Is a female Hindu possessed of property under s.14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 where she has a legal right to possess it?

Feeling aggrieved by the Judgment and Decree dated September 30, 1991 passed in A.S. No.78 of 1990 by 'the Subordinate Court, Cuddalore' ['First Appellate Court' for brevity], confirming the Judgment and Decree dated April 13, 1987 passed in O.S. No.202 of 1981 by 'the District Munsif Court, Kallakurichi' ['Trial Court' for brevity], the appellants therein who are the defendants 3,4,7,10 & 15 in the Original Suit have preferred this Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

For the sake of convenience, hereinafter, the parties will be referred to as per their array in the Original Suit before the Trial Court.

To be noted, the plaint in O.S. No.202 of 1981 was originally presented before the Subordinate Court, Cuddalore on January 2, 1976, and taken on filed and assigned O.S. No.102 of 1976 on April 1, 1976. On April 1, 1981, the same was transferred to the Trial Court in view of Tamil Nadu Act No.34 of 1980 and was assigned the present Original Suit number which is O.S. No.202 of 1981.

The Suit 'A' schedule is nothing but a genealogy tree. There is no dispute with respect to the relationship stated therein. For ease of reference, the same is reproduced hereunder:

Case of the plaintiff is that the Suit 'B' schedule properties original belonged to one Perumal Naidu, who had two sons - Pottu alias Duraisamy Naidu and Gopal Naidu. Three of them were members of a Hindu undivided joint family. Upon Perumal Naidu's demise in 1916, the Suit 'B' schedule properties devolved upon Pottu alias Duraisamy Naidu and Gopal Naidu and since then they had been in joint possession and enjoyment of the same. They both had no issues. Gopal Naidu passed away in 1929 leaving behind his wife / first defendant - Rangammal, whereupon the Suit 'B' schedule properties entirely fell into the hands of Pottu alias Duraisamy Naidu by way of survivorship. Thereafter, Pottu alias Duraisamy Naidu passed away in 1935 leaving behind his wife - Dhanalakshmi Ammal, whereupon Dhanalakshmi Ammal got limited estate over the Suit 'B' schedule properties. Later, Dhanalakshmi Ammal along with first defendant alienated the Suit 'B' schedule properties in favour of several alienees without any legal necessity or benefit to the estate.

The first defendant filed a written statement contending that the plaintiff herein is not a reversioner of Pottu alias Duraisamy Naidu. The first defendant and Dhanalakshmi Ammal were in joint possession and enjoyment of the Suit 'B' schedule properties. Even after the demise of Dhanalakshmi Ammal, the plaintiff has no right in Suit 'B' schedule properties. The plaintiff has no right to question the alienations made by the first defendant and Dhanalakshmi Ammal. Accordingly, the first defendant prayed to dismiss the Suit.

That being the written statement averments of first defendant, defendants 3, 4, 7, 9 and 10 filed a joint written statement. The same was adopted by defendants 2, 8 and 12. Sum and substance of their case is that the plaintiff herein is not a reversioner of Pottu alias Duraisamy Naidu as alleged. The second defendant purchased a portion of Suit 'B' schedule properties on behalf of the minor sons - defendants 3 and 4 vide Sale Deed dated February 15, 1975. Similarly, ninth defendant purchased a portion of Suit 'B' schedule properties vide Sale Deed even dated February 15, 1975. And Defendants 7 and 10 each purchased a portion of Suit 'B' schedule properties vide Sale Deeds dated February 27, 1975. All the above four Sale Deeds were executed jointly by Dhanalakshmi Ammal and first defendant - Rangammal for a valid consideration. Their further case is that Dhanalakshmi Ammal passed away on March 20, 1975, i.e., after coming into force of 'the Hindu Succession Act, 1956' ['the H.S. Act' for short] and hence, the first defendant - Rangammal being Gopal Naidu's widow, will be a heir and therefore, the widows' limited estate became absolute. Accordingly, the Sale Deeds executed by the widows are valid. Stating so, they prayed to dismiss the Suit.

To be noted, first defendant passed away on September 22, 1985 during pendency of the Original Suit. Similarly, defendants 2 and 9 also passed away during pendency of the Original Suit.

Defendants 5, 6, 11, 13, 19, 22 and 23 were called absent and placed ex-parte by the Trial Court.

