Supreme Court of India· 16 September 2026
Must an approver's testimony be corroborated in material particulars connecting the accused, not merely the transaction, with the offence?
BHARAT RAJ MEENA v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
2026 INSC 999 · CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 4732 OF 2024
Coram: Justice Dipankar Datta · Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh
Answer
An approver's testimony must be corroborated in material particulars connecting the accused, not merely the transaction, with the offence.
Yes. An approver's testimony must be corroborated in material particulars connecting the accused, not merely the transaction, with the offence. An accomplice who has secured pardon has an evident incentive to minimise his own culpability, and the rule of prudence under Illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act requires independent corroboration before his account can safely connect the principal accused, as distinct from the transaction itself, with the offence. (¶52, 53, 70)
Headnote
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — s.7 — s.13 — s.20 — Demand and acceptance — Approver evidence — Intermediary —
PC Act, 1988 — s.20 — Foundational facts —
Held: The presumption under Section 20 of the Act does not arise unless the prosecution establishes the foundational facts of demand and acceptance by the accused. Proof of demand may be circumstantial, but mere recovery of tainted currency without such proof does not establish the offence. (¶46, 47, 49)
PC Act, 1988 — s.7 — Explanation 2 — Intermediary —
Held further: Acceptance of gratification through an intermediary can satisfy Section 7 only if the intermediary is shown to have acted under the accused's authority or direction. Mere receipt of money by a third person cannot automatically fasten criminal liability on the public servant. (¶50, 51)
Approver evidence — Corroboration —
Held further: An approver's testimony must be corroborated in material particulars connecting the accused, not merely the transaction, with the offence. An accomplice who has secured pardon has an evident incentive to minimise his own culpability. (¶52, 53, 70)
Chain of proof — Presumption —
Held further: The chain of proof must be carried through cogent evidence to where the money is shown to have reached the accused. Recovery from an intermediary alone does not establish the money reached the accused, so the presumption under Section 20 does not arise; both appeals allowed and the appellant acquitted of all charges. (¶71, 74, 88)
Headnote
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Paragraph 52The present case raises an additional dimension inasmuch as the prosecution relies substantially upon the testimony of persons who were originally arraigned as accused and were subsequently tendered pardon. The law relating to accomplice evidence is equally well settled. Section 133 of the Evidence Act declares that an accomplice is a competent witness and that a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon uncorroborated accomplice testimony. At the same time, Illustration (b) to Section 114 embodies a rule of prudence that an accomplice is ordinarily unworthy of credit unless corroborated in material particulars.
Paragraph 53In Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab[^13], and in a long line of subsequent decisions, this Court has consistently held that though a conviction based upon accomplice evidence is legally permissible, courts ordinarily insist upon independent corroboration connecting the accused with the commission of the offence. The rationale is self-evident. An accomplice who has participated in the crime and subsequently secured pardon possesses a powerful incentive to minimise his own culpability and shift responsibility onto others.
Paragraph 70It bears emphasis that intermediary, PW-2 is not an independent witness. He was originally arraigned as a co-accused and was granted pardon under Section 306 CrPC, and as this Court has already noted in the light of Sarwan Singh (supra), that an approver has an evident incentive to support the version that best serves the terms of his own pardon. The rule of prudence embodied in Illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act requires that his testimony be corroborated in material particulars connecting the accused and not merely the transaction with the offence. Here, PW-6’s testimony corroborates the demand and PW-4’s evidence together with the phenolphthalein result corroborates the fact of collection of bribe money by PW-2 but neither corroborates the specific, and critical, assertion that delivery to the appellant’s residence was the intended and habitual mode of consummating the transaction of bribe. On this singular aspect, the record contains only the approver’s word devoid of any corroborating material.
Acts & Sections
Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988Explanation 2 to Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988Section 13(1)(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872Section 306 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973One judgment a day. That's the whole habit.
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