Is judicial review under Article 226 an evaluation of the decision making process and not the merits of the decision itself?

This Intra-Court appeal is filed by the Government against the order dated 01.11.2020 passed by the Learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(MD) No.14963 of 2014.

The respondent before us is the writ petitioner.

For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as set out in the writ proceedings.

The writ petitioner filed W.P.(MD) No.14963 of 2014 challenging the order of the second respondent bearing Ref.No.Ser.V2/43877/2011 dated 20.06.2012, whereby the writ petitioner was imposed with a punishment of compulsory retirement and the further order of the first respondent passed in G.O.(D) No.406, Revenue (Ser.7(2)) Department, dated 18.08.2014, whereby the appeal filed by the writ petitioner against the punishment order was rejected. The writ petitioner also sought for the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus directing the Government to sanction regular pension and other retirement benefits.

The facts leading to the filing of this writ appeal, in a nutshell, are as follows:- i) The writ petitioner upon abolition of the post of Hereditary Karnams/Headman joined duty as Village Administrative Officer on 01.09.1982; he was due to retire upon attaining the age of superannuation on 31.05.2004; vide twin orders both dated 27.05.2004, he was placed under suspension and as well retained in service for the purpose of completion of the pending enquiry regarding the action of the writ petitioner in acquiring assets disproportionate to his known sources of income; the writ petitioner was subjected to disciplinary proceedings before the Tribunal for disciplinary proceedings, Madurai in TDP Case.No.15/2007, that commenced upon the order of the Government in Government Letter No.(ID) 417/Revenue Department dated 19.07.2007; the writ petitioner was charged with misconduct under Rule 20(1) of the Tamil Nadu Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1973, on the premise that he failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty as he is found to have acquired and possessed assets disproportionate to the known sources of his income during the period from 01.01.1994 to 31.12.1998, to the extent of Rs.1,53,147/-; the enquiry happened for three years and the final report of the Commissioner of disciplinary proceedings was submitted to the Department vide letter No.A1/326/2007 (TDP No.15/2007) dated 29.02.2010; the writ petitioner filed W.P.(MD) No.6930 of 2011 seeking to expedite and dispose of the disciplinary action that was conducted against him in T.D.P.Case.No. 15/2007; this Court vide order dated 29.06.2011 disposed W.P.(MD) No. 6930 of 2011 granting the limited relief of directing the respondents to pass orders on the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the writ petitioner within a period of 8 weeks; upon conclusion of enquiry and receipt of the final report, further opportunity of hearing was given to the writ petitioner by the Disciplinary Authority and he was imposed with a punishment of compulsory retirement from service on 20.06.2012; he filed an appeal against the said order of punishment; his appeal before the first respondent was kept pending and therefore he was prompted to file W.P.(MD) No.2626 of 2013, seeking to expedite the appeal; this Court on 03.12.2013 passed orders in W.P.(MD) No.2626 of 2013 directing the respondents to dispose of the appeal filed by the writ petitioner dated 09.09.2012 within a period of 12 weeks; the appeal was dismissed on 18.08.2014. ii) Finally, the third writ petition, which is the subject matter, i.e., W.P.(MD) No.14963 of 2014, was filed against the punishment order as well as against the order of rejection of the appeal filed by the writ petitioner by the respondents 2 and 1 respectively; iii) This challenge to the disciplinary proceedings and against the order passed in the appeal filed by the writ petitioner was on various grounds viz., the disciplinary proceedings were initiated after a long, inordinate and unexplained delay; there was an inordinate delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings for 8 years from the date of his suspension on 27.05.2004 to the date of passing of the final order on 20.06.2012; the order of the appellate authority is without any reasons, i.e., it is a non-speaking order, bereft of consideration of any of the grounds raised in the appeal and without any application of mind, the views obtained by the appellate authority from Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission were blindly accepted without even giving an opportunity to the writ petitioner by furnishing a copy of the said enquiry report of the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission; the conclusion of the Disciplinary Authority on the factual matrix is also vitiated for non-appreciation of the material evidence and perverse for its failure in arriving at a fair conclusion on the available materials. iv) The learned single Judge accepted the case of the writ petitioner that there is a long and inordinate delay in the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings; the learned single Judge after referring to a catena of decisions in support of her findings, held that there is a long and inordinate delay both in concluding the disciplinary proceedings; the order of the appellate authority is lacking in reasons; and also on the final ground as well, that the charges against the writ petitioner were erroneously held as proved and therefore, the punishment imposed against the writ petitioner could not be sustained.

