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Writ / Public Law
Madras High Court

Is the proviso to Rule 24-A of the Tamil Nadu Liquor (License and Permit) Rules, 1981 a standalone provision or a qualifying proviso?

Published · Judgment delivered
THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU v. THE SUGUNA VILASA SABHA
WA.824/2026 · WA.No.824 of 2026 · 10 August 2026
Coram: Justice N.Mala · Justice G.Jayachandran
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Headnotes

Tamil Nadu Liquor (License and Permit) Rules, 1981 — Rule 24-A and its proviso — Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act, 1937 — Interpretation of a proviso — Refund of license and privilege fee — Surrender of license —

Tamil Nadu Liquor (License and Permit) Rules, 1981 — Rule 24-A — Proviso is not a standalone provision —

Held: A proviso must be limited to the subject matter of the enacting clause and read in relation to the principal matter to which it is a proviso. It is not a separate or independent enactment. (¶21)

Tamil Nadu Liquor (License and Permit) Rules, 1981 — Rule 24-A — Surrender of license remains mandatory —

Held further: Refund under the main provision is subject to surrender of the license and proof of non-transaction of business. The proviso reduces only the quantum, from full refund to proportionate refund. (¶20, 22)

Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act, 1937 — License and privilege fee — Consideration for the State's exclusive privilege —

Held further: The license and privilege fee is not a tax but consideration paid to acquire the State's exclusive privilege. Once the license is operationalised even for a single day, the State is not responsible for interruption in business. (¶23)

Tamil Nadu Liquor (License and Permit) Rules, 1981 — Rule 24-A — Refund in equity and not in law —

Held further: A construction that nullifies the principal provision must be discarded. Refund was therefore allowed in equity and not in law, confined to the days for which bars remained shut under the lock-down. Writ appeals allowed. (¶24, 31)

Points of Law
Ratio 1

Is the proviso to Rule 24-A of the Tamil Nadu Liquor (License and Permit) Rules, 1981 a standalone provision or a qualifying proviso?

It is a qualifying proviso. A proviso must be limited to the subject matter of the enacting clause and cannot be torn out of the provision to which it is appended. Reading it as a standalone provision would supplant the main provision and render it nugatory. [12, 21, 24]

Ratio 2

Must a licensee surrender the license to claim a proportionate refund of license and privilege fee?

Yes. The main provision requires the application for refund to be accompanied by the license, so refund is subject to surrender of the license and proof of non-transaction of business. The proviso only reduces the quantum from full to proportionate refund. [20, 22]

Ratio 3

Is the license and privilege fee paid for liquor trade a tax or consideration for the State's exclusive privilege?

It is consideration paid to acquire the State's exclusive privilege, not only to transact the business of sale of liquor but also to hold and possess it, and is neither a tax nor a simple service fee. Once the license is operationalised even for a single day, the State cannot be made responsible for interruption in business. [23]

Ratio 4

Can a proviso be construed so as to render the main provision nugatory?

No. Any construction that nullifies the principal provision, or renders the proviso an instrument for defeating the very object of the enactment, must be discarded. The main provision and the proviso are read together so that they mutually throw light on each other. [21, 24]

Result of the Judgment

What did the High Court finally decide on refund of bar license fee for the Covid-19 lock-down?

The writ appeals were allowed and the learned Single Judge's orders were set aside. The licensees were held not entitled to refund under the proviso as a matter of law, but were given liberty to approach the Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise for refund of license and privilege fee, in equity, for 171 days, subject to proof of non-transaction of business. [31, 32, 33]

Prepared by the LexStreak Editorial Desk — verify against the judgment.

Key passages from the judgment
Paragraph 20Jump →

“20. We find, upon a reading of the main provision in Rule 24-A, that the application for refund of the license fee/privilege fee is to be accompanied by the license granted to the licensee. Therefore, from the main enactment, it is clear that the refund is subject to the surrender of license and the proof of non-transaction of business under the license.”

Paragraph 21Jump →

“21. It is well settled legal principle that a proviso must be limited to the subject matter of the enacting clause and that proviso must prima facie be read and construed in relation to the principle matter to which it is a proviso. In other words, the proviso normally is not an independent or separate enactment. The proviso cannot be dissected or torn out from the provision to which it is appended and the golden rule of interpretation mandates that the main provision be read along with the proviso, so that they mutually throw light on each other and result in a harmonious construction. The clear and unambiguous intention of the legislature W.A.No’s.824 of 2026 etc. batch under the main provision is to permit the refund of the full license fee on surrender of the license and proof of non-transaction of any business on the strength of the license.”