Based on the above pleadings, the Trial Court framed the following issues: "1. Whether the Plaintiff is the next reversioner to the estate of Duraisami entitled to the possession of the suit properties? 2. Whether the defendants are barred by res judicata from questioning the status of the plaintiff by virtue of the decree in O.S. No.320 of 1946 as confirmed by the High Court in S.A. No.1163 of 1950? 3. Whether the sales in favour of defendants 4, 7, 9 and 10 are true valid and supported by consideration and binding on the plaintiff? 4. Whether the defendants 2, 8 and 12 are not necessary parties to the suit? 5. Whether the plaintiff is not entitled to any mesne profits as contended? 6. To what relief if any the plaintiff is entitled ? "

At trial, on the side of the plaintiff, the plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and Ex-A.1 to Ex-A.8 were marked. On the side of defendants, one Thangavel Pillai was examined as D.W.1 and Ex-B.1 to Ex-B.4 were marked.

The Trial Court found that Pottu alias Duraisamy Naidu was the last male owner / holder who was in possession and enjoyment of the Suit 'B' schedule properties, and the plaintiff is his next reversioner and consequently, he is entitled to Suit 'B' schedule properties. The Trial Court further found that res judicata does not apply in this case, as the earlier Suit was decided before the coming into force of the H.S. Act based on classic Hindu Law and hence, in this Suit, there is a need to see whether the plaintiff is a reversioner or not in light of the H.S. Act. The Trial Court further held that on the date of commencement of the H.S. Act, Dhanalakshmi Ammal being a limited owner was not in possession of the Suit 'B' schedule properties. The possession remained with the alienees arrayed as defendants in O.S. No.320 of 1946. Hence Dhanalakshmi Ammal's limited rights would not become absolute. Consequently, the Trial Court found the alienations made by Dhanalakshmi Ammal and the first defendant invalid. The Trial Court further found defendants 2, 8 and 11 as necessary parties as they are also in possession and enjoyment of the Suit 'B' schedule properties. The Trial Court further held that the plaintiff is entitled to mesne profits from the date of demise of Dhanalakshmi Ammal i.e., March 23, 1975 until the defendants handover possession of Suit 'B' schedule properties. Upon arriving at these findings, the Trial Court decreed the Suit as prayed for.

Feeling aggrieved, the defendants 3, 4, 7, 10, 12 and 15 preferred an Appeal Suit before the First Appellate Court in A.S. No.78 of 1990. The First Appellate Court, after hearing both sides, concurred with the Trial Court's findings and accordingly, dismissed the Appeal Suit confirming the Judgment and Decree of the Trial Court.

Feeling aggrieved, the appellants before the First Appellate Court has preferred this Second Appeal. On August 05, 1992, the Second Appeal was admitted on the following Substantial Question of Law: "Whether the judgements of the Court below are vitiated by their holding that Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act is not applicable to case?"

Again on June 02, 2026, after hearing both sides, the following Additional Substantial Questions of Law were framed: ''a) Whether the suit simpliciter for recovery of possession is maintainable without a prayer seeking declaration of title, when the defendants have specifically and categorically denied the tile of the plaintiff? b) Whether in law the plaintiff can maintain a suit as a reversioner after coming into force of Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which has done away with the concept of reversioner? c) Whether in law, the plaintiff will be the legal heir of the deceased 1st defendant as per Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956?"

Mr.S.Parthasarathy, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants would invite attention to Suit 'A' schedule Genealogy and submit that Perumal Naidu and his two sons - Gopal Naidu and Pottu alias Duraisamy Naidu formed a joint family. They were jointly in possession of Suit 'B' schedule properties. Perumal Naidu passed away in the year 1916. Thereafter, Gopal Naidu passed away in the year 1929 leaving behind his wife / first defendant - Rangammal. Thereafter Pottu alias Duraisamy Naidu passed away leaving behind Dhanalakshmi Ammal in the year 1935. Thus, Dhanalakshmi Ammal and first defendant - Rangammal became entitled to the Suit 'B' schedule properties for her life under the Classical Hindu Law. First defendant - Rangammal sold her share in favour of her brother who in turn sold the same to second defendant - Krishnappa Naicker vide Sale Deeds dated November 6, 1941 and September 22, 1942. Thereafter, second defendant - Krishnappa Naicker purchased portions of Suit 'B' schedule properties from Dhanalakshmi Ammal vide Sale Deeds dated August 11, 1942 and October 31, 1942. Accordingly, second defendant became entitled to major portion of the Suit 'B' schedule properties. However, in view of the earlier Suit proceedings which ended against the second defendant herein vide S.A. No.1163 of 1950, the alienations by Dhanalakshmi Ammal and Rangammal qua limited estate holders were declared invalid.

