Does a life estate not intended for maintenance enlarge into an absolute estate under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956?
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 — s.14(1) — s.14(2) — Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — s.43 — Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — s.68 — Will — Life estate — Vested remainder — Alienation —
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 — s.14(2) — Life estate under a Will — Not in lieu of maintenance —
Held: A life estate not intended for maintenance does not enlarge into an absolute estate under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Where separate and abundant maintenance provisions exist, Section 14(2) alone applies. (¶16)
Mitakshara — Self-acquired property — Bequest for absolute enjoyment — Separate property of the beneficiary —
Held further: Property bequeathed under a Will for the absolute enjoyment of the beneficiary is separate property in his hands. Where the intention is to benefit his branch as well, it takes the character of joint family property. (¶20)
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — s.43 — Life estate holder and remainderman — Joint alienation valid —
Held further: A life estate holder and the remainderman can together validly alienate the property covered under a Will, in the absence of any other interest holders. The title later acquired by the remainderman feeds the earlier transfer. (¶21, 26)
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — s.68 — Admitted execution — Attesting witness not required —
Held further: Examination of the attesting witnesses under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is not necessary where execution of the document is admitted and it has been acted upon. Second Appeal allowed. (¶18, 27)
Does a life estate not intended for maintenance enlarge into an absolute estate under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956?
No. A life estate not intended for maintenance does not enlarge into an absolute estate under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Looking into the intention of the testator using the armchair rule, the Court found the life interest was created to protect the self-acquired properties until the son attained maturity, and that abundant separate maintenance provisions had been made, so Section 14(2) alone applied. (¶16) [¶16]
Is property bequeathed under a Will for the absolute enjoyment of the beneficiary separate property in his hands?
Yes. Property bequeathed under a Will for the absolute enjoyment of the beneficiary is separate property in his hands. The nature of the property in the hands of the beneficiary depends on the intention of the testator; where the intention is to partition the property or to benefit the beneficiary's branch as well, it would be joint family property in his hands. (¶19, 20) [¶19, ¶20]
Can a life estate holder and the remainderman together validly alienate the property covered under a Will, in the absence of any other interest holders?
Yes. A life estate holder and the remainderman can together validly alienate the property covered under a Will, in the absence of the interests and rights of any other person. The principle is derived from the doctrine of estoppel and from the doctrine of feeding the grant by estoppel under Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the absolute title later acquired by the remainderman operating to fulfil the transfer already made. (¶21, 26) [¶21, ¶26]
Is examination of the attesting witnesses under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 necessary where execution of the document is admitted?
No. Examination of the attesting witnesses under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is not necessary where execution of the document is admitted on either side and it has been acted upon. The plaintiffs there admitted execution and challenged only validity, the certified copy was marked without objection, and the competent person to challenge the deed had never done so in his lifetime. (¶18) [¶18]
Prepared by the LexStreak Editorial Desk — verify against the judgment.
“18. So its execution was not denied by the plaintiffs, they challenge only its validity. Further, Ex-B.2 is a certified copy. It was stated by D.W.1 / first defendant in her evidence that the original was produced in another case between the parties. The same was not denied by the plaintiffs' side. Further, Ex-B.2 was marked without any objection. Since the execution of Ex-B.2 - Gift Settlement Deed is admitted on either side and it has been acted upon as this Court is to elaborate infra, this Court finds no necessity for examination of the attesting witnesses under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 to prove the execution of Ex-B.2. Therefore, this Court holds that the execution of Ex-B.2 - Gift Settlement Deed is proved. Moreover, as this Court is to elaborate infra, the suit property would be separate property in the hands of Veerappa. Hence, he is the competent person to challenge Ex-B.2 - Gift Settlement Deed if at all he has any grievance or contention. There is nothing available on record to show that Veerappa challenged the same during his lifetime. Veerappa passed away in 1986. In these circumstances, the plaintiffs cannot question the same.”
“20. As it flows from the afore-cited Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court, the nature of properties bequeathed under a Will in the hands of the beneficiary thereunder depends on the intention of the testator. Thus, if bequeath is intended for absolute enjoyment of the beneficiary, then it would be separate property in the hands of the beneficiary; on the other hand, if the intention is to partition the property or leave the property for the benefit of not just the beneficiary but his branch as well, then the property would be in the nature of joint family property in the hands of the beneficiary. Coming to the facts of instant case, as elaborated above, though life interest was granted, ultimate intention of the testator was to bequeath majority of his self-acquired properties absolutely in favour of his son - Veerappa in his individual capacity. It is clear that the bequeath was not in his capacity of the head of the family. Therefore, the suit property along with the other properties covered under Ex-A.1 - Will would be separate property in the hands of Veerappa. In this regard, reference may also be made to Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in M.P. Peria Karuppan Chettiar -vs- CIT, reported in (1975) 3 SCC 439. Relevant extract reads as hereunder: "12.Mr Desai further pointed out that the gift was stated to be in favour of the donees and “their respective heirs, executors, administrators and assignees” which, according to him, indicated that really the object of the bounty were the sons as heads of their respective families. We are unable to agree. It is clear from the deeds that the donor's desire was to transfer the properties to the three sons whom he named and described as donees. It was not stated that the donees would take the property as heads of their family units. The use of the words “heirs, executors, administrators and assignees” in the context in which they appear, in our opinion, indicate on the contrary that the gift was to the sons absolutely, the property gifted being both heritable and alienable. There is nothing in the two documents to suggest that the interest transferred to the sons was limited in any way. The surrounding circumstances also do not support Mr Desai's contention. …"”
“21. So, the suit property would be separate property in the hands of Veerappa. It is settled legal position that life estate holder and the remainderman / vested remainder holder, in the absence of any other interest / right holders, can together alienate the property covered under Will. This settled legal principle could be derived from the doctrine of estoppel. It could also be derived from the doctrine of feeding the grant by estoppel under Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, as per which, though Veerappa being the remainderman / vested remainder holder was yet to acquire title over the properties covered under Ex-B.2 - Gift Settlement Deed including the suit property, the latter absolute title he acquired upon the demise of the life estate holder - Unnamalaiammal would operate to fulfill the transfer made by him under Ex-B.2. For ready reference, Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is extracted hereunder: "43. Transfer by unauthorised person who subsequently acquires interest in property transferred. - Where a person fraudulently or erroneously represents that he is authorised to transfer certain immovable property and professes to transfer such property for consideration, such transfer shall, at the option of the transferee, operate on any interest which the transferor may acquire in such property at any time during which the contract of transfer subsists. Nothing in this section shall impair the right of transferees in good faith for consideration without notice of the existence of the said option. Illustration A, a Hindu who has separated from his father B, sells to C three fields, X, Y and Z, representing that A is authorised to transfer the same. Of these fields Z does not belong to A, it having been retained by B on the partition; but on B's dying A as heir obtains Z.C, not having rescinded the contract of sale, may require A to deliver Z to him."”