Paragraph 22Jump →

“22. The main provision in effect amounts to an “all-or-nothing” rule. In our view, the proviso was added out of equity with the intent to enable those who transacted some business, and wanted to surrender the license permanently, to avail partial/proportionate refund. The mischief sought to be remedied by the proviso was to permit only a partial/proportionate refund on surrender of license after the licensee had transacted some business. The proviso merely engrafts an exception to the quantum of refund otherwise admissible under the main provision, by reducing it from full refund to partial/proportionate on surrender of license. It, by no stretch of imagination, neither distracts from nor dilutes the substantive requirement of surrender of license for claiming partial/proportionate refund.”

Paragraph 23Jump →

“23. It is to be noted here that the license fee and privilege fee are collected for not only trading in liquor, but also for possession of the same. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of judgments [Har Shankar’s case (1975) 1 SCC 737, Khoday Distilleries case (1995) 1 SCC 574 & Issac Peter’s case 1994 SCC (4) 104] categorically declared that the State holds exclusive privilege over trade in W.A.No’s.824 of 2026 etc. batch intoxicating liquor and fee paid by the licensees is neither a tax or simple service fee, but is a consideration paid to acquire the States exclusive privilege, in not only transacting the business of sale of liquor, but also to hold and possess the same. Once the privilege is parted by paying the license and privilege fee, if the license is operationalised even for a single day, the State cannot be made responsible for interruption in business or profitability.”

Paragraph 24Jump →

“24. Keeping in view, the nature of the license and privilege fee, the interpretation sought to be placed by the learned counsel for the respondents, if accepted, would not merely qualify/except the main provision, but would virtually supplant it. Such a construction, in our considered view, would do violence to the scheme of the provision, for the principal provision is concerned with the surrender of license and the consequent refund of the license fee, while the proviso merely regulates the quantum of refund under the circumstances mentioned therein. From the principles of interpretation of statute relating to the interpretation of the proviso, as laid down by the authors referred to above and the relevant judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is clear that any construction that nullifies the principal provision or renders the proviso into an instrument for defeating the very object of the enactment must be discarded/eschewed. In our considered view the W.A.No’s.824 of 2026 etc. batch interpretation placed by the learned counsel for the respondents, creates irreconcilable conflict between the main provision and the proviso, thereby subverting the legislative intent and thus, rendering the main provision nugatory. Therefore, keeping in view the text and the context of the main provision and the proviso, the interpretation sought to be placed by the respondents cannot be accepted.”

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Acts & Sections
Tamil Nadu Liquor (License and Permit) Rules, 1981 — Rule 24-ATamil Nadu Liquor (License and Permit) Rules, 1981 — Rule 20Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act, 1937 — ss.17-C, 17-D, 17-E, 18-C, 20, 21 and 54
Cases referred
1.S.Sundaram Pillai v. V.R.Pattabiraman, (1985) 1 SCC 591
2.Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf, (1976) 1 SCC 128
3.Har Shankar, (1975) 1 SCC 737
4.Khoday Distilleries, (1995) 1 SCC 574
5.Issac Peter, 1994 SCC (4) 104
Full judgment
1.

The state disquieted by the common order of the learned Single Judge of this Court in allowing the writ petitions of the respondents, seeking refund of the license and privilege fees paid in respect of F.L.III licenses, on account of closure W.A.No’s.824 of 2026 etc. batch of their bar/hotel, on account of the lock-down declared during the Covid-19 pandemic, has filed the above bunch of writ appeals.

2.

Since the issues raised in all the writ appeals are one and the same, they are disposed of by this common judgment. For the sake of brevity, the parties will be referred to as per their rank in the writ appeals. Facts and Submissions:

3.

The facts need not detain us for long since they remain undisputed, suffice it to state that the respondents all F.L.III licensees running bars/hotels filed the writ petitions seeking refund of the license and privilege fees for the period they were forced to close business on account of lock-down, declared throughout the country due to Covid-19 Pandemic.

