Supreme Court of India· 20 August 2026
Whether the High Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, was justified in disturbing the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the trial court and the first appellate court?
JAMNABAI AND OTHERS v. VASUDEV AND OTHERS
2026 INSC 900 · SLP (C) NO.39 OF 2026
Coram: Augustine George Masih; Sanjay Karol
Answer
No, save where the findings are perverse or vitiated by an error of law. Section 100 of the Code confers a restricted jurisdiction, entertaining a second appeal only where it raises a substantial question of law; concurrent findings of fact cannot be disturbed merely because the High Court, on a fresh look, prefers a different inference. Interference is warranted only where there is a demonstrable error in the approach to the evidence, reliance on inadmissible material, omission of vital evidence, or a conclusion no reasonable judicial mind could have reached. Here, the High Court's reversal reflected a reappreciation of the same evidence, not demonstrable perversity, and exceeded the permissible limits of its Section 100 jurisdiction.
Headnote
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — s.100 — Order XLI Rule 27 — Specific Relief Act, 1963 — s.34 — Limitation Act, 1963 — Art. 58, 100 — Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 — s.117, 257 — Second appeal — Revenue mutation — Adverse possession between co-owners —
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — s.100 — Second appeal — Interference standard —
Held: Section 100 confers a restricted jurisdiction; a second appeal lies only on a substantial question of law, not because a different inference is preferable. Interference needs a demonstrable error in approach, or a conclusion no reasonable judicial mind could have reached. ('17)
Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 — s.117 — Mutation entries and title —
Held further: An entry in the revenue record neither creates nor extinguishes title and exists for fiscal purposes; it cannot operate as a conveyance or relinquishment of proprietary rights. The presumption of correctness attaching to it is rebuttable, not a presumption of title. ('22)
Limitation Act, 1963 — Adverse possession — Ouster between co-owners —
Held further: Possession of one co-owner is ordinarily possession on behalf of all; mere continuance in possession does not confer adverse title. An ouster requires assertion of hostile title with exclusive possession to the other co-owner's knowledge, absent which limitation does not run. ('25)
Specific Relief Act, 1963 — s.34 — Consequential relief bar —
Held further: Section 34's bar applies only where a bare declaration is sought without available consequential relief; it does not apply where partition, possession and injunction were also sought. Appeal allowed; the impugned judgment is set aside. ('27, 30)
In the Court's own words
Paragraph 17As settled by this Court in catena of judgments including, Bholaram v. Ameerchand[^7], Kulwant Kaur and Others v. Gurdial Singh Mann (Dead) by LRs. and Others[^8] and P. Kishore Kumar (supra), Section 100 of the CPC confers a restricted jurisdiction upon the High Court, and that a second appeal can be entertained only where it involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact ordinarily cannot be disturbed in such an appeal unless they are shown to be perverse or vitiated by an error of law, and the existence of a power to interfere where findings are demonstrably perverse cannot become a license to reappreciate the evidence merely because another view of it is possible. A finding is not rendered perverse simply because the High Court, upon a fresh look at the evidence, considers a different inference preferable. Interference is warranted only where there is a demonstrable error in the approach to the evidence, reliance upon material that is inadmissible, omission of evidence that is vital, or a conclusion that no reasonable judicial mind could have reached on the material available. We propose to test the departure of High Court from the concurrent findings of the courts below against this standard while examining each of the remaining points that arise in the appeal.
Paragraph 29It follows from the foregoing that the reversal by the High Court of the concurrent findings of the courts below cannot be sustained. On the question of Ex.D5, its conclusion rested on treating DW3 as an attesting witness when he was nothing of the sort, and on treating the document as undisputed when its genuineness had been squarely contested and found wanting for specific and itemised reasons that the impugned judgment does not engage with. On the mutation, it proceeded on the premise that a revenue entry can itself extinguish title and that a separate prayer for its cancellation was indispensable, a premise unsupported by settled law as discussed above. On limitation, it rested on an isolated line of cross-examination read out of context, treating a suit for declaration of title by succession as though it were a direct challenge to the revenue order itself. In each of these respects, the departure by the High Court from the concurrent findings reflects a reappreciation of the same evidence to reach a different conclusion, rather than the kind of demonstrable perversity or error of law that alone would justify interference under Section 100 of the Code, particularly when both courts below had examined the very same question, namely whether the respondents had established the alleged relinquishment, and the first appellate court had done so after the additional revenue documents were specifically brought on record and examined.
Paragraph 30We are accordingly of the view that the High Court exceeded the permissible limits of its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code, and that the appellants were rightly held by the courts below to be entitled to the co-ownership, partition and consequential relief that had been granted to them. The impugned judgment cannot be sustained, and the appeal is allowed.
Acts & Sections
s.100 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908Order XLI Rule 27 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s.34 Specific Relief Act, 1963Art. 58 Limitation Act, 1963Art. 100 Limitation Act, 1963s.257 Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959s.117 Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959s.114(e) Evidence Act, 1872One judgment a day. That's the whole habit.
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