LexStreak
Read free →
Supreme Court of India· 16 September 2026

Must a party raising a territorial-jurisdiction objection at the appellate stage additionally show failure of justice, unlike at the original stage?

K RASHIK v. NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY
2026 INSC 996 · CIVIL APPEAL NO.10706 OF 2026
Coram: Justice Ujjal Bhuyan · Justice Atul S. Chandurkar
🔖 Save this judgment🔔 Follow Section 166(2) of the Motor Vehi…📬 Get today's judgments
View the original judgment PDFFree to read. To download it — or the LexStreak typeset copy with the headnote and Points of Law — create an account; downloads are part of the Pro plan.
Answer

An objection to territorial jurisdiction at the original stage is governed by Section 166(2); at the appellate stage it needs proof of failure of justice.

Yes. Section 166(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 governs an objection raised before the Tribunal at the original stage, but where the objection is raised at an appellate or later stage after an award, Section 21(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 additionally requires the objecting party to show that the Tribunal's exercise of jurisdiction, despite lacking territorial authority, resulted in a failure of justice. (¶10, 14)

Headnote

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — s.166(2) — Territorial jurisdiction — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — s.20 — s.21(1) — Insurer as party-respondent — Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — s.166(2) — Distinct from CPC s.20 — Held: Section 166(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 does not confer jurisdiction where the defendant merely carries on business, unlike Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. A claimant may sue where he resides, carries on business, where the accident occurred, or where the defendant resides. (¶8) Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — s.166(2) — 'Defendant' excludes insurer — Held further: The word ‘defendant’ in Section 166(2) does not include an insurer, whose impleadment is optional at the claimant's choice. The contesting defendant is principally the owner or driver of the offending vehicle. (¶9) Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — s.149(2) — Insurer as party-respondent — Held further: An insurer impleaded as a party-respondent, not merely a noticee under Section 149(2), can raise all grounds available to a contesting defendant, including territorial jurisdiction. (¶6) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — s.21(1) — Stage of the objection — Held further: An objection to territorial jurisdiction at the original stage is governed by Section 166(2); at the appellate stage it additionally requires proof of failure of justice under Section 21(1) of the Code. Civil Appeal dismissed; claim restored to the Tribunal at Chittoor. (¶10, 14, 16)

Headnote

You've used your free headnotes this month

The answer above and the Court's own paragraphs stay free. LexStreak's full headnote on this judgment needs an account — a free one opens it again.

Create my free account
In the Court's own words
Paragraph 10While considering an objection raised to the territorial jurisdiction of a Tribunal, the factors material at the original stage of the proceedings and those material at subsequent stages of the proceedings are also relevant. Under Section 169 of the Act of 1988, the Tribunal is required to follow a summary procedure as it thinks fit while deciding proceedings before it. The Tribunal has been granted powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and other ancillary matters. The general principles flowing from the Code have to be kept in mind while adjudicating an objection to territorial jurisdiction. In original proceedings of a claim application before the Tribunal, Section 166(2) of the Act of 1988 provides for various options to a claimant to make an application for compensation under Section 166(1). The requirements prescribed in the matter of territorial jurisdiction would, therefore, have to be satisfied. However, when an objection to territorial jurisdiction of the Tribunal is pursued at an appellate stage or at any later stage after the award is passed, the requirements prescribed under Section 21(1) of the Code have to be satisfied. Besides showing that an objection to the competence of the Tribunal based on territorial jurisdiction was raised before it, the adjudication undertaken by the Tribunal despite absence of territorial jurisdiction has resulted in failure of justice is also required to be shown. In other words, unless a party raising an objection to the territorial jurisdiction at an appellate stage shows that for want of territorial jurisdiction of the Tribunal which considered the original proceedings, there has been a failure of justice, such objection cannot be entertained at that stage. The stage at which an objection based on lack of territorial jurisdiction is being considered is, therefore, relevant. If the same is raised before the Tribunal at an initial stage of the proceedings, as in the present case, the provisions of Section 166(2) of the Act of 1988 would guide the Tribunal in the matter. If such objection is considered post award at an appellate stage, the threshold required would be to demonstrate failure of justice by virtue of the Tribunal exercising jurisdiction despite absence of territorial authority to do so.
Paragraph 14In all the above cases, the objection based on territorial jurisdiction was considered at the appellate stage, thus, attracting the rigors of Section 21(1) of the Code that requires a party raising such objection to also demonstrate failure of justice being caused due to exercise of jurisdiction by a Tribunal having no territorial jurisdiction. In the present case, the claimant himself impleaded the insurer as a party to the claim application and it raised an objection to territorial jurisdiction before the Tribunal itself. As the claim application of the claimant awaits adjudication by the Tribunal on merits, the requirements of Section 166(2) of the Act of 1988 have to be satisfied and Section 21(1) of the Code is not attracted. I. Consideration of the impugned order:
Acts & Sections
Section 166(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988Section 166(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988Section 168(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988Section 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988Section 169 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908Section 21(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

One judgment a day. That's the whole habit.

Read the full text of K RASHIK v. NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY — and get the Supreme Court's output as a five-minute daily read, with plain-language headnotes and the questions each judgment settles.

Create my free account

Free forever plan · 30 seconds · data stays in India

Open the full judgment →

Also decided in this judgment
Does Section 166(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 confer jurisdiction where the defendant merely carries on business, unlike Section 20 of the Code?Does the word 'defendant' in Section 166(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 include an insurer?Can an insurer impleaded as a party-respondent, not merely a noticee, raise all grounds without being restricted to Section 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988?
Plain-language answer prepared by the LexStreak Editorial Desk — verify against the judgment. Source: Supreme Court of India. Corrections