In response to the above arguments, Mr.C.Samivel, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent Nos.2 and 3 would contend that the first defendant - Rangammal was never entitled to any limited estate. The Suit 'B' schedule properties which was jointly enjoyed by Pottu alias Duraisamy Naidu and Gopal Naidu, upon Gopal Naidu's demise, fell entirely into the hands of Pottu alias Duraisamy Naidu by way of survivorship. While so, after the demise of Pottu alias Duraisamy Naidu, Dhanalakshmi Ammal alone became the limited estate holder of the Suit 'B' schedule properties.

Heard on either side. Perused the evidence available on record in light of the Substantial Questions of Law.

There is no dispute with respect to the relationships shown in Genealogy set out supra.

Admittedly, Perumal Naidu, Gopal Naidu and Pottu alias Duraisamy Naidu constituted a joint family and as such, were enjoying Suit 'B' schedule properties jointly. After the demise of Perumal Naidu in the year 1916, Gopal Naidu and Pottu alias Duraisamy Naidu were enjoying the same jointly. In the year 1929, Gopal Naidu passed away issueless leaving behind his wife / first defendant - Rangammal. Whereupon, the first defendant - Rangammal acquired limited rights over the Suit 'B' schedule properties and Pottu alias Duraisamy Naidu's survivorship was subject to her limited estate. However, Pottu alias Duraisamy Naidu passed away before the first defendant in 1935, issueless, leaving behind his wife - Dhanalakshmi Ammal, and thereby Dhanalakshmi Ammal got limited estate over the Suit 'B' schedule properties. Thus, Dhanalakshmi Ammal and the first defendant - Rangammal were both enjoying limited estate over the Suit 'B' schedule properties.

The Judgment passed by the Trial Court in the earlier Suit proceedings in O.S. No.320 of 1946 has been marked as Ex-A.1. The matter went on appeal to the First Appellate Court vide A.S. No.267 of 1948. The First Appellate Court's Judgment is marked as Ex-A.2 and from there it came before this Court vide S.A. No.1163 of 1950 and this Court's Judgment has been marked as Ex-A.3.

From the perusal of Ex-A.1 to Ex-A.3 - Judgments, it could be seen that first defendant - Rangammal qua limited estate holder sold certain portions of Suit 'B' schedule properties in favour of her brother who in turn sold the same to second defendant - Krishnappa Naicker vide Sale Deeds dated November 6, 1941 and September 22, 1942, and following this, Dhanalakshmi Ammal qua limited estate holder sold certain portions of Suit 'B' schedule properties in favour of the second defendant - Krishnappa Naicker vide Sale Deeds dated August 11, 1942 and October 31, 1942. Thereby, the second defendant herein, who is the third defendant in O.S. No.320 of 1946, became alienee to a major portion of the Suit 'B' schedule properties.

It could be seen that, the earlier Suit in O.S. No.320 of 1946 was filed by the plaintiff herein along with one Thirumalai Naidu who is his cousin, claiming that he, said Thirumalai Naidu, and said Thirumalai Naidu brother - Govindarajalu Naidu (arrayed as tenth defendant in O.S. No.320 of 1946) were reversioners of Pottu alias Duraisamy Naidu. They further claimed that the aforesaid sales made by the widows in respect of Suit 'B' schedule properties were invalid. The prayer was to declare them along with the tenth defendant therein as the reversioners of Pottu alias Duraisamy Naidu and recover the possession of Suit 'B' schedule properties from the alienees.

The final outcome of the earlier Suit proceedings was that the plaintiff herein was declared as a reversioner of Pottu alias Duraisamy Naidu along with Thirumalai Naidu and Govindarajalu Naidu, and the alienations made by the widows were held invalid, however, the relief of recovery of possession was refused on the ground that the widows qua limited estate holders were alive and the reversioners' rights qua rights of spes successionis are subject to the widows' estate. The final outcome came on March 01, 1955 via Ex-A.3 - Judgment of this Court in S.A. No.1163 of 1950.