The learned Government Advocate appearing for the appellants would argue that the order of the Disciplinary Authority could not have been easily interfered with by the Writ Court in exercise of powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India; there is substantial power available with the Disciplinary Authority to continue with the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the writ petitioner, even after the writ petitioner attained the age of superannuation; there is substantial material available to support the conclusion of the Disciplinary Authority that the writ petitioner was found to have acquired disproportionate assets to the extent of Rs.1,53,147/- than the known sources of the income during the period from 01.01.1994 to 31.12.1998 and that the concept of delay cannot be applied to cases involving a probe by the Vigilance and Anti Corruption Department, as it cannot be equated to cases, where the delinquent is charged for some misconduct related to lapses in the discharge of his duties; the acquiring of wealth disproportionate to the known sources of income, is a fact within the knowledge of the delinquent officer and action came to be initiated soon upon the department, coming to know about the said fact and after an enquiry warranting action by the Vigilance wing of the department.

Per contra, the learned counsel for the writ petitioner/respondent herein sought to support the order of the Writ Court and argued that there is no substantial ground to interfere with the well reasoned order of the learned single Judge on any one of the reasons, for which the learned single Judge had allowed the writ petition. He had also circulated his written notes of submission, which reiterated the points canvassed before us as well.

We heard the learned counsel on either side and perused the materials available on record.

The order of suspension is dated 27.05.2004. In the said order of suspension, it is stated that the writ petitioner, a Village Administrative Officer, had acquired the landed properties to an extent of 5.24 acres during the period from 1986 to 1992 and had also constructed a house worth about Rs.5,00,000/- without getting prior permission from the competent authority and had also dug an open well and also sunken a bore well in his lands and had purchased a Tractor and that the reputation of the delinquent officer is very bad. Subsequently, the writ petitioner was subjected to disciplinary proceedings upon the orders of the Government dated 19.07.2007; charges were framed against him by the Tribunal for disciplinary proceedings and it is as follows:- “CHARGE: that during the period from 01.01.1994 to 31.12.1998, the writ petitioner, viz., A.Subramanian, former Village Administrative Officer, Villapuram, Madurai, was found to have acquired and possessed assets, which are found to be disproportionate to the known sources of his income to the extend of Rs.1,53,147/-, as detailed in the enclosed statements I to VII, for which the delinquent officer was not able to account for satisfactorily and thus, the writ petitioner had failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and had thereby, violated Rule 20(1) of the Tamil Nadu Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1973.”

It is true that for the alleged period from 1994 to 1998, the charges were framed on 14.11.2007 and delivered upon the writ petitioner on 21.01.2008. There is a long and inordinate delay of 9 years from the end of the check period to the framing of the charges. The explanation by the department is that they did not have knowledge about the conduct of the petitioner in acquiring wealth disproportionate to the known sources of income and soon upon getting to know of the said fact, he was placed under suspension and after a preliminary enquiry on the Vigilance side, a proper charge memo was framed and served.

There was a further delay in completion of the proceedings that commenced with the suspension of the writ petitioner in 2004 to the passing of the final order of punishment on 20.06.2012 for a further period of 8 years.

The delinquent officer was due to retire on 31.05.2004. On the last day of his work i.e., on 31.05.2004, he was served with the order of suspension and the order to retain him into service, both dated 27.05.2004. Since 2004, he had to undergo the ordeal of conducting the disciplinary proceedings for 8 long years till 2012.

In the above factual backdrop, the question that arises for consideration is whether such inordinate delay both in the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings and in the culmination of the disciplinary proceedings can be a ground to quash the order of punishment passed after a detailed enquiry conducted by the Tribunal for disciplinary proceedings.