“26. In view of the foregoing narrative, this Court finds that the decision of the Trial Court in dismissing the Suit is correct. The First Appellate Court failed to appreciate the settled legal position that life estate holder and the remainderman / vested remainder can together validly alienate the property covered under the Will, in the absence of interests and rights of any other person, in the right perspective and erred in reversing the Trial Court's decision. The Judgment and Decree of the First Appellate Court are liable to be set aside and the Judgment and Decree of the Trial Court are to be restored.”
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Feeling aggrieved by the Judgment and Decree dated November 28, 2007 passed by 'the Sub Court, Tirupattur, Vellore' ['First Appellate Court' for convenience] in A.S. No.19 of 2007, reversing the Judgment and Decree dated April 11, 2005 passed in O.S. No.161 of 1997 on the file of 'the District Munsif Court, Tirupattur' ['Trial Court' for convenience], the defendants in the Original Suit who are the respondents in the Appeal Suit, have come up with this Second Appeal.
For the sake of convenience, the parties will hereinafter be referred to as per their array in the Original Suit.
PLAINTIFFS' CASE:
Case of the plaintiffs is that an extent of 2 Acres 50 Cents in Survey No.368/7 in A.K.Mottur Village, Tirupattur Taluk is the suit property. According to the plaintiffs, the suit property originally belonged to Arunachala Chetty, as his ancestral entitlement. Said Arunachala Chetty voluntarily executed a Will dated November 10, 1953 in favour of his wife - Unnamalaiammal, creating life interest to her without any power of alienation with vested remainder to his son - Veerappa for absolute enjoyment. The testator - Arunachala Chetty passed away in the year 1953 and the said Will came into effect. Life estate holder - Unnamalaiammal and the remainderman - Veerappa, jointly executed Settlement Deed dated February 26, 1975 in favour of first defendant - Ganga. 3.1. Contention of the plaintiffs is that Unnamalaiammal and Veerappa had no right to execute the Settlement Deed, for as per the terms of the Will, the said Unnamalaiammal shall enjoy the suit properties without any power of alienation for life and thereafter the properties shall devolve upon her son - Veerappa, and moreover the Settlement Deed was a nominal document which was not acted upon. Veerappa was alone in possession and enjoyment of the suit property and passed away in the year 1986 leaving behind, his wife - Rathinammal and daughter - Kalaiselvi [plaintiffs] as his legal heirs to succeed his estate. The defendants have no right, title or interest over the suit property. The defendants with an intention to grab the suit property attempted to trespass and take forcible possession on December 10, 1996. Hence the plaintiffs have filed the present Suit for declaration and injunction against the defendants.
CASE OF THE FIRST DEFENDANT:
The first defendant filed a written statement denying certain plaint averments. The first defendant admitted the plaint averments which are set out in brief hereinabove in Paragraph No.3, except for the averment that the suit property is ancestral property of Arunachala Chetty. The case of first defendant is that she is none other than the wife of Veerappa. The Settlement Deed executed in her favour was acted upon. Pursuantly, she executed a Sale Deed in favour of the second defendant on September 25, 1996. On and after the sale, the second defendant is in possession and enjoyment of the suit property. The plaintiffs have no right and were never in possession and enjoyment thereof. Further, the first defendant contended that the Court Fee paid by the plaintiffs is incorrect. Accordingly, the first defendant prayed to dismiss the Original Suit.
CASE OF THE SECOND DEFENDANT:
The second defendant filed a written statement reiterating the contentions made by the first defendant and sought for dismissal of the Original Suit.
TRIAL COURT:
Based on the above pleadings, the Trial Court framed the following issues on August 12, 1997: "1. Whether the gift settlement deed executed by Unnamalaiammalal and Veerappa Chetty in favour of 1 st defendant is valid? 2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of declaration as sought by them ? 3. Whether the plaintiffs are in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties? 4. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get the relief of the permanent injunction as prayed ? 5. Whether the suit has no cause of action ? 6. Whether the valuation of the plaint and Court fee paid there on by the plaintiffs are correct?
To what reliefs the plaintiffs are entitled to?" 7. At trial, on the side of the plaintiffs, the second plaintiff was examined as P.W.1 and one Ramalingam was examined as P.W.2 and Ex-A.1 to Ex-A.5 were marked. On the side of the defendant, the first defendant was examined as D.W.1 and one Arumugam, one Natarajan and one Perumal were examined as D.W.2 , D.W.3 and D.W.4 respectively and Ex-B.1 to Ex-B.39 were marked.
The Trial Court found that Ex-B.2 - Gift Settlement Deed executed by Veerappa in favour of first defendant is valid. The plaintiffs are not in possession and enjoyment of the suit property. Consequently concluded that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief of declaration and permanent injunction. Accordingly, the Trial Court dismissed the Suit.
