applicability of Sections 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. It will now be worthwhile to extract Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, , 1897 which is as follows:

When Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and the savings clause of the Repealing and Amending (Second) Act of 2017 are examined, there are certain minute but significant differences. By the Repealing Act, it had been very specifically stated that the repeal of the Act will not revive or restore any jurisdiction or any amendment. The word “jurisdiction” is not used in any of the clauses in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, could be termed as an exception for putting into effect or continuing to put into effect any repeal or any amendment of an existing statute. It saves certain rights and it is for that purpose, Section 6 had been introduced.

We hold that when the Repealing and Amending (Second) Act 2017 very specifically excluded and very specifically stated that it does not revive any jurisdiction to act in accordance with the said Act, the very right of the Government to proceed further under the original assignment itself is questionable.

The Constitution Bench in (2000) 2 SCC 536, referred supra, in paragraph No.37 held as follows:

It had been very categorically held that if a statute is unconditionally omitted without a saving clause in favour of pending proceedings, all actions must stop. In the instant case, to again reiterate, the Government has never ever acted and still has not acted on its own motion to enforce any of the conditions of the assignment. The Constitution Bench further held that when a particular provision in a statute is omitted without a saving clause in favour of pending proceedings, then the intention of the legislature could be reasonably interfered. But however, if there were no pending proceedings, there cannot be any instance of proceedings being initiated under an Act which had been repealed like the Government Grants Act, 1895, as in this case.

The learned Additional Advocate General while arguing very strongly, pointed out to the document of indenture by which the lands had been transferred by the American Mission to the Church of South India Trust Association and stated that in the said document, there was no indication or stipulation or even a reference to the condition which had been imposed at the time of assignment of the lands. The learned Additional Advocate General therefore argued that this transfer was borne out of fraudulent intention and anything mired with fraud can never be subsequently stated to be cloaked with an honest intention or as a bona fide transaction. He therefore justified the inaction of the Government or statutory authorities in subsequent transactions since the parent document, by which transfer of land was made to the Church of South India Trust Association did not refer the conditions which had been imposed at the time of original grant. The authorities were therefore oblivious of such conditions and therefore, could not be blamed for not raising any objection at subsequent transfers or even consenting for transfer or for mutation of the revenue records and for granting building permissions and for such other official acts.

The same argument is also put forth by the learned Senior Counsels on behalf of the purchasers, who stated that in view of the absence of such conditions in the said transfer document, the purchasers should only be treated as innocent purchasers without notice of the conditions imposed and therefore cannot be visited with notices to resume the lands.

In this connection, it would be worthwhile to take recourse to the dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in (1995) 3 SCC 434, in the case of Municipal Corporation for City of Pune and another -vs.- Bharat Forge Company Limited and others. The facts in that case related to a notification that was gazetted in the year 1881 providing that octroi duties in the Cantonment of Poona would be imposed at the rates “for the time being” leviable and in respect of several articles, “for the time being” dutiable in the Municipality of Poona, when such articles entered into the Cantonment from any place outside the limits of the Municipality. In effect, by the notification of the year 1881, the Cantonment Board had authorised the Municipality to collect octroi, which has become leviable and thereafter, to divide the proceeds as agreed upon.

The Municipality of Poona had then become a Corporation under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949. It, however, continued to collect octroi on the strength of the notification issued in the year 1881. This collection was challenged by the respondents before the High Court. They claimed that this collection was not lawful and not in accordance with 1963 Schedule to the Octroi Rules framed by the appellant, the Municipal Corporation for City of Poona.

The High Court allowed the challenge to the collection of octroi necessitating filing an appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The challenge to the collection before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was on two grounds, namely, that the 1881 notification does not, as a fact, permit collection and even if factually it were to permit, the appellant could not have done so in law.

