LexStreakRead free →
Supreme Court of India· 11 March 2026

Does a clause requiring co-arbitrators to jointly appoint the third arbitrator within thirty days become mandatory once that period expires, without the parties themselves approaching ICSID?

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER MUMBAI v. M/S R.V. ANDERSON ASSOCIATES LIMITED
2026 INSC 228
Coram: J.K. Maheshwari; Atul S. Chandurkar
🔖 Save this judgment🔔 Follow s.16 Arbitration and Conciliatio…📬 Get today's judgments
View the original judgment PDFFree to read. To download it — or the LexStreak typeset copy with the headnote and Points of Law — create an account; downloads are part of the Pro plan.
Answer

No. The clause is enabling, not restrictive; it does not denude the co-arbitrators of their power to appoint the third arbitrator merely because thirty days have passed. That power is lost only if a party actually approaches ICSID and makes a request for such appointment.

Headnote

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — s.4, s.16, s.34, s.37 — Constitution of arbitral tribunal — Enabling clause vs. mandatory appointment — Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Contractual clause on appointment of third arbitrator — Enabling, not restrictive — Held: A contractual clause permitting either party to approach ICSID after the co-arbitrators fail to name the third arbitrator within the stipulated period is an enabling provision, not a bar on the co-arbitrators' power. Absent a request by either party to ICSID, the co-arbitrators retain the power to appoint the third arbitrator even after the period expires. (¶30) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — s.34, s.37 — Scope of interference — Plausible interpretation not disturbed — Held further: Where the arbitral tribunal has reached a plausible interpretation of the contract, a court under Section 34 or Section 37 cannot substitute its own view merely because another interpretation is possible. Interference remains narrow, and courts must respect arbitral autonomy and ensure minimum judicial interference. (¶36) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — s.4 — Conduct short of statutory waiver — Relevant to interpreting the contract — Held further: Even where a timely Section 16 challenge means statutory waiver under Section 4 does not attract, a party's conduct in not objecting through three appointments of the Presiding Arbitrator without any demur remains relevant to how the parties themselves understood the contract. The appeals are dismissed. (¶66, 68)

In the Court's own words
Paragraph 30On an objective perusal of the arbitration clause, it appears to be enabling in nature. It does not provide that in case the two arbitrators do not succeed in appointing the third arbitrator within the period so prescribed, the two arbitrators will lose their power of appointment of the third arbitrator. Rather, the power of appointment of the third arbitrator acts in an independent sphere when juxtaposed with the second part of the clause which is enabling in nature, permitting the parties to approach the ICSID after 30 days, in case the two arbitrators appointed by the parties reach an impasse and do not succeed in making such appointment.
Acts & Sections
s.16 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996s.4 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996s.34 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996s.37 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

One judgment a day. That's the whole habit.

Read the full text of MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER MUMBAI v. M/S R.V. ANDERSON ASSOCIATES LIMITED — and get the Supreme Court's output as a five-minute daily read, with plain-language headnotes and the questions each judgment settles.

Create my free account

Free forever plan · 30 seconds · data stays in India

Open the full judgment →

Also decided in this judgment
Under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, whether the arbitral award deserves to be set aside on the ground of lack of jurisdiction due to improper constitution of the arbitral tribunal or patent illegality?Under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, when statutory waiver under Section 4 does not attract, is a party's prior conduct still relevant to how the contract was understood?
Plain-language answer prepared by the LexStreak Editorial Desk — verify against the judgment. Source: Supreme Court of India. Corrections