FIRST APPEAL:
Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiffs preferred an appeal in A.S. No.19 of 2007 before the First Appellate Court, which after hearing both sides, allowed the Appeal by setting aside the Judgment and Decree passed by the Trial Court in O.S. No.161 of 1997 and decreed the Suit as prayed for. The First Appellate Court found that only after demise of Unnamalaiammal, Veerappa would acquire rights over the suit property under Ex-A.1 - Suit Will. Ex-B.2 - Gift Settlement Deed was made in contravention of the terms and conditions of Ex-A.1 - Suit Will and hence not valid. After the demise of Veerappa, the plaintiffs are alone his legal heirs. The marriage between Veerappa and the first defendant is invalid in the eyes of law. Upon arriving at these findings, the Appeal Suit was allowed.
SECOND APPEAL:
Feeling aggrieved by the Judgment and Decree passed by the First Appellate Court, the defendants, who were respondents in the Appeal Suit, have preferred this Second Appeal, which was admitted on March 12, 2008 on the following Substantial Questions of Law: "(a) When the Unnamalai ammal gains full ownership to the suit property pursuant to Section 14(1) is the lower appellate Court right in concluding that she has no right to execute settlement deed? (b) Whether the Court below is right in concluding that the marriage between the first appellant and Veerapa Chetty was not established even after production of Exhibit B.1 and marriage was accepted by the plaintiff herself ?"
ARGUMENTS:
Ms. V.Srimathi, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants, submitted that the suit property was the separate and self-acquired property of Arunachala Chetty. He executed Ex-A.1 - Will dated November 10, 1953 and passed away in the same year. After the demise of Arunachala Chetty, the Will came into force and was acted upon. As per the Will, Unnamalaiammal was put in possession and enjoyment of the suit property as a life estate holder. According to the terms of the Will, Unnamalaiammal was entitled to enjoy the property without any power of alienation for her lifetime, and after her demise, the property was to vest with Veerappa. During the lifetime of Unnamalaiammal, the life estate holder and the remainderman, jointly executed Ex-B.2 - Gift Settlement Deed dated February 26, 1975, in respect of the suit property and some other properties, in favour of the first defendant, who is the second wife of the remainderman - Veerappa. Even otherwise, with the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Unnamalaiammal's limited life estate blossoms into absolute estate. Hence, Ex-B.2 - Gift Settlement Deed is perfectly valid. Further, possession was handed over under Ex-B.2. Revenue records were also pursuantly mutated in favour of first defendant. In these circumstances, first defendant under Ex-B.3 - Sale Deed dated September 25, 1996 sold the suit property in favour of the second defendant. The First Appellate Court, without considering the correct legal position, erroneously allowed the Appeal Suit and decreed the Suit. Accordingly, she prayed that the Second Appeal be allowed, the Judgment and Decree of the First Appellate Court be set aside and the Judgement and Decree of the Trial Court be restored.
Per contra, Mr. R.Lakshmi Narasimhan, learned Counsel appearing for respondents 2 to 5, assisted by Mr. P.Chandrasekar, contended that under Ex-A.1 - Suit Will, the life estate holder - Unnamalaiammal had no power of alienation, and further, only after her lifetime, the remainderman - Veerappa would acquire rights over the suit property. In these circumstances, neither Unnamalaiammal nor Veerappa nor them jointly had any right to execute any deed or alienate the suit property. Accordingly, the alleged Gift Settlement Deed executed by Unnamalaiammal and Veerappa jointly in favour of the first defendant - Ganga, is void ab initio. Further, in view of the terms contained in Ex-A.1 - Suit Will, Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 would alone be applicable and not Section 14 (1) thereof, which means the limited life estate under Ex-A.1 in favour of Unnamalaiammal cannot be enlarged into absolute estate. It was further contended that Ex-B.2 - Gift Settlement Deed was executed only with a view to defeat and defraud the rights of the plaintiffs. Therefore, the First Appellate Court, after considering the facts and circumstances of the case, rightly allowed the Appeal and decreed the Suit. Accordingly, he prayed to dismiss the Second Appeal and sustain the Judgment and Decree of the First Appellate Court. 12.1. In support of his submissions on the question of applicability of Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, he relied upon the following Judgments:
(i) Mangal Singh -vs- Smt. Rattno, reported in AIR 1967 SCC 1786;
(ii) Seth Badri Prasad -vs- Kanso Devi, reported in (1969) 2 SCC 586;
(iii) MST. Karmi -vs- Amru, reported in (1972) 4 SCC 86;
(iv) V. Tulasamma -vs- Sesha Reddy, reported in (1977) 3 SCC 99;
(v) Gulwant Kaur -vs- Mohinder Singh, reported in (1987) 3 SCC 674;
(vi) Jaswant Kaur -vs- Major Harpal Singh, reported in (1989) 3 SCC 572;
(vii) Thota Sesharathamma -vs- Thota Manikyamma, reported in (1991) 4 SCC 312;
(viii) Bhura -vs- Kashi Ram, reported in (1994) 2 SCC 111;
(ix) Gumpha -vs- Jaibai, reported in (1994) 2 SCC 511;
(x) Nazar Singh -vs- Jagjit Kaur, reported in (1996) 1 SCC 35;
(xi) C. Masilamani Mudaliar -vs- Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami Thirukoil, reported in (1996) 8 SCC 525;
(xii) Bhoomireddy Chenna Reddy -vs- Bhoospalli Pedda Verrappa, reported in (1997) 10 SCC 673;
(xiii) Raghubar Singh -vs- Gulab Singh, reported in (1998) 6 SCC 314;
(xiv) Balwant Kaur -vs- Chanan Singh, reported in (2000) 6 SCC 310;
(xv) Shankuntla Devi -vs- Kamla, reported in (2005) 5 SCC 390;
(xvi) Sadhu Singh -vs- Gurdwara Sahib Narike, reported in (2006) 8 SCC 75;
(xvii) Sharad Subramanyan -vs- Soumi Mazumdar, reported in (2006) 8 SCC 91;
(xviii) Santhosh -vs- Saraswathibai, reported in (2008) 1 SCC 465;
(xix) Gaddam Ramakrishnareddy -vs- Gaddam Ramireddy, reported in (2010) 9 SCC 602;
(xx) Jagan Singh -vs- Dhanwanti, reported in (2012) 2 SCC 628;
(xxi) Shivdev Kaur -vs- R.S. Grewal, reported in (2013) 4 SCC 636;
(xxii) Jupudy Pardha Sarathy -vs- Pentapati Rama Krishna, reported in (2016) 2 SCC 56;
(xxiii) Ranvir Dewan -vs- Rashmi Khanna, reported in (2018) 12 SCC 1;
(xxiv) V. Kalyanaswamy -vs- L. Bakthavatsalam, reported in (2021) 16 SCC 543;
(xxv) Jogi Ram -vs- Suresh Kumar, reported in (2022) 4 SCC 274;
(xxvi) Munni Devi Alias Nathi Devi -vs- Rajendra Alias Lallu Lal, reported in (2022) 17 SCC 434;
(xxvii) Tej Bhan -vs- Ram Kishan, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 3661. DISCUSSION:
Heard on either side. Perused the evidence available on record in light of the Substantial Questions of Law framed.
