Does a reference to a Constitution Bench under Article 145(3) require an unsettled substantial question of law?

Paragraph 79The question, therefore, is not one whether the present challenge invokes constitutional provisions of considerable significance. It emphatically does! But, the more germane inquiry, for the extant purpose of reference under Article 145(3), is whether the challenge raises a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution which remains unsettled (emphasis added) and the determination of which is necessary for disposal of the lis? The constitutional character of the controversy, per se, cannot be the determinative test. This distinction entails some consequence.

Paragraph 80In Thakur Ganga Singh (supra), this Court had the occasion to explain that a question of constitutional interpretation emanates where competing constructions of a constitutional provision are canvassed. Where, however, the governing principle has already been authoritatively settled, what remains is no more than the application of the settled principle to the facts of the case. Such application, by itself, does not transmute the controversy into one of constitutional interpretation. The relevant passage may be profitably extracted hereinbelow: 7. What does interpretation of a provision mean? Interpretation is the method by which the true sense or the meaning of the word is understood. The question of interpretation can arise only if two or more possible constructions are sought to be placed on a provision - one party suggesting one construction and the other a different one. But where the parties agree on the true interpretation of a provision or do not raise any question in respect thereof, it is not possible to hold that the case involves any question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. On an interpretation of Art. 14, a series of decisions of this Court evolved the doctrine of classification. As we have pointed out, at no stage of the proceedings either the correctness of the interpretation of Art. 14 or the principles governing the doctrine of classification have been questioned by either of the parties. Indeed accepting the said doctrine, the appellants contended that there was a valid classification under the rule while the respondents argued contra. The learned Additional Solicitor General contended, for the first time, before us that the appeal raised a new facet of the doctrine of equality, namely, whether an artificial person and a natural person have equal attributes within the meaning of the equality clause, and, therefore, the case involves a question of interpretation of the Constituion. This argument, if we may say so, involves the same contention in a different garb. If analysed, the argument only comes to this: as an artificial person and a natural person have different attributes, the classification made between them is valid. This argument does not suggest a new interpretation of Art. 14 of the Constitution, but only attempts to bring the rule within the doctrine of classification. We, therefore, hold that the question raised in this case does not involve any question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. (emphasis added)

Paragraph 85Having surveyed the precedents, germane for the present remit of consideration, solely as to whether the present matter warrants a reference to a larger Bench, the submission seeking a reference merely because the constitutional principles invoked by the challengers are of foundational significance, does not, carry the matter any further. The Court is required to identify the precise proposition of constitutional law which remains open for determination and which, despite the extant body of binding precedents, calls for reconsideration by a larger Bench.

Paragraph 86The present case involves propositions relating to the constitutional imperative of free and fair elections and the necessity of the institutional independence of the ECI. The constitutional conspectus of Article 324 cannot be examined in silos, de hors the binding principles enunciated in the precedents. The 2023 Act undoubtedly adds a new element to the canvas that must be tested against the settled principles occupying the field thus far. Such an exercise, however, is materially different from saying that the constitutional principles themselves remain unsettled. The former is an application of settled constitutional standards to a subsequent legislative measure; the latter alone would warrant a reference to a larger Bench. The two ought not to be conflated.