A parallel could be drawn with the grant of the year 1912 under the Government Grants Act, 1895. In the instant case, there had been assignment of the lands, not free of cost as any of the assignment would normally be, but for valuable market rate. Thereafter, conditions had been imposed. The learned Single Judge was of the view that these conditions could not be so imposed and should be held unlawful in view of Sections 10 and 11 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1872. But, we have observed earlier that the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act would not come into play in view of the exception under Section 2(d) of the said Act. Further, under Section 5 of the Act, a transfer of property had been defined as an act by which a living person conveys property in present or in future to one or more other living persons or to himself. It could be in simple terms put as a transfer inter vivos.

This was not the case of the assignment in the year 1912. There was an element of consideration which is an important element so far as transfer of a right is concerned. For effecting such transfer of a right vested in the Government, consideration had been paid, but still conditions had been imposed. That is a fact. Whether the conditions could be enforced as per law is the issue involved herein and was also before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation for city of Pune referred supra.

The Supreme Court had drawn a fine distinction between a permission which exists as a fact and whether though it exists as a fact, it could be enforced in law. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while examining in the backdrop of the facts narrated above relating to octroi and the right to collect octroi or rather the permission to collect octroi granted by the Cantonment Board to the Municipality and further sought to be exercised by the Corporation of Pune, had examined the phrases “executive construction” viz-a-viz, “practical construction” as stated in Interpretation of Laws by Crawford. It had been observed that in those circumstances, even though the notification was of the year 1881, it had never been applied either impliedly or explicitly by the Municipality of Poona and therefore, the earlier notification could not be stated to be still existing in law. It was under those circumstances that the Supreme Court had examined the doctrine of desuetude.

The Supreme Court held that they found no objection in principle to apply this doctrine to our statues as well. They had observed as follows:

The Hon'ble Supreme Court had thus travelled on a pathway which had not been earlier traversed. It held that when a statute had been in disuse for long duration, a citizen should know whether he is still required to act as per the “dead letter”.

While we draw a parrellel with this principle to the document by which the transfer had been made of the properties in the year 1973 by the American Mission in favour of the Church of South India Trust Association, it should be kept in mind that the transfer dealt with a property which had been assigned nearly more than 6 decades back and there has never been any question raised or any step taken by the Government to examine whether the conditions of the grant had been adhered to or not.

What remained as a fact was the payment of adequate consideration at market value, which normally should have divested the Government of all rights over the property. Even in the very said grant, an opinion had been stated by the Board of Revenue that imposition of such conditions was not required and the only condition that should be imposed was assessment of the property to tax at periodical revisions. The conditions therefore had watered down and had never been put into use. They had become a “dead letter”. It is under those circumstances that we fall back on this doctrine and its applicability to the laws of this land.

This judgment had been subsequently referred to and the doctrine had also been referred to in yet another judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (1997) 9 SCC 450 in the case of Cantonment Board, MHOW and another -vs.- MP State Road Transport Corporation. In this particular judgment, it was held that disuse of a statute for long and evolution of contrary practice of some duration would render the statute as desuetude. This was with respect to the Taxation Act and its applicability to the Cantonment and subsequent introduction of the Municipalities Act and whether they had repealed the earlier provisions of the Taxation Act.

Once again, the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to the said doctrine and held that when a statute in question had been in disuse for long, then it does not behove well to revive it or apply it to the disadvantage of any party.

As pointed out, quite parallelly, during the devolution of the lands to the Church of South India Trust, the Government or the authorities had not taken any steps to examine whether subsequent mutations are permissible or whether a stamp of approval could be granted to them. They granted the stamp approval. They never objected to any of the further transactions. They remained silent spectators. They in fact acquiescenced to such transfers. All the transfers became lawful.

It must be further pointed out that the Board of Revenue was subsequently abolished by the Tamil Nadu Board of Revenue Abolition Act, 1980. The said Act had been introduced to provide for the abolition of the Board of Revenue and to provide for matters connected there with. The powers of the Board of Revenue and the jurisdiction were vested and performed by the Government or the Commissioner or any officer not below the rank of Additional Secretary to the Government or any other officer not below the rank of District Collector. With the abolition of the Board of Revenue, a question which has to be addressed is about the status of the lands assigned by the Board of Revenue prior to its abolition.