For better appreciation, the following chart showing the relationship between the parties may be referred to: 14.1. It is to be noted that the relationships between Veerappa on one hand and the first defendant & her children on the other, is not an admitted one. Similarly, the sale of suit property by first defendant in favour of second defendant is also not an admitted one. Rest of the relationships shown in the chart are all admitted by the parties on either side.
Arunachala Chetty executed Ex-A.1 - Will dated November 10, 1953. He thereby bequeathed the suit property and some more properties absolutely in favour of his son - Veerappa as vested remainder with life estate in favour of his wife - Unnamalaiammal without any power of alienation. Further, some maintenance provisions have been made in favour of his wife - Unnamalaiammal. He thereby also made some provisions in favour of his two daughters which are not relevant to decide the present matter. Ex-A.1 - Will is admitted by either side, however, while the plaintiffs contend that the suit property is Arunachala Chetty's ancestral property, the defendant has not admitted the same. At the same time, the defendants have not specifically denied it. While so, both, P.W.1 / second plaintiff and D.W.1 / first defendant have in their evidence admitted that the suit property is separate and self-acquired property of Arunachala Chetty. Further, there is intrinsic evidence available in Ex-A.1 - Will to show that the suit property is the testator's self-acquired property. Further, there is no contra evidence available on record to show otherwise. Hence, this Court finds the suit property as separate and self-acquired property of Arunachala Chetty and hence, he is entitled to execute Will in respect of the same. As admitted by either side, Ex-A.1 - Will executed by Arunachala Chetty in respect of his self-acquired properties including the suit property is perfectly valid. The scenario would have been different in case of ancestral properties. Ex-A.1 - Will having been executed and having come into effect before the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, had it been in respect of ancestral properties, would have been valid subject to certain conditions. Be that as it may, as the properties covered under Ex-A.1 are separate and self-acquired properties of the testator, no doubt that Ex-A.1 is perfectly valid. Relevant extract from the evidence of P.W.1 and D.W.1 and from Ex-A.1 - Will, can be found hereunder: Relevant portion from P.W.1's evidence: ''/// 1953y; vd; jhj;jh ,we;Jnghdhh;//// vd; jhj;jh mUzhry brl;oahUf;F mth; rk;ghjpj;jjd; \yk; tHf;F brhj;J ghj;jpag;gl;lJ//// mUzhry brl;oahUf;F tHf;F brhj;J jtpu ntW ,ju brhj;Jf;fSk; ,Ue;jd vd;why; rhpjhd;/ uh$ghisak; kw;Wk; ,ju ,l';fspYk; me;j brhj;J cs;sJ/ midj;J brhj;Jk; mUzhrybrl;o rk;ghjpj;j Rahh;$pj brhj;jhFk; . . . '' Relevant portion from D.W.1's evidence: '' . . . ,e;j brhj;Jk;/ ,ju brhj;Jk; Mjpapy; vd; khkdhh; mUzhry brl;oahh; vd;gtUf;F ghj;jpag;gl;lJ. . . 1953k; tUlk; fhh;j;jpif khjk; mUzhry brl;oahh; ,we;Jnghdhh;/ '' Relevant extract from Ex-A.1 - Will: ''. . . vdf;F jw;rkak; 77 tajhfpwJ vdf;F ,U kidtpfs; ,Uf;fpwhh;fs; xU kidtpahfpa Kj;jk;khs; vd;gts; $Ptdhk;rk; bgj;Jf;bfhz;Lk; nkw;goahs; FkhuDkhfpa $lag;gbrl;o vd;gtd; vd;Dld; tpah$;$pak; bjhlh;e;J nfhh;l;L \yk; brhj;Jf;fis gphptpid bra;Jbfhz;L Rkhh; gj;J tUlfhykhf FLk;gj;ij tpl;L jdpikapy; ,Ue;J tUfpwhd;/ jw;rkak; vd; FLk;gj;jpy; vd; kidtp cz;zhkiy mk;khs; (1) nkw;goahh; Fkhud; tPug;g brl;o (2) ,th;fs; ,Uf;fpwhh;fs/; jtput[k; vd; Fkhh;j;jpfSk; v.s.mz;zhkiy brl;o kidtp jQ;rk;khs;(3) fpU#;zbrl;o kidtpa[k; vd; fdp#;l Fkhh;j;jpa[khd rk;g{h;zk;khs; (4) ,th;fs; ,Uf;fpwhh;fs/; rpy ehshf vd; jpnufk; ehSf;F ehs; gytPdg;gl;L ,dp mjpf ehs; gpd;g[j;jpUg;ngd; vd;fpw ek;gpf;if vdf;F ,y;yhky; ,Ug;gjhYk; vd; gphpaj;Jf;Fl;gl;lth;fSf;F xUtpj Vw;ghL bra;a ntqbkd;fpw mth ,Ug;gjhYk; vd;dhy; rpWgpuhak; Jl';fp ey;y g{!;jpjpfis rk;ghjpj;J FLk;gj;Jf;F