Then came the H.S. Act, whereof Section 14 (1) stipulates that a female Hindu becomes a full owner of any property possessed by her before or after the commencement of the H.S. Act. The term "possessed" gains significance in the context of the present case. While there are rival submissions on the question of the widows' possession of Suit 'B' schedule properties pursuant to Ex-A.3 - Judgment in S.A. No.1163 of 1950, Ex-B.1 to Ex-B.4 - Sale Deeds recite that the widows were in possession of the Suit 'B' schedule properties and conveyed the same for a valid consideration. The plaintiff did not produce any contra evidence to show that the Suit 'B' schedule properties were in possession of the earlier alienees i.e., the persons described as alienees in O.S. No.320 of 1946. Moreover, the widows need not be in actual possession thereof, as the term "possessed" means possession in law and is broad enough to accommodate within its scope their legal right to possess, provided they have not departed with the same [See V.Sampathkumari's Case [cited supra] relied on by the learned Counsel for the respondents 2 and 3]. In this regard, reference shall be made to Mulla's Hindu Law [25th Edition, Lexis Nexis Publication, relevant Page No.1253]. Relevant portion reads thus: " [§ 14.9] "Possessed" — Meaning of The word “possessed” is used in this section in a broad sense and in its widest connotation and as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Kotturuswami v Veerava Jagannathan Pillai’s case above it means “the state of owning or having in one’s hand or power”. It need not be actual physical possession or personal occupation of the property by the female but may be possession in law. It may either be actual or constructive or in any form recognised by law. Thus, for instance the possession of a licensee, lessee or a mortgagee from the female owner would be her possession for the purpose of this section. Such also would be the case where a person is in possession as an agent of the female owner and is accountable to her. Life interest coupled with possession given to a female Hindu of properties managed by her husband, would confer absolute ownership on her and she would thus be full owner. … … … It is thus evident that for a widow to be “possessed” of property on the commencement of this Act, she must be in possession of such a property either actual, physical or constructive. If, however, such widow has parted with her rights to the property by way of a gift or any devise which has the effect of extinction of her rights to the property before the commencement of this Act, the widow not being "possessed" of the property on the date when the Act came into force, such widow would have no title to the property whatsoever and cannot thus avail the beneficial provisions of this section. …"

In view of the finding in the earlier Suit proceedings that the sales made by the widows are invalid, automatically the widows became vested with the right to possession of Suit 'B' schedule properties. They could have at any point of time claimed possession over the Suit 'B' schedule properties. Their right to claim possession over the Suit 'B' schedule properties did not become extinct in any manner. Consequently, for the purpose of Section 14 (1) of the H.S. Act, the widows were possessed of the Suit 'B' schedule properties, and therefore, upon the commencement of the H.S. Act, their limited rights over Suit 'B' schedule properties blossomed into absolute rights under Section 14 (1). Consequently, they became entitled to dispose of the Suit 'B' schedule properties as per their desire and as such, they executed Ex-B.1 to Ex-B.4 - Sale Deeds in favour of defendants 2, 7, 9 and 10, which are valid and binding on the plaintiff herein. In fact, the recitals in Ex-B.1 to Ex-B.4 - Sale Deeds would also show that the widows disposed of the Suit 'B' schedule properties claiming it to be their absolute properties.

Though the plaintiff was declared as a reversioner of Pottu alias Duraisamy Naidu in the earlier proceedings, the same is not valid in view of the advent of the H.S. Act. Moreover, claim of a presumptive reversioner is merely based on spes successionis or a chance of succession and there is no vested or accrued right. The rights of a reversioner is subject to the female's limited estate and accrues only upon her demise. In such a scenario, the final outcome of the earlier Suit proceedings declaring the plaintiff herein along with two others as reversioners cannot be considered valid. In this regard, reference may be made to the Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Daya Singh's Case [cited supra] relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, wherein it was held thus: "5. That position may now be considered. It was authoritatively laid down by the Privy Council in its decision in Moniram Kolita v. KerryKolitany [ILR 5 Cal 776, 789], that :

Further, a Full Bench of this Court in Kumarasamy Gounder's Case [cited supra] relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, following afore-cited Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Daya Singh's Case, has held thus: "7. As we see from the judgment of the Supreme Court, it was directly seized of the very question we are called upon to answer. There as here, the husband had died before the Act. The widow inheriting his property was not possessed of it and she died subsequent to the Act. The Supreme Court reviewed all the decisions on the subject rendered by the High Court among whom there was no unanimity, referred to Moniram Kolita v. Kerry Kblitari, (1880) ILR 5 Cal 776 (PC) and held that, once it is taken to be the law that succession in a case like this opens when the widow dies as if her husband also died on the very date, this presumption should not be boggled with and should be applied as a fact, so that Section 8 of the Act is attracted to the situation. We are bound by this approach. Every possible argument against that view has also been visualised by the Supreme Court and it resolved the difference of opinion among the High Courts." [Emphasis supplied by this Court]