Section 12 of Tamil Nadu Board of Revenue Abolition Act, 1980, provided for a repeal of the earlier Tamil Nadu Board of Revenue Regulation, 1803, The Tamil Nadu Revenue Commissioner Act, 1849 and the Tamil Nadu Board of Revenue Act 1894. They were all repealed.

It had been provided as follows in Section 12 (2) of the Tamil Nadu Board of Revenue Abolition Act, 1980:

A careful perusal of the above provision would show that though the Act had been repealed, any application, any appeal, any revision or any proceeding pending before the Board of Revenue under any Law shall stand transferred to the Government. The primary condition is that the action initiated should be pending on the date of the abolition of the earlier Acts and the coming into force of the present Act. The further stipulation is that any action taken under any law including any order passed before the date of commencement shall be deemed to have been done, taken or given by the Government or appropriate authority.

It had been argued on behalf of the appellant/State that the condition which had been imposed is an order which had been passed by the Board of Revenue and is a binding condition, and failing which, the land will be resumed by the Government. That condition remained only on paper. It is, as had been referred in the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pune Corporation referred supra, a condition on fact, but it can never applied in law.

The condition that the lands should be put to a particular use is a condition which can never be disputed. The condition that if the lands are not put to that particular use, the Government could resume the lands is again a fact which cannot be disputed. But the crucial aspect is whether the Government had initiated action to resume the lands. If they had done so prior to the introduction of the Tamil Nadu Board of Revenue Abolition Act and if such proceedings were pending, then proceedings will have to continue and be taken to their logical conclusion. But if the Government had taken a conscious and considered decision not to take any legal steps in that regard, then, subsequent to the abolition of the Board of Revenue and more importantly, to the repeal of the Government Grants Act, 1895, no step could be taken by the Government. The Act stands repealed. The order of the Board of Revenue stands wiped out. What remains is the consideration paid to the Government for the lands and there can be no quarrel to the assertion that when consideration is paid, right is divested.

We are not able to fathom as to why the Government had not initiated any steps. It would only indicate that they were never interested in initiating steps. They have still not initiated steps on their own motion. They had woken up only when the Court in the judgment initially referred supra, had directed the Commissioner of Land Administration to enquire into the entire issue. It was more an act of compulsion rather than exercising the powers vested with the Government. The Commissioner of Land Administration had acted only owing to directions of the Court. This can never be stated as a proceeding pending on the date of abolition or repeal of the Government Grants Act, 1895, or abolition of the Board of Revenue.

Very significantly, when the Division Bench had issued directions in the year 2022, the Government Grants Act, 1895 had already been repealed in the year 2018. That fact had not been brought to the notice of the Division Bench. The Act under which the land had been assigned was not in force. The attention of the Division Bench was also not drawn to the fact that the Tamil Nadu Board of Revenue Abolition Act had abolished the Board of Revenue. The fact that there were savings in the Repealing Act of the 2017 was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench. The fact that in the savings, it had been very specifically stated that there could be no restoration of jurisdiction with respect to practice, procedure or other matter was never brought to the notice of the Division Bench. It was merely an order passed on the facts presented before it and the facts as presented by the Writ Petitioner in the manner he wanted them to be presented. The effect of the repeal of the Government Grants Act, 1895, was never discussed. The abolition of the Board of Revenue was not discussed. The fact that the said enactment had become a dead letter and therefore whether a mandamus could be issued was never discussed.

A question was never thrown as to why the Government had not acted. It was only a direction to the Commissioner of Land Administration to enquire into the entire aspect. By that time, valuable right had accrued to various third parties. Such right had accrued under operation of law. Such right had accrued without being questioned or challenged. Such right to property can never be sought to be deprived.

In this connection, it would be extremely appropriate to refer to Article 300A of the Constitution, which provides that no person shall be deprived of property, except by authority of law. In the Constitution, the word “authority” is used only in two Articles. One with respect to imposition of taxes, which can never be imposed on a citizen except by authority of law and the other with respect to deprivation of property, which could never be done, except by authority of law. The law which existed, the Government Grants Act, 1895, had been wiped out by the Parliament. It had been declared as redundant, as a dead law by the Parliament. The legislature did not want the law to exist anymore in the books of records.

