Supreme Court of India· 19 August 2026
Does an invalid order of sanction for prosecution, by itself, require a conviction to be set aside?
RAFIKMIYA AHMEDMIYA MALEK v. STATE OF GUJARAT
2026 INSC 890 · CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1177 OF 2015
Coram: Ujjal Bhuyan; Atul S. Chandurkar
Answer
Not necessarily. Although the sanction granted for prosecution was found invalid because it was not accorded by the authority competent to remove the public servant from office, the Court declined to set aside the conviction solely on that ground, and instead examined whether the prosecution had otherwise proved its case beyond reasonable doubt on the merits.
Headnote
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Sections 7, 12, 13(1)(d), 19(1)(c), 20 — demand and acceptance of bribe — sanction for prosecution —
presumption under Section 20 — prior proof of demand —
Held: The statutory presumption under Section 20 of the Act of 1988 comes into play only after the initial demand is proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt; mere recovery of the amount, without proof of demand, does not resurrect the prosecution's case. (¶15)
sanction under Section 19(1)(c) — authority competent to remove —
Held further: Sanction for prosecution under Section 19(1)(c) of the Act of 1988 must be granted by the authority competent to remove the public servant from office, not merely the authority that appointed him; an invalid sanction, however, does not by itself require a conviction to be set aside. (¶17)
payment after completion of official act — no automatic inference of demand —
Held further: Where money is handed over only after the official act for which a bribe was allegedly demanded has already been completed, it cannot, ipso facto, be assumed that the payment was pursuant to a demand. (¶16)
conviction set aside — appellants acquitted —
Held further: Finding the prosecution's evidence insufficient to prove demand beyond reasonable doubt, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellants. (¶19)
In the Court's own words
Paragraph 17According to the learned counsel for the appellants, the sanction granted to the prosecution of A[^1] was invalid in view of the fact that the same was granted by PW-2, who was holding the post of Deputy District Development Officer. As A[^1] was holding the post of Talati-cum-Mantri, sanction for his prosecution was required to be granted by the District Development Officer. This was for the reason that the District Development Officer was the authority competent to remove a Talati-cum-Mantri from his office. As A[^1] was holding the post of Talati-cum-Mantri, the provisions of Section 19(1)(c) of the Act of 1988 would be required to be complied with. As per the said provision, cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 7 and 13 of the Act of 1988 cannot be taken unless there is previous sanction of the authority competent to remove the public servant from office. In his deposition at Exhibit 24, PW-2 admitted that he was performing duties as a Deputy District Development Officer since September 1995. He further admitted that if a Talati-cum-Mantri desires to go abroad, he has to seek no objection of the Department and permission of the appointing authority. He admitted that in such a situation, it was the District Development Officer, who had authority to issue a no objection certificate. It has not been brought on record by the prosecution that a Deputy District Development Officer is empowered to remove a Talati-cum-Mantri from office. It may be true that A[^1] was initially appointed on ad-hoc basis as Talati-cum- Mantri by an order issued by the Deputy District Development Officer. What is contemplated by Section 19(1)(c) of the Act of 1988 is the grant of sanction by an authority competent to remove the concerned public servant from office. When the sanction was sought, A[^1] was holding the substantive post of Talati-cum-Mantri and, hence, it was only the District Development Officer under the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1961 who could have removed him from office. On this count, the sanction granted to the prosecution of A[^1] by the Deputy District Development Officer is found to be invalid. We would, however, not set aside the conviction of A[^1] solely on the ground of an invalid order of sanction. Even otherwise, we find on an appreciation of the entire material brought on record by the prosecution that it falls woefully short of proving the charge against both the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Acts & Sections
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988Indian Penal Code, 1860One judgment a day. That's the whole habit.
Read the full text of RAFIKMIYA AHMEDMIYA MALEK v. STATE OF GUJARAT — and get the Supreme Court's output as a five-minute daily read, with plain-language headnotes and the questions each judgment settles.
Create my free accountFree forever plan · 30 seconds · data stays in India
Open the full judgment →