jPh;f;f Mjut[k; bra;jpUg;gjhy; mg;ngh;f;bfhj;jbrhj;Jf;fs; vd; Ma[Rf;Fk; gpd; vd; gphpaj;Jf;Fl;gl;lth;fSf;F tpdpnahfk; bra;ag;gl;L mile;Jtu ntqbkd;fpw gphpaj;ij Kd;dpl;Lk; ,t;tpjk; bra;tjpy; nkw;go vd; Fkhudhd 2yf;fpkpl;l tPug;gbrl;o vd;gtd; FLk;gj;jpy; mjpfkha; <LglhkYk; FLk;g ed;ikia cj;njrpj;Jk; brhj;JghJfhg;ig cj;njrpj;Jk; mtDf;F brhj;Jf;fis vnjr;irahf bfhLj;jhy; ,g;nghnj tPz;tpuak; bra;JtpLthd; vd;fpw jpl;lkhd kdJld; mt;tpjk; brhj;Jf;fis mtDf;F bfhLj;Jtpl vdf;F ,#;lkpy;yhky; ,Ug;gjhYk; mtDila gpw;fhy ed;ikia cj;njrpj;nj ,t;tpjk; jPh;khdpj;Jf;bfhz;lgoahYk; vd; Ma[Rf;Fg;gpd; vd; brhj;Jf;fs; tp#akhf nkw;go ehy;th;fSf;Fs; vt;tpj mgpg;gpuhangjKkpy;yhkYk; brhj;ij mile;J mDgtpf;f ntqbkd;fpw ey;y vz;zj;Jld; fPH;tpthpj;j jpl;l';fSld; ,e;j capy; rhrdk; vGjpitj;jpUf;fpnwd;/ vd; Ma[Rf;Fg;gpd; fPH; tpthpj;j brl;oa{y; brhj;Jf;fis nkw;go vd; 3yf;fkpl;l Fkhh;j;jp jQ;rk;khSk; 4yf;fkpl;l vd; fdp#;l Fkhh;j;jp rk;g{h;zk;khs; ,UtUk; rkghfkha; g';fpl;L nkw;go brhj;ij ifg;gw;wp mtuth;fs; $Ptjpir tiuapy; brhj;Jf;fs; vt;tpj guhjPdk; tpy;y';fk; bra;ahky; mDgtpj;Jte;J nkw;goahh;fs; $Ptjpirf;Fgpe;jp jQ;rk;khs; rk;g{h;zk;khs; ,th;fspd; Fkhuh;fs; rh;t Rje;jpughj;jpaj;Jld; jhdhjptpf;fpua';fSf;F mh;fkha; Mz;L mDgtpj;Jf; bfhs;s ntz;oaJ/ moapy; fz;l brl;oa{y; brhj;jpy; tpthpj;jpUf;Fk; brhj;Jf;fs; nghf vd; trkpUf;Fk; kpFjp M!;jpfs; mjhtJ FLk;gj;ijtpl;L Vw;fdnt tpyfp $lag;gbrl;o jd;ghfj;Jf;F gphptpid bra;Jbfhz;lJ nghft[k; kpFjpahUf;Fk; tp#k';fyk;. ehfuh$k;gl;o. rpj;njhp. kl;ugs;sp. $k;kzg[Jhh;. nkhl;^h;. Fhprpyhg;gl;L. gs;sbts;sp. Tlg;gl;L. uh$ghisak;. Kj;jk;gl;o g[Jhh;. FUkhk;gs;sp. g[Dfd;tyir. bgUkhg;gl;L ,d;Dk; vy;yh fpuhk';fspy; ,Uf;Fk; eQ;ir g[Q;ir njhg;g[ tifauh rfy M!;jpfisa[k; tPL fhyp $hfh rfyj;ija[k; vd; Ma[Rf;Fg;gpd; nkw;go vd;ghhpahs; 1-yf;fkpl;l cz;zhkiyak;khs; ifg;gw;wp brhj;Jf;fis vt;tpj guhjPdk; tpy;y';fk; bra;ahky; mDgtpj;J te;Jk; nkw;go vd; Fkhud; tPug;gbrl;oahd; rk;ul;riz Kjypaitfisa[k; FLk;gj;jpnyna bra;Jbfhz;L tuntz;oaJ nkw;go vd; ghhpahs; cz;zhkiy mk;khs; Ma[Rf;Fg;gpe;jp ,t;tpjk; Fwpg;gpl;l rfy !;jhtu brhj;Jf;fisa[k; nkw;go vd; Fkhud; tPug;gbrl;o ifg;gw;wp rh;tRje;jpu ghj;jpaj;Jld; Mz;lDgtpj;Jf; bfhs;s ntz;oaJ ,t;tpjk; eph;zapj;jgo nkw;go vd; ghhpahs; cz;zhkiy mk;khns vdf;F btspahuhy; tuntz;oa rfy tpjkhd ghf;fpfisa[k; g[nuhnehl;L. mlkhdk;. ofphp Kjypa rfytpj ghf;fpfisa[k; tR{ypf;f vdf;F thhprhf ,Ue;J tR{ypj;J jd; , @#;lk; nghy; mile;Jbfhs;s ntz;oaJ ,t;tpjk; mila[k; buhf;fk; tifahuf;fisa[k; rfy $';fk brhj;Jf;fisa[k; ,Uk;g[ bgl;oiaa[k; nkw;go cz;zhkiy mk;khs; $Ptjpirf;Fg; gpe;jp jd;dhy; brytHpf;fg;gl;lJ nghf kpFjpaha; ,Uf;fg;gl;litfis nkw;go vd; Fkhud; tPug;gbrl;o rh;tRje;jpukha; mDgtpj;Jf;bfhs;s ntz;oaJ/ nfhh;l;L \yk; jPh;g;ghizgo ehd; vd; ,uz;lhtJ ghhpahs; Kj;jk;khSf;F khjk; xd;Wf;F +.25.00 ,Ugj;ije;J +gha; bfhLj;J tUtJnghy; vd; Ma[Rf;Fg;gpd; nkw;go vd;ghhpahs; cz;zhkiy mk;khs; brYj;jpf;bfhz;Lk;. nkw;go cz;zhkiy mk;khs; $Ptjpirf;Fg;gpd; vd; Fkhud; tPug;gbrl;oa[k; bfhLj;J tuntz;oaJ/ vd; Ma[Rf;Fg;gpd; vdf;F bra;a ntz;oa cj;jufphpia vd; Fkhudhd tPug;gbrl;ona bra;a ntz;oaJ/ ,e;j capy;rhrdkhdJ Kf;fpakhf vd; brhj;Jf;fs; tPz;tpuak; bra;ag;gl;L nghfhkhy; ,Uf;Fk; epkpj;jk; ey;y vz;zj;Jld; vd; Fkhh;j;jpfSf;Fk; xUtpj Vw;ghL bra;antz;Lbkd;W ,Uf;Fk; gphpaj;ij Kd;dpl;Lk; vd;dhy; vGjp itf;fg;gl;oUg;gjhy; nky; fz;l #uj;Jg;gona vd; Ma[Rf;Fg;gpd; mKYf;F tuntz;oaJ/ vd; Ma[Sf;Fg;gpd; ,e;j rhrdj;jpy; Vw;gLk; ghj;jpag;ghj;jpa!;jh;fisj; jtpw ,ju vg;ngh;gl;lth;fSf;Fk; vt;tpj ghj;jpaKk; Jlh;r;rpa[k; fpilahJ/ ,e;j capy; rh!dj;ij vd; $Ptjirapy; uj;J bra;a[k; ghj;jpaKk; khw;wt[k; vdf;F mjpfhuk; cz;L ,e;jg;go vd;kdr;rk;kjpapy; vGjp itj;j capy; rhrdk/;” [Emphasis supplied]