4.

The issue is primarily anchored on whether the refund of license and privilege fee claimed by the respondents is sustainable under the provisions of Rule 24-A read with the proviso to the Tamil Nadu Liquor (License and Permit) Rules, 1981, (Hereinafter called as Rules).

5.

The learned Additional Advocate General, for the appellants submitted that the interpretation placed by the learned Judge on the proviso to Rule 24-A of the Rules is erroneous, since the learned Judge failed to note that under Rule 24-A, for W.A.No’s.824 of 2026 etc. batch refund of license and privilege fee, the licensee is bound to surrender the license and should not have transacted any business on the strength of the license. The learned Additional Advocate General, submitted that Rule 24-A was premised on providing relief to those licensees who genuinely ceased operations and surrendered the licenses. The learned Additional Advocate General, submitted that the refund/adjustment ordered by the learned Judge, overlooking the mandatory condition relating to surrender of license in Rule 24-A is erroneous and unsustainable. The learned Additional Advocate General, further submitted that the learned Judge erred in reading the proviso as a substantive provision, for directing refund of the license and privilege fee to the respondents. The learned Additional Advocate General, based on the Covid-19 lock-down notifications issued by the Central Government from time to time submitted that in fact, the respondents were prevented from transacting the business for a period of 90 days only, and therefore the claim for the entire period of the Covid Pandemic was mischievous. The learned Additional Advocate General, finally contended that the learned Judge failed to appreciate the financial implications of the refund order on the State Exchequer.

6.

The learned counsels for the respondents submitted that the learned Judge W.A.No’s.824 of 2026 etc. batch taking into account the exceptional circumstances, arising out of Covid-19 pandemic and on appreciation of Rule 24-A and the proviso rightly allowed the refund. The learned counsels for the respondents further submitted that the failure to transact business was not due to fault of the respondents, but due to the Government's lock-down notifications which prevented them from exploiting the licenses granted to them and therefore they are entitled to refund of the license and privilege fee.

7.

We have heard the learned counsels and perused the materials placed on record. Discussions:

8.

As correctly pointed out by the learned Judge, though there are slight variations in the prayer in the writ petitions, the reliefs claimed are one and the same, namely refund of license and privilege fee under Rule 24-A read with proviso of the Tamil Nadu Liquor (License and Permit) Rules 1981.

9.

Rule 24-A was framed and inserted in the statute by G.O.Ms.No.788, Prohibition and Excise (VIII) Department, dated 10.11.1982, by exercising the powers conferred by Sections 17-C, 17-D, 17-E, 18-C, 20, 21 and 54 of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act, 1937. Section 17C, deals with the grant of exclusive W.A.No’s.824 of 2026 etc. batch privilege for manufacture etc, Section 17D relates to payment of consideration for grant of any exclusive or other privilege or fee on license for manufacture or sale, Section 17E deals with issuance of license for import and export of any liquor or article containing liquor, Section 18C deals with the imposition of duty, Section 20 deals with permits and licenses, Section 21 deals with form and conditions of licenses and Section 54 deals with power to make rules. It is pertinent to note that till the insertion of Rule 24-A, there was no provision for refund of license fees, to the licensees who could not transact any business by utilising their license. Rule 20 only provided for refund of license fee where application for grant of license was refused.

10.

Under G.O.Ms.No.788, Prohibition and Excise (VIII) Department, dated 10.11.1982, Rule 24-A alone was introduced. The G.O clearly narrates the background to the introduction of the Rule. It was stated that immediately after liberising the rules relating to issue of licenses, a large number of applications were received which could not be disposed of immediately and the licenses in some cases were granted even during January and February 1982. Therefore, an exceptional situation arose, where the licensees could not commence their business for various reasons beyond their control. Hence, it was felt that it would be W.A.No’s.824 of 2026 etc. batch improper and unfair to the licensees to let them forego the huge licensee fee of Rs.10,000/- when no business was conducted even for a day. The Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise in anticipation of the Government's approval, sanctioned the refund of the license fee of Rs.10,000/- to the grantees on surrender of their licenses and by ascertaining from the Collectors concerned that they had not commenced any business by utilising the licenses. The Commissioner thereafter requested the Government to grant ex post facto approval for the refund of the license fee and also proposed to the Government to amend the Tamil Nadu Liquor (License and Permit) Rules, 1981 to provide for refund of license fee in such cases. The Government approved the Commissioner’s action and also ratified the proposal for amendment of the Rules by inserting the Rule 24A, in the statute, by the aforesaid G.O.