In support of his argument to quash the punishment order upon the culmination of the disciplinary proceedings on the ground of delay, both in the institution of the disciplinary proceedings and also in the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, the learned counsel for the writ petitioner had referred to a long line of authorities, listed as under:- “i) State of Punjab and others Vs. Chaman Lal Goyal reported in (1995) 2 SCC 570 ii) P.V.Mahadevan Vs. M.D. Tamil Nadu Housing Board reported in 2005 (2) CTC 403 iii) The Special Commissioner Vs. N.Sivasamy, Commercial Tax reported in (2005) 4 MLJ 659 iv) The Government of Andhra Pradesh and others Vs. Appala Swamy reported in (2007) 14 SCC 49”

In Chaman Lal Goyal case reported in (1995) 2 SCC 570, the charge memo and the order appointing the enquiry officer were quashed on the ground of delay, with a clear rider recorded as follows: - “...How long a delay is too long always depends on facts of the given case.... Wherever such a plea is raised, the Court has to weight he factors appearing for and against the said plea and take a decision on the totality of the circumstances....”

In P.V .Mahadevan Vs MD Tamil Nadu Housing Board reported in 2005 (4) CTC 403, the Hon'ble Apex Court was dealing with a writ petition seeking to quash the charge memo on the ground of delay; and the Apex Court in the recorded circumstances of the said case, had quashed the charge memo.

A division bench of this Court in The Special Commissioner Vs N. Sivasamy reported in (2005) 4 MLJ 659 was dealing with a case seeking to quash the suspension order and the charge memo on the ground of delay and also on the ground that the discharge of quasi-judicial functions cannot be the subject matter of disciplinary action. The Division Bench taking note of the position that the action of the delinquent officer as a Commercial Tax Officer, even if he had committed error in passing orders of assessment cannot be subjected to disciplinary proceedings and also noticing the delayed progress of the disciplinary proceedings quashed the same.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Government of Andhra Pradesh and others Vs. Appala Swamy reported in (2007) 14 SCC 49 had categorically held that the quashing of the delayed proceedings continuing after retirement is not permissible, unless the employee before approaching the High Court had made out before the Enquiry Officer that he was prejudiced by the inordinately delayed initiation of the disciplinary proceedings.

The above precedents, we are afraid, may not come to the rescue of the writ petitioner, when applied to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In those cases, the aggrieved parties approached the Court at the charge-memo stage. Here, by contrast the petitioner actively participated in the disciplinary proceedings, took his chance with the possible outcome, and only raised the issue of delay after suffering an adverse order of punishment.

We are reminded of the judgment of the Larger Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh and another vs. Akilesh and another reported in (2021) 12 SCC 460, wherein it is held that the delay cannot be a sole ground to quash the disciplinary proceedings and every delay in concluding the disciplinary enquiry does not, ipso facto, lead to the enquiry being vitiated and at best, there could only be a direction to expeditiously conclude the enquiry and not quash the enquiry in its entirety.