When the Government Grants Act, 1895 had been repealed and when the Board of Revenue which originally granted the assignment had also been abolished and when there was no substitute enactment brought in force, we hold there was no authority provided by law and there was no authority authorised by law to deprive the property of any individual, including, particularly of the respondents herein.

The Commissioner of Land Administration who passed the order impugned in the Writ Petition appears to be an interesting person. He had passed the orders under direction of the Court. He was only aware of the fact that the lands have been assigned on certain conditions. The condition was to establish an institute for empowerment of women. Incidentally, it must also be pointed out that there is no quarrel over the fact that Schools and Colleges have been established in the said lands, though a portion had also been commercially exploited. An argument was also advanced that the profit from such commercial establishments are actually also applied for the benefit of the institutes which are run by the Church. We would leave it at that. The Commissioner of Land Administration primarily had to examine whether the lands had been put to use satisfying the conditions of assignment. After directing that they should be resumed, it was only lawful to expect him to also adhere to the conditions. What applied to the assignees at that particular point of time should also apply when the lands are resumed. Very interestingly and for reasons, which we are not able to decipher, he had directed the lands to be handed over to the Tamil Nadu Housing Board. We are confident and we are sure that the Housing Board would never apply the lands for the benefit of women or set up industrial units for the benefit of any woman. It is evident that the Commissioner did not know the direction in which to proceed. He had to pass an order. He passed an order. He did not however know what to do with the lands after the Government had resumed it. He had given his own opinion, as to how the lands should be used. He did not refer to the Government to indicate the usage in a particular manner. Those observations are binding only on himself and on none other. We speculate whether on a re-reading of his own order, he would consent for those observations to bind himself also.

He had given various opinions as to how the vacant lands should be applied, how the commercial establishment should be applied, how the educational and other institutions should be applied and also the residential apartments. These directions to put them mildly are absurd. We hold that it was an order passed, as repeatedly pointed out by us, more out of fear of adverse comments by the Court which passed the order directing examination of the representation, rather than an unbiased, impartial examination of the entire facts.

Though we agree with the findings of the learned Single Judge that proceedings cannot lie after the repeal of the Government Grants Act, 1895, we are not able to bring ourselves to agree with the observations of the learned Single Judge about the applicability of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. If the provisions were to be applied, they could have been resorted to initially and there could have been an outright sale inter vivos as provided under Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. But however, the transaction was excluded by Section 2(d) of the Act, and consequently, Sections 10 and 11 of the Act would also not be applicable. However, in view of the repeal and by the doctrine of desuetude, the Government Grants Act, 1895, under which the assignment was done had become dead and abolished.

We hold that the Government can never impose the conditions stipulated in the year 1912. They had never initiated any action. They had never initiated any action till this date. There were no proceedings pending to vest jurisdiction on the Government to initiate action subsequent to the abolition of the Government Grants Act, 1895. The Government Grants Act, 1895 is dead. The assignment stands. The subsequent transactions stands. They are bona fide. We have no hesitation in holding that the Writ Appeals necessarily have to suffer an order of dismissal. They are dismissed.

In view of the final orders passed in the Writ Appeals, the applications seeking leave to file appeals become redundant. They are dismissed.

In the result 1)W.A.(MD)Nos.2487 to 2490 and 3288 of 2025 and 152 of 2026 are dismissed; 2)The order passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P(MD)Nos. 1399 of 2024, 1401 of 2024, 2772 of 2024 and 2860 of 2024, dated 09.05.2025, are confirmed; 3)C.M.P.(MD)Nos.14152 and 14154 2025 are dismissed. 4)Consequently, W.A.(MD)SR.Nos.56214 and 56213 of 2025 are rejected at SR stage itself; 5)There shall be no order as to costs; and 6)Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed. [C.V.K., J.] [R.S.V., J.]