Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena v. Dinesh Kumar Mahto @ Dinesh Kumar Mahato and another
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — s.125 — s.125(4) — Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — s.9 — Maintenance of wife — Decree for restitution of conjugal rights — Refusal to live with husband —
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — s.125(4) — Restitution decree not by itself a disqualification —
Held: The mere passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, and non-compliance with it by the wife, is not by itself sufficient to attract the disqualification under Section 125(4). Whether she still had valid and sufficient reason to refuse to live with her husband depends on the facts of each case. (¶29)
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — s.125(4) — 'Refusal' distinguished from 'failure' —
Held further: Section 125 must be given a liberal construction to fulfil the intention of the legislature. The crucial word chosen in the provision is 'refusal', and the mere failure of a wife to live with her husband does not disentitle her to maintenance. (¶27)
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — s.125 — Maintenance proceedings essentially civil — Civil Court findings not binding —
Held further: Maintenance proceedings under Section 125 are essentially civil in nature, and the two proceedings are altogether independent. Findings of the Civil Court in the restitution suit are therefore not binding on the Court seized of the maintenance petition. (¶30, 33)
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — s.125(4) — Husband's conduct — Sufficient reason to stay away —
Held further: Where the husband ignored his wife after her miscarriage, denied her the use of the toilet and proper cooking facilities, and having secured the restitution decree neither sought its execution nor a decree of divorce, she had sufficient reason to stay away. Appeal allowed and the maintenance order restored. (¶37, 38)
In the Court's own words
Paragraph 32The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, distinguishes between judgments in rem and judgments in personam and Sections 40 to 43 therein stipulates the relevance of existing judgments, orders or decrees in subsequent proceedings in different situations. The relevant provisions are extracted hereunder for ready reference: 40. Previous judgments relevant to bar a second suit or trial: - The existence of any judgment, order or decree which by law prevents any Court from taking cognizance of a suit or holding a trial is a relevant fact when the question is whether such Court ought to take cognizance of a such suit, or to hold such trial. 41. Relevancy of certain judgments in probate, etc., jurisdiction: - A final judgment, order or decree of a competent Court, in the exercise of probate, matrimonial admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction which confers upon or takes away from any person any legal character, or which declares any person to be entitled to any such character, or to be entitled to any specific thing, not as against any specified person but absolutely, is relevant when the existence of any such legal character, or the title of any such person to any such thing, is relevant. Such judgment, order or decree is conclusive proof— that any legal character, which it confers accrued at the time when such judgment, order or decree came into operation; that any legal character, to which it declares any such person to be entitled, accrued to that person at the time when such judgment, [order or decree] declares it to have accrued to that person; that any legal character which it takes away from any such person ceased at the time from which such judgment, [order or decree] declared that it had ceased or should cease; and that anything to which it declares any person to be so entitled was the property of that person at the time from which such judgment, [order or decree] declares that it had been or should be his property. 42. Relevancy and effect of judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in section 41: - Judgments, orders or decrees other than those mentioned in section 41, are relevant if they relate to matters of a public nature relevant to the enquiry; but such judgments, orders or decrees are not conclusive proof of that which they state. Illustration: A sues B for trespass on his land. B alleges the existence of a public right of way over the land, which A denies. The existence of a decree in favour of the defendant, in a suit by A against C for a trespass on the same land in which C alleged the existence of the same right of way, is relevant, but it is not conclusive proof that the right of way exists. 43. Judgments, etc., other than those mentioned in sections 40 to 42, when relevant. - Judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in sections 40, 41 and 42, are irrelevant, unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree, is a fact in issue, or is relevant under some other provisions of this Act. Illustrations
Paragraph 33Sections 34 to 37 of the Bharata Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, correspond to Sections 40 to 43 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, with some modifications. Section 41, as is clear from the extraction hereinabove, specifically deals with instances where an earlier judgment, order or decree constitutes conclusive proof whereas Section 42 provides that an earlier judgment is relevant if it relates to matters of public nature relevant to the inquiry, but such judgments, orders or decrees are not conclusive proof of that which they state. These provisions were considered in detail by a 3-Judge Bench of this Court in K.G. Premshankar vs. Inspector of Police and another[^23], in the context of when a judgment in a civil proceeding, on the same cause of action, would be relevant in a criminal case, and it was observed thus:
One judgment a day. That's the whole habit.
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