This Court shall now look into the intention of the testator behind the execution of Ex-A.1 - Will using armchair rule. From the recitals contained in Ex-A.1, it could be seen that the testator wanted to bequeath majority of his self-acquired properties in favour of his son - Veerappa. However, Veerappa was very young and was not very much involved in the family and its affairs. It appears that he was not a very responsible person at that time in the opinion of the testator. Apprehending that Veerappa may unnecessarily alienate and lose the properties if bequeathed absolutely at a young age, the testator decided to create life interest in favour of his wife - Unnamalaiammal without any power of alienation with vested remainder in favour of Veerappa for absolute enjoyment. So, the intention of the testator to eventually handover his self-acquired properties including the suit property in favour of his son - Veerappa absolutely is clear. Besides this, the testator had given some properties as life estate to his two daughters with vested remainder to their children, and he had also made abundant absolute maintenance provisions, including jewels, cash, decree amount, promissory note debts, etc., in favour of his wife - Unnamalaiammal. This shows that the primary intention behind the life estate in favour of Unnamalaiammal is not maintenance, but to protect his self-acquired properties and safely handover the same later to his son - Veerappa, who was young at the time of Ex-A.1; the intention was only to leave management of his self-acquired properties in safe hands with his wife - Unnamalaiammal and handover possession in favour of his son - Veerappa for absolute enjoyment at the right time when he would have presumably attained more maturity and become more responsible. In short, the testator ultimately intended to absolutely bequeath his self-acquired properties including the suit property in favour of his son - Veerappa. As the life estate in favour of Unnamalaiammal in respect of some self-acquired properties was clearly not intended for the purpose of her maintenance, this Court is of the considered view that Section 14 (2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is applicable and not Section 14 (1) thereof. As Section 14 (1) is not in the picture, the Substantial Questions of Law No.(a) does not arise at all. The Judgments relied on by the learned Counsel for the respondents, which are 27 in number, would together show that any interest or right over a property given to a women under a testament in lieu of her maintenance would attract Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, but otherwise, the applicable section would be Section 14 (2). There is no quarrel with the same. In this case, as stated above, the life estate in favour of Unnamalaiammal is clearly not intended for her maintenance purposes, for which there are separate provisions have been made under Ex-A.1 in an abundant manner. Hence, these case laws would come to aid the plaintiffs' case. Relevant recitals from Ex-A.1 - Will are as hereunder: ''... nkw;go vd;ghhpahs; cz;zhkiy mk;khs; Ma[Rf;Fg;gpe;jp ,t;tpjk; Fwpg;gpl;l rfy !;jhtu brhj;Jf;fisa[k; nkw;go vd; Fkhud; tPug;gbrl;o ifg;gw;wp rh;tRje;jpu ghj;jpaj;Jld; Mz;lDgtpj;Jf; bfhs;s ntz;oaJ ,t;tpjk; eph;zapj;jgo nkw;go vd; ghhpahs; cz;zhkiy mk;khns vdf;F btspahuhy; tuntz;oa rfy tpjkhd ghf;fpfisa[k; g[nuhnehl;L. mlkhdk;. ofphp Kjypa rfytpj ghf;fpfisa[k; tr{ypf;f vdf;F thhprhf ,Ue;J tr{ypj;J jd; ,#;lk; nghy; mile;Jbfhs;s ntz;oaJ ,t;tpjk; mila[k; buhf;fk; tifahuf;fisa[k; rfy $';fk brhj;Jf;fisa[k;. ,Uk;g[ bgl;oiaa[k; nkw;go cz;zhkiy mk;khs; $Ptjpirf;Fg; gpe;jp jd;dhy; brytjpf;fg;gl;lJ nghf kpFjpaha; ,Uf;fg;gl;litfis nkw;go vd; Fkhud; tPug;gbrl;o rh;tRje;jpukha; mDgtpj;Jf;bfhs;s ntz;oaJ. . . “
The next point is with regard to the alleged execution of Ex-B.2 - Gift Settlement Deed. The settlement under Ex-B.2 - Gift Settlement Deed is not denied by the plaintiffs; in fact, P.W.1 / second plaintiff in her evidence has specifically admitted the execution of Ex-B.2 - Gift Settlement Deed. In this regard, it is apposite to extract the evidence of P.W.1 which reads as follows: “. . .cz;zhkiy mk;khs; kw;Wk; tPug;gbrl;o Mfpnahh;. j';fs; capUld; ,Uf;Fk;nghnj ,e;j tHf;fpd; 1-k; gpujpthjpf;F tHf;F brhj;J Fwpj;J jhd brl;oy;bkz;l; gj;jpuk; vGjp itj;Js;shh;fs; vd;why;/ rhpjhd;... jhdbrl;oy;bkz;l; vGjpitj;jt[ld; mij goj;Jg;ghh;j;J me;j jhdgj;jpu mog;gilapy; 1- k; gpujpthjpf;F vt;tpj ghj;jpaKk;. chpika[k; tuhJ vd;W tHf;fwpOh; \yk; mwpf;if bfhLj;njhk;. . . “