The proposition canvassed by the writ petitioner that the delay in the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings and the completion of disciplinary proceedings vitiate the same is not acceptable to us, for the following reasons:. i. Firstly, the writ petitioner had not challenged the disciplinary proceedings at the stage of issuance of a charge memo on the ground that the disciplinary proceeding is initiated after a long and inordinate delay. Rather, he voluntarily took part in the disciplinary proceedings without demur and had also cross examined the witnesses and entered into defence. ii. Secondly, he had not raised a plea of any prejudice having been caused to him because of such delay in the initiation of disciplinary proceedings before the disciplinary authority and consequently, his plea on the ground of initiation of delay in disciplinary proceedings is not acceptable. In the subject case, the writ petitioner had consciously participated in the disciplinary proceedings and had not espoused any prejudice that occurred to him due to such delayed initiation of the disciplinary proceedings. iii. Thirdly, in fact, he had come before this Court on 25.06.2011 with W.P.(MD) No.6930 of 2011 asking, not to quash the disciplinary proceedings on the ground of delay , but with the following prayer:- “To issue a Writ of Mandamus, directing the respondent to dispose of the disciplinary action against the petitioner by passing orders on the enquiry report sent by the Commissioner of Disciplinary Proceedings, Madurai in his letter No.A-1/326/2007 (T.D.P. No. 15/2007) dated 29.02.2010 within a specified time frame that may be fixed by this Honourable Court. ” It was disposed on 29.06.2011 with a simple direction to pass order in the disciplinary proceedings within a time frame. He was then imposed with an order of punishment on 20.06.2012. The writ petitioner then filed a departmental appeal on 09.09.2012 and structurally came before this Court on 15.02.2013 with W.P.(MD) No.2626 of 2013, not to challenge the punishment or the disciplinary proceeding on the ground of delay or any other ground but with the following prayer:- “To issue a Writ of Mandamus, directing the first respondent to dispose of the petitioner s appeal dated 09.09.2012 against the orders dated 20.06.2012 of the Commissioner of Revenue Administration, Chennai passed in his proceedings No.Ser.V(2) 43877/2011, on merits and in accordance with law within a specified time frame that may be fixed by this Honble Court.” This was disposed on 03.12.2013 with an innocuous direction to dispose of the appeal within a time frame. This ground to attack the disciplinary proceedings on the ground of delay was very much available to the writ petitioner, when he filed the aforesaid two writ petitions. He did not choose to canvass the said ground at that point of time. Though the provision of Code of Civil Procedure is not directly applicable to the writ proceedings by extending the underlying public policy against splitting the claims, and invoking the “Doctrine of Waiver” we hold that the failure of the writ petitioner to challenge the disciplinary proceedings on the ground of delay in the initiation of disciplinary proceedings or in the completion of proceedings in those two writ petitions makes him ineligible to canvass the same, after suffering an order of punishment, and after effectively participating in the disciplinary proceedings and after failing to get himself exonerated of the charges. iv.Fourthly, mere delay cannot be a reason to quash the disciplinary proceedings, more so, when the charges are grave and serious, involving acquisition of assets disproportionate to the known sources of income. Useful reference can be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Anant R.Kulkarni Vs. Y.P.Education Society and others reported in (2013) 6 SCC 515. The Hon'ble Apex Court had held that the court must take into consideration all the relevant facts and evaluate the same, so as to determine, if it is in fact in the interest of clean and honest administration, that the disciplinary proceedings should be terminated, only on the ground of a delay in conclusion of the proceedings. The Court cautioned that the High Court or the Tribunal should verify the gravity of the charges and the departmental enquiry can be quashed on the ground of delay only if the charges are not very grave. In the present case, admittedly, the charges against the writ petitioner are grave and serious. He is alleged to have acquired assets disproportionate to the known sources of income. Useful reference is made to the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in P.D.Agrawal vs. State Bank of India and others reported in (2006) 8 SCC 776. Relevant portion of the same reads as under:- “17.The validity of the disciplinary proceeding and/or justifiability thereof on the ground of delay or otherwise had never been raised by the Appellant before any forum. It was not his case either before the Appellate Authority or before the High Court that by reason of any delay in initiating the disciplinary proceeding he had been prejudiced in any manner whatsoever. It may be true that delay itself may be a ground for arriving at a finding that enquiry proceeding was vitiated in the event it is shown that by reason thereof the delinquent officer has been prejudiced, but no such case was made out. ......... 28. In Additional Supdt. of Police vs. T. Natarajan [1999 SCC (L&S) 646], this Court held: "In regard to the allegation that the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings was belated, we may state that it is settled law that mere delay in initiating proceedings would not vitiate the enquiry unless the delay results in prejudice to the delinquent officer. In this case, such a stage as to examine that aspect has not arisen." 29. In this case, as noticed hereinbefore, the Appellant did not raise the question of delay before any forum whatsoever. He did not raise such a question even before the Disciplinary Authority. He not only took part therein without any demur whatsoever, but, as noticed hereinbefore, cross- examined the witnesses and entered into the defence. The Principles of natural justice cannot be put in a straight jacket formula. It must be seen in circumstantial flexibility. It has separate facets. It has in recent time also undergone a sea change.”

Accordingly, we are of the considered view that the reason of the learned single Judge in setting aside the order of punishment on the ground of delay in initiation of the disciplinary proceedings and also in conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings is not sustainable and the finding in this regard is hereby set aside.