11.

Rule 24-A of the rules introduced vide G.O.Ms.No.788, Prohibition and Excise (VIII) Department, dated 10.11.1982, reads as follows:

“A licensee who has not transacted any business under the license shall apply to the licensing authority for refund of the license fee along with the licence granted to him. On receipt of the application the licensing authority may refund the license fee, if he is satisfied that the licensee has not transacted any business under license W.A.No’s.824 of 2026 etc. batch granted to him.” Though the rule was introduced in 1982, the proviso to the rule was inserted vide G.O.Ms.No.1107, Home, Prohibition & Excise (VIII) Department, dated 5 th October, 1989. The proviso to Rule 24-A reads as follows:

“Provided that if any licensee has not transacted any business for any part of the year, the proportionate license fee and privilege fee shall be refunded”

12.

The short but interesting question that arises for consideration is whether the proviso to Section 24-A of the Tamil Nadu Liquor (License and Permit) Rules, 1981, should be construed as a standalone provision or as excepting or qualifying provision.

13.

The learned Judge interpreted Section 24-A as a standalone provision and on such interpretation, held that the respondents were entitled to the refund of the license and privilege fee, even without surrendering their licenses. The interpretation given to the proviso by the learned Judge is questioned by the State in these Writ Appeals. The State contends that the proviso to Section 24-A, is not a substantive provision or standalone provision, but is only a simple proviso qualifying/excepting the main enactment. It is submitted that the proviso should therefore be limited to the subject matter of the enacting clause. It is submitted W.A.No’s.824 of 2026 etc. batch that Section 24-A was introduced with a view to permit complete refund of the license fee subject, however, to surrender of license, and not transacting any business. According to the learned Additional Advocate General, the proviso is only qualifying/ exception provision and therefore, even for claiming the refund of a part of the license and privilege fee, the licenses should be surrendered.

14.

The learned counsel for the respondents in reply submitted that the interpretation placed by the learned Judge to the proviso to Section 24-A was proper and based on the construction of the text and context of the proviso and therefore the same cannot be faulted.

15.

There is no dearth of case laws and literature on the rules of interpretation of a proviso. However, we are being selective, having regard to the text and context of the statute in question before us. Craies in his book Statute Law (Seventh Edn.) while explaining the purpose and import of a proviso states at page 218 thus:

“The effect of an exception or qualifying proviso, according to the ordinary rules of construction, is to except out of the preceding portion of the enactment, or to qualify something enacted therein, which but for the W.A.No’s.824 of 2026 etc. batch proviso would be within it.... The natural presumption is that, but for the proviso, the enacting part of the section would have included the subject-matter of the proviso.” Odgers in Construction of Deeds and Statutes (Fifth Edn.) while referring to the scope of a proviso mentioned the following ingredients:

“p. 317. Provisos —These are clauses of exception or qualification in an Act, excepting something out of, or qualifying something in, the enactment which, but for the proviso, would be within it. p. 318. Though framed as a proviso, such a clause may exceptionally have the effect of a substantive enactment.” Sarathi in Interpretation of Statutes at pages 294-295 has collected the following principles in regard to a proviso: (a)When one finds a proviso to a section the natural presumption is that, but for the proviso, the enacting part of the section would have included the subject-matter of the proviso. W.A.No’s.824 of 2026 etc. batch (b)A proviso must be construed with reference to the preceding parts of the clause to which it is appended. (c)Where the proviso is directly repugnant to a section, the proviso shall stand and be held a repeal of the section as the proviso speaks the latter intention of the makers. (d)Where the section is doubtful, a proviso may be used as a guide to its interpretation: but when it is clear, a proviso cannot imply the existence of words of which there is no trace in the section. (e)The proviso is subordinate to the main section. (f)A proviso does not enlarge an enactment except for compelling reasons. (g)Sometimes an unnecessary proviso is inserted by way of abundant caution. (h)A construction placed upon a proviso which brings it into general harmony with the terms of section should prevail. (i)When a proviso is repugnant to the enacting part, the proviso will not prevail over the absolute terms of a later Act directed to be read as supplemental to the earlier one. W.A.No’s.824 of 2026 etc. batch (j)A proviso may sometimes contain a substantive provision.”