So its execution was not denied by the plaintiffs, they challenge only its validity. Further, Ex-B.2 is a certified copy. It was stated by D.W.1 / first defendant in her evidence that the original was produced in another case between the parties. The same was not denied by the plaintiffs' side. Further, Ex-B.2 was marked without any objection. Since the execution of Ex-B.2 - Gift Settlement Deed is admitted on either side and it has been acted upon as this Court is to elaborate infra, this Court finds no necessity for examination of the attesting witnesses under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 to prove the execution of Ex-B.2. Therefore, this Court holds that the execution of Ex-B.2 - Gift Settlement Deed is proved. Moreover, as this Court is to elaborate infra, the suit property would be separate property in the hands of Veerappa. Hence, he is the competent person to challenge Ex-B.2 - Gift Settlement Deed if at all he has any grievance or contention. There is nothing available on record to show that Veerappa challenged the same during his lifetime. Veerappa passed away in 1986. In these circumstances, the plaintiffs cannot question the same.
The next point to be decided is whether Ex-B.2 - Gift Settlement Deed executed by remainderman - Veerappa and the life estate holder - Unnamalaiammal, jointly in favour of first defendant - Ganga is valid or not. To decide the same, first the character of the self-acquired properties of Arunachala Chetty including the suit property as it would be in the hands of Veerappa needs to be ascertained. At this point, it is pertinent to cite the Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in C.N.Arunachala Mudaliar -vs- C.A.Muruganatha Mudaliar reported in AIR 1953 SC 495 [Coram Strength =2], wherein Paragraph No.16 reads thus: "16. As the law is accepted and well settled that a Mitakshara father has complete powers of disposition over his self-acquired property, it must follow as a necessary consequence that the father is quite competent to provide expressly, when he makes a gift, either that the donee would take it exclusively for himself or that the gift would be for the benefit of his branch of the family. If there are express provisions to that effect either in the deed of gift or a will, no difficulty is likely to arise and the interest which the son would take in such property would depend upon the terms of the grant. If, however, there are no clear words describing the kind of interest which the donee is to take, the question would be one of construction and the court would have to collect the intention of the donor from the language of the document taken along with the surrounding circumstances in accordance with the well-known canons of construction. Stress would certainly have to be laid on the substance of the disposition and not on its were form. The material question which the court would have to decide in such cases is, whether taking the document and all the relevant facts into consideration, it could be said that the donor intended to confer a bounty upon his son exclusively for his benefit and capable of being dealt with by him at his pleasure or that the apparent, gift was an integral part of a scheme for partition and what was given to the son was really the share of the property which would normally be allotted to him and in his branch of the family on partition. In other words, the question would be whether the grantor really wanted to make a gift of his properties or to partition the same. As it is open to the father to make a gift or partition of his properties as he himself chooses, there is, strictly speaking, no presumption that he intended either the one or the other."