Further, it would be useful to refer to Hanuman Prasad's Case [cited supra] relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, wherein the Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad has held thus: "45. Though an alienation made before the passing of the Act remains vulnerable and does not dispose of the preliminary dispute, the question still remains who can impugn it and how? Now arises the real difficulty of the respondent. The widow continues to be estopped from challenging the validity on the ground of want of legal necessity and reversioners have completely disappeared by virtue of the provisions of S. 15. The customary law of succession has been completely abrogated by the Act which exhaustively amends and codifies the law relating to intestate succession among Hindus. Even the heirs of the husband referred to in S. 15 are the heirs mentioned in S. 8 and not the heirs under the customary law. The next reversioner, who was a creation of the customary law, is no longer in the picture. 46. It makes no difference whatsoever if by accident the heir of the widow is the same person who would have inherited the property on her death as the next reversioner; if he inherits the property now, it will be in his capacity as the widow's heir and not as the next reversioner. Since there will be no reversioners after the passing of the Act, nobody can get a decree as a reversioner now. Even these persons who could have obtained a decree before the passing of the Act that an alienation made before the passing of the Act was invalid cannot now get a declaration to that effect because they have lost the status by virtue of which they could get it." [Emphasis supplied by this Court]

Coming to the case laws relied on by the learned Counsel for the respondents 2 and 3, all the case laws relied on except Jumma Masjid Case, were primarily for the proposition that Section 8 of the H.S. Act does not operate retrospectively. There is no quarrel with the same. With the advent of the H.S. Act, as stated supra, the widows being limited estate holders, Section 14 (1) applies and their limited rights blossom into absolute rights. Moreover, Kempiah's Case [cited supra] has been impliedly overruled by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Daya Singh's Case. Further, the reliance placed by the learned Counsel on Eramma's Case [cited supra] was also for the proposition that Section 14 (1) of the H.S. Act does not come into picture when a widow is possessed of the property without any legal right over the property. This Court finds no quarrel with the said proposition. In the present case, the widows were limited estate holders of Suit 'B' schedule properties and hence they had a legal right over the same. Further, in Shanmughasundarathammal's Case [cited supra] relied on by him, it has also been held that the reversioners of the last male holder / owner shall be ascertained on the date of demise of the widow qua limited estate holders. There is no quarrel with the said proposition.

As regards the Substantial Question of Law originally framed, the estoppel under Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 applies only against the unauthorised person who makes the transfer. In other words, the estoppel thereunder applies only against such transferor. In the context of this case, as per the version of the plaintiff, the unauthorised transferors would be the widows qua limited estate holders. It cannot be applied against the plaintiff who claims to be entitled to Suit 'B' schedule properties as a reversioner. For the same reason, Jumma Masjid Case [cited supra] relied on by the learned Counsel for respondents 2 and 3 is not applicable to the present facts, though there is no quarrel with the legal propositions advanced therein. Moreover, as stated supra, the earlier sales were already declared invalid in the earlier Suit proceedings and Ex-B.1 to Ex-B.4 - Sale Deeds are executed by Dhanalakshmi Ammal and first defendant - Rangammal after their limited estate was enlarged into absolute estate in view of Section 14 (1) of the H.S. Act. Hence, the question of estoppel under Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 does not arise in this case.

As regards the additional Substantial Question of Law (a), as stated supra, the plaintiff is not a reversioner with the advent of the H.S. Act. Hence, the Suit for recovery of possession is not maintainable, that too without declaration of title.

As regards the additional Substantial Question of Law (b), as held above, the plaintiff cannot claim rights as a reversioner with the advent of the H.S. Act. Further, the widows' right over Suit 'B' schedule properties enlarged from limited estate to absolute estate with the advent of the H.S. Act in view of Section 14 (1) thereof and hence, they are entitled to dispose of the same as they desire.

As regards the additional Substantial Question of Law (c), as the Suit 'B' schedule properties have been validly alienated by the widows under Ex-B.1 to Ex-B.4 as held above, it does not arise at all. The Substantial Question of Law originally framed and the additional Substantial Questions of Law are answered accordingly.

Resultantly, the Second Appeal is allowed. The Judgments and Decrees of the First Appellate Court and the Trial Court are set aside. The Original Suit is hereby dismissed without costs. The legal representatives of the plaintiff is directed to refund the mesne profits, if any, received from the defendants. In view of the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no Order as to costs in this Second Appeal. Consequently, connected Civil Miscellaneous Petition(s) if any shall stand closed. 18 / 09 / 2026