16.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.Sundaram Pillai and others versus V.R.Pattabiraman and others, reported in (1985) 1 SCC 591, while interpreting the proviso and explanation to Section 10(2) of the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act, held as follows:

“27. The next question that arises for consideration is as to what is the scope of a proviso and what is the ambit of an Explanation either to a proviso or to any other statutory provision. We shall first take up the question of the nature, scope and extent of a proviso. The well established rule of interpretation of a proviso is that a proviso may have three separate functions. Normally, a proviso is meant to be an exception to something within the main enactment or to qualify something enacted therein which but for the proviso would be within the purview of the enactment. In other words, a proviso cannot be torn apart from the main enactment nor can it be used to nullify or set at naught the real object of the main enactment.”

17.

In the judgment Dwarka Prasad versus Dwarka Das Saraf, reported in (1976) 1 SCC 128, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para '18', held as follows:

“18. We may mention in fairness to Counsel that the W.A.No’s.824 of 2026 etc. batch following, among other decisions, were cited at the Bar bearing on the uses of provisos in statutes: C.I.T v. Indo- Mercantile Bank Ltd, M/s. Ram Narain Sons Ltd. v. Asstt. C.S.T.;Thompson v. Dibdin; Rex v. Dibdin and Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P. The law is trite. A proviso must be limited to the subject-matter of the enacting clause. It is a settled rule of construction that a proviso must prima facie be read and considered in relation to the principal matter to which it is a proviso. It is not a separate or independent enactment. “Words are dependent on the principal enacting words, to which they are tacked as a proviso. They cannot be read as divorced from their context” (1912 AC 544). If the rule of construction is that prima facie a proviso should be limited in its operation to the subject-matter of the enacting clause, the stand we have taken is sound. To expand the enacting clause, inflated by the proviso, sins against the fundamental rule of construction that a proviso must be considered in relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso. A proviso ordinarily is but a proviso, although the golden rule is to read the whole section, inclusive of the proviso, in such manner that they mutually throw light on each other and result in a harmonious construction.” W.A.No’s.824 of 2026 etc. batch

18.

From, the literature and the precedents on the rules interpretation of a proviso, it is clear that a proviso may act either as a excepting or qualifying proviso. In excepting proviso, it creates a exception to something within the main enactment and in qualifying proviso, it qualifies something enacted therein, which but for the proviso would be within the purview of main enactment.

19.

The background relating to the insertion of Rule 24-A, in the statute has been narrated above. To recapitulate, the intention of the Legislature in introducing rule 24-A was to cater to an exceptional situation whereunder the licensees were granted the license months before expiry of the license period, resulting in the licensees not commencing their business. As the State felt that it would be unfair and improper for the licensees to forgo the huge license fee of Rs.10,000/-, the provision was enacted by the amending Act. The amendment was carried out in 1982, and thereafter the proviso was added seven years later, providing for refund of proportionate license fee and privilege fee to a licensee who had not transacted any business for any part of the year. The object of the legislature in introducing Rule 24-A in the statute book was to refund the license fee and privilege fee to the licensees, who did not intend to conduct business and who were willing to surrender the license. The proviso has to be interpreted W.A.No’s.824 of 2026 etc. batch keeping in view the said object of the legislature. Further, as per the rules of interpretation of a proviso, it is to be read in harmony with the main enactment. The respondents want this Court to treat the proviso, as a standalone provision, in order that the surrender of license may not be insisted for claiming the proportionate license fee and privilege fee.

20.

We find, upon a reading of the main provision in Rule 24-A, that the application for refund of the license fee/privilege fee is to be accompanied by the license granted to the licensee. Therefore, from the main enactment, it is clear that the refund is subject to the surrender of license and the proof of non-transaction of business under the license.

21.

It is well settled legal principle that a proviso must be limited to the subject matter of the enacting clause and that proviso must prima facie be read and construed in relation to the principle matter to which it is a proviso. In other words, the proviso normally is not an independent or separate enactment. The proviso cannot be dissected or torn out from the provision to which it is appended and the golden rule of interpretation mandates that the main provision be read along with the proviso, so that they mutually throw light on each other and result in a harmonious construction. The clear and unambiguous intention of the legislature W.A.No’s.824 of 2026 etc. batch under the main provision is to permit the refund of the full license fee on surrender of the license and proof of non-transaction of any business on the strength of the license.

