Supreme Court of India· 12 August 2026

What is the scope of an appellate court's power under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to interfere with a discretionary order granting or refusing a temporary injunction?

SHRUTI MANAV SHARMA & ANR v. SUNANINA SINGH & ORS

2026 INSC 843
Coram: Alok Aradhe; Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha

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Answer

The appellate court does not undertake a fresh reconsideration of the entire matter or substitute its own view merely because it might have arrived at a different conclusion on the same material; interference is warranted only where the discretion has been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely, mala fide, upon an irrelevant or extraneous consideration, or contrary to settled legal principles, the guiding test being whether a reasonable person could have reached the same conclusion on the material before the trial court.

Headnote

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XLIII Rule 1(r) — Appellate interference with discretionary injunction — Temporary injunction — Trinity test — Prima facie case — Balance of convenience — Irreparable injury — Vice of the mini-trial — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XLIII Rule 1(r) — Limited scope of appellate interference — Held: An order on an application for temporary injunction is discretionary, and an appellate court does not undertake a fresh reconsideration of the entire matter or substitute its own view merely because it might have arrived at a different conclusion on the same material; interference is warranted only where the discretion has been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely, mala fide, upon an irrelevant or extraneous consideration, or contrary to settled legal principles, the guiding test being whether a reasonable person could have reached the same conclusion on the material before the trial court. (¶13, 36, 39) Temporary injunction — Trinity test — Prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury — Held further: The grant of a temporary injunction rests on three coexisting conditions: a prima facie case, meaning a substantial question raised bona fide requiring investigation and not a case proved to the hilt; a balance of convenience requiring the court to weigh the injury to the plaintiff against the corresponding injury to the defendant were the uncertainty to be resolved against each; and an irreparable injury which cannot be adequately compensated in damages; where these three conditions coexist, as found by the court of first instance on the material before it, its exercise of discretion cannot be faulted merely because an appellate court would have weighed the same material differently. (¶24, 28, 31, 35) Temporary injunction — Interlocutory stage — Vice of the mini-trial — Held further: The scope of examination on an application for interim injunction, and equally of an appeal against an order made on such an application, is confined to the limited and threshold question whether the plaintiff has shown a serious dispute meriting investigation at trial; it does not extend to an examination of the final effect, probative value or ultimate merits of the documents annexed to the pleadings, and courts must confine such orders to recording, with reasons, their findings on the three settled conditions without embarking upon what is, in substance, a mini-trial upon affidavits and documents that properly await the leading of evidence. (¶37, 38, 40)

In the Court's own words

Paragraph 13By the impugned judgment dated 20.03.2026, the Division Bench noted the limited scope of its jurisdiction under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the Code – that, the grant or refusal of an injunction being discretionary, an appellate court does not undertake a fresh reconsideration of the entire matter, nor substitute its own view merely because it might have arrived at a different conclusion on the same material, and that interference is warranted only where the discretion has been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely, mala fide, upon an irrelevant or extraneous consideration, or contrary to settled legal principles; the guiding test being whether a reasonable person could have reached the same conclusion on the material before the trial court. Applying that standard, the Division Bench nonetheless proceeded to hold as follows:

Paragraph 36An order on an application for temporary injunction is a discretionary one, and an appellate court does not ordinarily substitute its own discretion for that of the court of first instance, save where the discretion has been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or perversely, or in ignorance of the settled principles governing the grant or refusal of such relief. The principle laid down in Wander Ltd. & Anr. (supra) which has been approved by subsequent decisions of this Court[^15], has been guiding the appellate courts in the country for decades while exercising the appellate jurisdiction considering the correctness of the discretion and jurisdiction for grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. The order of the learned Single Judge, resting as it does on seven specific findings addressing the nature of the original plaintiff’s interest under the Will, the doubt surrounding its finality, the plea of undue influence, and the alter-ego character of the defendant entities, cannot be said to be arbitrary, capricious or perverse, nor to have been passed in ignorance of settled principle. It is, on the contrary, an order squarely anchored in the three conditions that govern the grant of interim injunction. The Division Bench’s substitution of its own appreciation of the Will, of the parties’ conduct, and of the applicability of statutory provisions bearing on the final merits, for the exercise of discretion by the learned Single Judge, was not warranted on the standard it had itself correctly recited, and constitutes precisely the kind of interference that Wander Ltd. & Anr. (supra) forbids. XII. THE VICE OF THE MINI-TRIAL

Paragraph 39Measured against this standard, the judgments of the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench bear the marks of a mini-trial. Having correctly stated the limited standard of appellate interference laid down in Wander Ltd. & Anr. (supra) that interference is warranted only where the discretion below has been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely, or contrary to settled principles of law regulating the grant or refusal of temporary injunctions. The Division Bench proceeded, over twelve detailed findings, to construe individual clauses of the Will dated 26.03.2004, to weigh the effect of delay and of admissions said to have been made in a separate suit, to apply Section 89 of the Companies Act, 2013 to the facts, and to assess whether a “clear prima facie nexus” had been demonstrated between specific acquisitions and specific proceeds. Each of these is a matter of substance properly reserved for trial; none of them is a matter upon which an appellate court, confined to asking whether the Single Judge’s discretion was perversely or arbitrarily exercised, may substitute its own appreciation of the evidence.

Acts & Sections

Order XLIII Rule 1(r) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908Order XXXIX Rule 1 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s.94 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s.151 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s.36 Specific Relief Act, 1963s.37(1) Specific Relief Act, 1963s.89 Companies Act, 2013s.14 Hindu Succession Act, 1956

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Also decided in this judgment

What are the three conditions that must coexist for a court to grant a temporary injunction under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?Can a court, while deciding an application for temporary injunction under Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, conduct a detailed, merits-based analysis of disputed documents to assess the probable outcome at trial?Where properties are alleged to have been acquired using proceeds traceable to shareholding procured by undue influence, does the availability of a subsequent money decree adequately compensate the plaintiff, such that an interlocutory injunction restraining alienation should be refused?

Plain-language answer prepared by the LexStreak Editorial Desk — verify against the judgment. Source: Supreme Court of India. Corrections