However, in our considered view, the learned single Judge had rightly concluded that the order of the appellate authority is bereft of reasons and apart from being a non-speaking order, it is also passed without any application of mind.

The counsel for the writ petitioner had also relied upon a judgment of the learned single Judge of this Court in N.S.Jayaraman and sons Vs. Government of India reported in 2010 (2) CWC 485 to persuade us to appreciate the proposition that a non-speaking order bereft of reasons is in violation and is liable to be set aside and also the judgment in V.P.Sureshkumar Vs. Deputy Inspector General of Police, Armed Police Trichy reported in (2011) 7 MLJ 1282 and the judgment of the co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the Secretary to the Government Vs. G.Nagendran reported in 2016 (2) CWC 445 and the unreported judgment in W.A.(MD) No.779 of 2024, dated 08.04.2021.

A perusal of the order dated 18.08.2014 passed in the appeal filed by the writ petitioner reveals that the appellate authority had simply reproduced the opinion obtained by the appellate authority from the TNPSC and in para 9, he concludes that the appellate authority had decided to reject the appeal of the delinquent officer. Para 9 is extracted hereunder: - “The Government have carefully and independently examined the appeal of Thiru A.Subramanian, formerly Village Administrative Officer, Melur Taluk, Madurai District dated 09.09.2012 along with the views of Tamil Nadu Public Services Commission and hold that the appeal preferred by the appellant is devoid of merits and "there is no need to interfere in the punishment of Compulsory retirement to the Appellant imposed by the Principal Secretary / Commissioner of Revenue Administration" and have decided to reject the appeal of Thiru A.Subramanian, formerly Village Administrative Officer, Melur Taluk, Madurai District, dated 09.09.2012 against the orders of Principal Secretary / Commissioner of Revenue Administration imposing the punishment of compulsory retirement in the proceedings No.Ser.V(2)/43877/2011, dated 20.06.2012 as devoid of merits and order accordingly.”

Apparently, no reason is found available in the said order of the appellate authority. The reason for seeking the opinion of the TNPSC is not available anywhere in the impugned proceedings. Further, it is well settled legal proposition that the reason must be reflected in the order of the appellate authority for refusing to accept the grounds raised in the appeal. Useful reference can be made in Divisional Forest Officer, Kothagudem and others Vs. Madhusudhan Rao reported in (2008) 3 SCC 469. The Hon'ble Apex Court had held that though no detailed reasons are required to be given at least some brief reasons should be indicated even in the order of affirming the views of the lower authority. Unfortunately, in the case on hand, the appellate authority had merely reproduced the opinion he obtained from TNPSC and came to a cryptic conclusion recorded in para 9 that he does not find any reason to interfere with the order of punishment.

Further, there is no reason elicited before us for the appellate authority to call for a report from TNPSC or to rely upon the same, without even furnishing a copy of the same to the delinquent officer. The question is can a TNPSC report be sought and obtained behind the back of the delinquent officer, and relied upon without supplying the same to the delinquent officer, and will it attract the prohibition of malice in law.

A reference is necessary to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Union of India and another Vs. T.V.Patel reported in (2007) 4 SCC 785. It was a case involving a delinquent officer under the Central Civil Services. The Supreme Court held that there is no requirement on the part of the disciplinary authority to make available a copy of the advise tendered by UPSC to the delinquent officer to enable him to make an effective representation to the punishment proposed. After noticing the differing view in State Bank of India and others Vs. D.C.Aggarwal and another reported in (1993) 1 SCC 13, by referring to the judgment of the constitutional Bench in State of Uttar Pradesh and another Vs. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava reported in (1957) 2 SCC 759, the Supreme Court held that the supply of a copy of the advice tendered by UPSC is not a mandatory requirement. Relevant portion is extracted as under:- "12.In Swamy's Compilation of CCS CCA Rules, Rule 15 deals with the action on the inquiry report. 13. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 15 reads as under:

In the present case, the disciplinary authority is not under any requirement to get the advice of the TNPSC; In fact, he did not ask for any such advice, and it was only the appellate authority that sought such advice without referring to any legal requirement warranting such seeking of an opinion from TNPSC. In the absence of any such legal requirement, the appellate authority's reliance on a hidden TNPSC opinion does not, by itself, invalidate the initial punishment order of the disciplinary authority. The writ petitioner had not shown any prejudice caused to him because of such non-supply of the opinion given by the TNPSC to the appellate authority. There is a serious lapse on the part of the appellate authority. We have already concluded that the order of the appellate authority is bereft of reasons. The action of the appellate authority is therefore bad in law for this second reason as well.

