Supreme Court of India· 19 August 2026
Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, does rejection of an application under Section 156(3) bar subsequent registration of an FIR founded on the same or substantially similar allegations, by operation of res judicata?
PRAMOD KUMAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS
2026 INSC 887 · CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 3931 OF 2026
Coram: Prashant Kumar Mishra; N.V. Anjaria
Answer
No. An order under Section 156(3) is confined to directing, or declining to direct, investigation, and neither entails an adjudication on the merits nor determines any right or liability; being rendered at the threshold without adjudication after trial, it cannot be accorded the finality that attracts res judicata, and the Police's independent statutory duty under Section 154 to register an FIR disclosing a cognizable offence continues to operate.
Headnote
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Sections 154, 156(3), 190, 202, 482 — quashing of FIR — res judicata in criminal proceedings —
res judicata — rejection of Section 156(3) application not a bar to subsequent FIR —
Held: An order under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC is confined to directing or declining to direct investigation and involves no adjudication on the merits; being a threshold order, its rejection cannot attract res judicata so as to bar a subsequent FIR founded on the same or substantially similar allegations, and the Police's independent statutory duty under Section 154 continues unaffected. (¶38-39, 42-43)
Section 156(3) is pre-cognizance, Section 202 is post-cognizance —
Held further: The jurisdiction under Section 156(3) is exercisable at the pre-cognizance stage as a direction to the police to investigate, while Section 202 operates at the post-cognizance stage to assist the Magistrate in proceedings already instituted upon a complaint. (¶27, 29)
res judicata in criminal proceedings — decisive consideration is finality of the earlier adjudication —
Held further: Res judicata applies in criminal proceedings in principle, but only where the earlier proceeding culminated in a final adjudication on the merits; an order at the threshold, without adjudication on the merits, does not attract the doctrine. (¶34-37)
Section 482 — face-value test —
Held further: At the stage of quashing an FIR under Section 482, the Court is concerned only with whether the allegations, taken at face value, disclose a cognizable offence, and does not examine the correctness or reliability of the material relied upon by either side. (¶47-48)
In the Court's own words
Paragraph 38The inquiry before this Court must, therefore, proceed on the same doctrinal footing. The issue is not whether an earlier application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC had been preferred or rejected. Rather, the determinative question is whether an order rejecting such an application possesses the character of a final adjudication on the merits so as to attract the doctrine of res judicata.
Paragraph 39In our considered view, the answer must be in the negative. As already discussed, an order passed under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC is confined to directing, or declining to direct, the exercise of the statutory power of investigation under Chapter XII of the Code. Such an order neither entails an adjudication on the merits of the allegations nor determines any right or liability of the proposed accused. Applying the same principle, the rejection of an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC, being an order rendered at the threshold without any adjudication on the merits after trial, cannot be accorded such finality as would attract the doctrine of res judicata so as to bar the subsequent registration of an FIR or the continuation of criminal proceedings founded upon the same or substantially similar allegations.
Paragraph 42Independent of whether an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC has been allowed or rejected, the duty of the Police under Section 154 of the Cr.PC remains governed by the statutory mandate of the Code. The obligation to register and investigate a cognizable offence does not emanate from a direction issued by the Magistrate under Section 156(3) but flows directly from Sections 154 and 156[^21] of the Cr.PC itself. This position stands authoritatively settled by the Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and Others[^22] wherein it was held that where the information furnished discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, registration of an FIR is mandatory. The police officer cannot avoid that statutory duty and at the stage of registration, the enquiry is confined to whether the information ex facie discloses a cognizable offence, the truthfulness, credibility or otherwise of the allegations being matters for investigation and not for refusing registration.
Paragraph 43The consequence is self-evident. The rejection of an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC cannot curtail or extinguish the independent statutory obligation cast upon the Police under Section 154 of the Cr.PC. If, notwithstanding such rejection, information disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence is subsequently furnished to the Police, the statutory duty recognised in Lalita Kumari (supra) continues to operate with full force.
Acts & Sections
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973Indian Penal Code, 1860Constitution of IndiaOne judgment a day. That's the whole habit.
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