22.

The main provision in effect amounts to an “all-or-nothing” rule. In our view, the proviso was added out of equity with the intent to enable those who transacted some business, and wanted to surrender the license permanently, to avail partial/proportionate refund. The mischief sought to be remedied by the proviso was to permit only a partial/proportionate refund on surrender of license after the licensee had transacted some business. The proviso merely engrafts an exception to the quantum of refund otherwise admissible under the main provision, by reducing it from full refund to partial/proportionate on surrender of license. It, by no stretch of imagination, neither distracts from nor dilutes the substantive requirement of surrender of license for claiming partial/proportionate refund.

23.

It is to be noted here that the license fee and privilege fee are collected for not only trading in liquor, but also for possession of the same. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of judgments [Har Shankar’s case (1975) 1 SCC 737, Khoday Distilleries case (1995) 1 SCC 574 & Issac Peter’s case 1994 SCC (4) 104] categorically declared that the State holds exclusive privilege over trade in W.A.No’s.824 of 2026 etc. batch intoxicating liquor and fee paid by the licensees is neither a tax or simple service fee, but is a consideration paid to acquire the States exclusive privilege, in not only transacting the business of sale of liquor, but also to hold and possess the same. Once the privilege is parted by paying the license and privilege fee, if the license is operationalised even for a single day, the State cannot be made responsible for interruption in business or profitability.

24.

Keeping in view, the nature of the license and privilege fee, the interpretation sought to be placed by the learned counsel for the respondents, if accepted, would not merely qualify/except the main provision, but would virtually supplant it. Such a construction, in our considered view, would do violence to the scheme of the provision, for the principal provision is concerned with the surrender of license and the consequent refund of the license fee, while the proviso merely regulates the quantum of refund under the circumstances mentioned therein. From the principles of interpretation of statute relating to the interpretation of the proviso, as laid down by the authors referred to above and the relevant judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is clear that any construction that nullifies the principal provision or renders the proviso into an instrument for defeating the very object of the enactment must be discarded/eschewed. In our considered view the W.A.No’s.824 of 2026 etc. batch interpretation placed by the learned counsel for the respondents, creates irreconcilable conflict between the main provision and the proviso, thereby subverting the legislative intent and thus, rendering the main provision nugatory. Therefore, keeping in view the text and the context of the main provision and the proviso, the interpretation sought to be placed by the respondents cannot be accepted.

25.

Further, the interpretation placed by the learned counsel for the respondents may lead to preposterous consequences. As already stated the amendment was introduced to resolve a very narrow and a specific issue of refund of license fee and privilege fee either total or partial/proportionate on surrender of license and definitely not introduced with an intention to compensate the licensees for temporary closures, where the licensees subsequently resume and utilise the license. For example, if a licensee was permitted to seek for refund of license and privilege fee without surrendering the license, it may pave way for licensees to claim refund for loss of business, despite having conducted the business for some time and even if no actual loss was incurred. By merely quoting non-transaction of business, the licensee may claim refund despite having made reasonable profit during the transacted period. The interpretation to the proviso should therefore W.A.No’s.824 of 2026 etc. batch logically be one commensurate with the main provision, otherwise, it may lead to spurious claims. Therefore, we are in complete agreement with the learned Additional Advocate General, that the proviso cannot be read as a standalone or substantive provision, enabling the licensees to claim refund of the proportional license fee and privilege fee, for business not transacted for any part of the year without surrender of the license. We are therefore of the view that the interpretation placed by the learned Judge on the proviso is misconceived, erroneous and unsustainable.

26.

Even though we find that the respondents are not entitled to claim refund of license and privilege fee under the proviso to Rule 24-A, in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the cases, we are inclined to allow the petitioners claim for refund on equity and for limited period.

27.