As it flows from the afore-cited Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court, the nature of properties bequeathed under a Will in the hands of the beneficiary thereunder depends on the intention of the testator. Thus, if bequeath is intended for absolute enjoyment of the beneficiary, then it would be separate property in the hands of the beneficiary; on the other hand, if the intention is to partition the property or leave the property for the benefit of not just the beneficiary but his branch as well, then the property would be in the nature of joint family property in the hands of the beneficiary. Coming to the facts of instant case, as elaborated above, though life interest was granted, ultimate intention of the testator was to bequeath majority of his self-acquired properties absolutely in favour of his son - Veerappa in his individual capacity. It is clear that the bequeath was not in his capacity of the head of the family. Therefore, the suit property along with the other properties covered under Ex-A.1 - Will would be separate property in the hands of Veerappa. In this regard, reference may also be made to Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in M.P. Peria Karuppan Chettiar -vs- CIT, reported in (1975) 3 SCC 439. Relevant extract reads as hereunder: "12.Mr Desai further pointed out that the gift was stated to be in favour of the donees and “their respective heirs, executors, administrators and assignees” which, according to him, indicated that really the object of the bounty were the sons as heads of their respective families. We are unable to agree. It is clear from the deeds that the donor's desire was to transfer the properties to the three sons whom he named and described as donees. It was not stated that the donees would take the property as heads of their family units. The use of the words “heirs, executors, administrators and assignees” in the context in which they appear, in our opinion, indicate on the contrary that the gift was to the sons absolutely, the property gifted being both heritable and alienable. There is nothing in the two documents to suggest that the interest transferred to the sons was limited in any way. The surrounding circumstances also do not support Mr Desai's contention. …"
So, the suit property would be separate property in the hands of Veerappa. It is settled legal position that life estate holder and the remainderman / vested remainder holder, in the absence of any other interest / right holders, can together alienate the property covered under Will. This settled legal principle could be derived from the doctrine of estoppel. It could also be derived from the doctrine of feeding the grant by estoppel under Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, as per which, though Veerappa being the remainderman / vested remainder holder was yet to acquire title over the properties covered under Ex-B.2 - Gift Settlement Deed including the suit property, the latter absolute title he acquired upon the demise of the life estate holder - Unnamalaiammal would operate to fulfill the transfer made by him under Ex-B.2. For ready reference, Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is extracted hereunder: "43. Transfer by unauthorised person who subsequently acquires interest in property transferred. - Where a person fraudulently or erroneously represents that he is authorised to transfer certain immovable property and professes to transfer such property for consideration, such transfer shall, at the option of the transferee, operate on any interest which the transferor may acquire in such property at any time during which the contract of transfer subsists. Nothing in this section shall impair the right of transferees in good faith for consideration without notice of the existence of the said option. Illustration A, a Hindu who has separated from his father B, sells to C three fields, X, Y and Z, representing that A is authorised to transfer the same. Of these fields Z does not belong to A, it having been retained by B on the partition; but on B's dying A as heir obtains Z.C, not having rescinded the contract of sale, may require A to deliver Z to him."
Besides, as stated supra, the intention of the testator was to handover his self-acquired properties in the hands of his son - Veerappa absolutely, who was very young then, at the right time when he would have presumably become more mature and responsible. At the time of Ex-B.2 - Gift Settlement Deed, which was executed on February 26, 1975, Veerappa was grown up, aged about 50 Years and married twice and his mother - Unnamalaiammal attained old age. Hence, this Court is of the view that Ex-B.2 - Gift Settlement Deed is not contrary to the intention of the testator.
As regards the marriage between Veerappa and the first defendant - Ganga, Ex-B.1 - Marriage Invitation shows that Veerappa married the first defendant on February 11, 1973. Further, the recitals contained in Ex-B.2 - Gift Settlement Deed, would show that the first defendant is the second wife of Veerappa and daughter-in-law of Unnamalaiammal. Ex-B.24 to Ex-B.26, which are birth certificates of the three children of the first defendant, shows the father's name as Veerappa and mother's name as Ganga. Further, there are abundant evidence available on record to show that the first defendant is the second wife of Veerappa. There is Ex-B.4 - UDR Patta (original) issued in 1985 in respect of the properties covered under Ex-B.2 including suit property, in favour of first defendant referring to her as the wife of Veerappa. There are Ex-B.5 - Patta Pass Book issued under the Tamil Nadu Patta Passbook Act, 1983 [Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1986] and Ex-B.6 - Chitta which also similarly stands in the name of first defendant as the wife of Veerappa. There are Ex-B.8 to Ex-B.10, which are cultivation adangal records for Fasli Year 1396 - 1405, standing in the name of first defendant. Similarly, kist receipts in Ex-B.13 to Ex-B.23 also stands in her name referring to her as wife of Veerappa. These documents show that Ex-B.2 - Gift Settlement Deed was acted upon and pursuantly she got into the possession of the suit property and other properties covered thereunder. Further, even the plaintiffs have only been evasive about the marriage between Veerappa and the first defendant; they have not specifically denied the same. In these circumstances, this Court is of the view that the marriage is proved. Whether it is valid or not is a different question; it may be a void one. Since the marriage is proved as stated above, Ex-B.2 - Gift Settlement Deed could be executed in favour of first defendant. Substantial Question of Law No.(b) is answered accordingly in favour of the first defendant.
In these circumstances, this Court is of the view that Ex-B.2 - Gift Settlement Deed executed by Veerappa in favour of his second wife / first defendant in respect of the suit property and some more properties is perfectly valid.
On the strength of Ex-B.2 - Gift Settlement Deed, first defendant executed Ex-B.3 - Sale Deed dated September 25, 1996 in favour of the second defendant. While Ex-B.3 is a certified copy, its original has been marked as Ex-B.38. As Ex-B.2 - Gift Settlement Deed is perfectly valid, the first defendant has every right to dispose of the property covered thereunder including the suit property as per her desire. Hence, Ex-B.3 = Ex-B.38 - Sale Deed in favour of second defendant is also perfectly valid. Pursuantly, revenue records have been mutated in the name of second defendant and they have been let in as evidence. These documentary evidence prove possession and enjoyment of second defendant over the suit property. Moreover, P.W.1 / second plaintiff in her evidence has admitted the possession of second defendant over the suit property. In such a scenario, the Suit as framed would not be maintainable.
In view of the foregoing narrative, this Court finds that the decision of the Trial Court in dismissing the Suit is correct. The First Appellate Court failed to appreciate the settled legal position that life estate holder and the remainderman / vested remainder can together validly alienate the property covered under the Will, in the absence of interests and rights of any other person, in the right perspective and erred in reversing the Trial Court's decision. The Judgment and Decree of the First Appellate Court are liable to be set aside and the Judgment and Decree of the Trial Court are to be restored.
CONCLUSION:
Resultantly, the Second Appeal is allowed. The Judgment and Decree of the First Appellate Court are set aside. The Judgment and Decree of the Trial Court are restored. In view of the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs. 08-09-2026
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