To determine the extent of relief permissible to the respondents, we examine the Covid lock-down notifications. The 1st notification imposing lock-down by the Ministry of Home Affairs was issued on 24.03.2020. The Ministry of Home Affairs issued guidelines on the measures to be taken by the Ministries/Departments of Government of India, State/Union Territory Governments and State/Union Territory Authorities for containment of Covid-19 W.A.No’s.824 of 2026 etc. batch pandemic in the country. Clause '7' of the said notification deals with hospitality services and it reads as follows:

“7.Hospitality Services to remain suspended Exceptions: a. Hotels, homestays, lodges and motels, which are accommodating tourists and persons stranded due to lockdown, medical and emergency staff, air and sea crew. b. Establishments used/earmarked for quarantine facilities.”

28.

The lock-down under the said notification was for a period of 21 days with effect from 25.03.2020. Thereafter, the lock-down was periodically extended until it was partially lifted vide notification dated 29.07.2020. In the said notification, under Clause 1(ii) the following activities were permitted:

“1. Activities permitted during Unlock 3 period outside the Containment Zones (ii) Cinema halls, swimming pools, entertainment parks, theatres, bars, auditoriums, assembly halls and similar places. Yoga institutes and gymnasiums will be allowed to function from 5th August 2020 for which, Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) will be issued by the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare (MoHFW).”

29.

From the aforesaid notifications, it is clear that there was either total prohibition or partial prohibition of activities relating to bars, alone. Hospitality W.A.No’s.824 of 2026 etc. batch services continued to operate with restrictions. The learned Additional Advocate General has filed the relevant dates and notifications of Covid lock-down restrictions vis-a-vis F.L.III licensees. The same is as follows: S.No. Date Effect on Hospitality Effect on Bars Services 1. 17.03.2020 None Shut Down [Letter dated 16.03.2020 issued by the Commissioner, Prohibition & Excise] 2. 25.03.2020 Partial Suspension. Shut down [MHA Notification Permitted operations: [All commercial dated 24.03.2020] 1. Accommodation of (i) establishments tourists; (ii) stranded unless exempted persons; (iii) medical were to be closed] and emergency staff; (iv) air and sea crew 2. Quarantine facilities 3. 08.06.2020 Permitted to operate Remained shut [MHA Notification dated 30.05.2020] 4. 29.08.2020 Continued to operate Permitted to [MHA Notification operate dated 29.08.2020] 5. 03.09.2020 Continued to operate Permitted to [Letter dated operate 03.09.2020 issued by the Commissioner, Prohibition & Excise] Business remained shut for 0 days 171 days W.A.No’s.824 of 2026 etc. batch

30.

Covid-19 pandemic was an exceptional global phenomenon resulting in prohibition of all activities across the country, save those specifically exempted. The failure of the respondents to transact business during the Covid period, is not because of any fault on their part, but was a result of the force majeure situation created by the pandemic which affected humans across the globe. The relevant dates submitted by the appellants and referred to above, clearly shows that Bars remained closed for 171 days. Under such circumstances, we are of the view that the respondents would be entitled for partial/proportionate refund for a period of 171 days, however subject to proof of non-transaction of any business during that period.

31.

In the light of the above discussions, we are of the view that in equity and not in law, the respondents are entitled for refund/adjustment of the license fee and the privilege fee for the limited period of 171 days, without surrendering the licenses, since they were prevented from transacting business due to the Covid pandemic and for reasons beyond their control.

32.

We find that since the respondents were not able to transact business due to the lock-down, and not because of any default on their part, the respondents shall be entitled to refund/adjustment of license and privilege fee only for 171 days, W.A.No’s.824 of 2026 etc. batch subject to proof of non-transaction of business during the relevant period.

33.

Accordingly, the Writ Appeals are allowed and the orders of the learned Single Judge dated 25.07.2023 made in W.P.Nos.9868, 9873, 9181, 9685, 9182, 9834, 9177, 10122, 10105, 9468, 10119, 10121, 9688, 10110, 10109, 9811, 10112, 9686 and 10353 of 2021 are set aside, however, with liberty to the respective respondent in the above writ appeals to approach the Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise, for refund of license and privilege fee for the period of 171 days only. The respondents shall submit their claim petitions within two weeks from today. On receipt of the claim petition along with supporting evidence, the Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise shall, if satisfied that the claim is genuine, pass appropriate orders on merit and in accordance with law, preferably within 12 weeks thereafter. No costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed. (G.J.J.) (N.M.J) 10.08.2026

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