It would have been very easy for us to have relegated the writ petitioner to the appellate authority for a fresh consideration of his appeal. However, considering the fact that the disciplinary proceedings that commenced with the suspension of the writ petitioner in 2004 had continued in litigious route for all these years till 2026, we deem it appropriate not to remit the matter to the appellate authority and instead, ascertain the correctness of the order of the learned single Judge in finding fault with the conclusion of the disciplinary authority regarding the misconduct committed by the writ petitioner.

It is long settled legal proposition that the power of judicial review, of the Constitutional Courts, is only an exercise of evaluation of the decision making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is for the Writ Court to ascertain as to whether there is fairness in treatment and not to verify whether there is fairness of conclusion. The Writ Court can interfere with the disciplinary proceedings held against the delinquent officer, only if it is inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or it is in violation of the statutory rules prescribed in the mode of enquiry or if the conclusion or finding arrived at by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. Also, if the conclusion arrived at by the disciplinary authority is found to be perverse upon consideration of the evidence or it suffers from patent error on the face of record, the power of judicial review can be exercised. It cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of fact finding authority.

The Writ Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of mala fides or perversity, i.e., where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at that findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained.

Useful reference can be made in this regard to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Deputy General Manager (appellate authority) and others Vs. Ajai Kumar Srivastava reported in (2021) 2 SCC 612; Ex-Const/DVR Mukesh Kumar Raigar Vs. Union of India and others reported in (2023) 11 SCC 159; Indian Oil Corporation and others Vs. Ajit Kumar Singh and another reported in (2023) 19 SCC 102 and Apparel Export Promotion Council Vs. A.K.Chopra reported in (1999) 1 SCC 759.

The three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pravin Kumar Vs. Union of India reported in (2020) 9 SCC 471 had reiterated the above proposition and had held as under:- “I. Scope of Judicial Review in Service Matters 25. Learned counsel for the appellant spent considerable time taking us through the various evidencesonrecord with the intention of highlighting lacunas and contradictions. We feel that such an exercise was in vain, as the threshold of interference in the present proceedings is quite high. The power of judicial review discharged by Constitutional Courts under Article 226 or 32, or when sitting in appeal under Article 136, is distinct from the appellate power exercised by a departmental appellate authority. It would be gainsaid that judicial review is an evaluation of the decision making process and not the merits of the decision itself. Judicial Review seeks to ensure fairness in treatment and not fairness of conclusion. It ought to be used to correct manifest errors of law or procedure, which might result in significant injustice; or in case of bias or gross unreasonableness of outcome. 26. These principles are succinctly elucidated by a three- judge Bench of this Court in BC Chaturvedi v. Union of India4 in the following extract: “12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goe this Court held at p.728-29 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.” 27. These parameters have been consistently reiterated by this Court in a catena of decisions, including: (i) State of Tamil Nadu v. S Subramaniam, (ii) Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank, (iii) Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd v. Mahesh Dahiya, 28. It is thus well settled that the Constitutional Courts while exercising their powers of judicial review would not assume the role of an appellate authority. Their jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law, procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Put differently, judicial review is not analogous to venturing into the merits of a case like an appellate authority.”

In the present case, the learned single Judge had approached the issue by embarking upon an enquiry to find out as to whether the findings arrived at by the disciplinary authority were based on the acceptable evidence or not. The permissible enquiry is only whether there was no evidence on which the findings were arrived at or whether there was any perversity in the findings and not whether the evidence was acceptable or not, unless the question of admissibility is raised. The question of adequacy of evidence also could not have been gone into to conclude that the evidence was insufficient to hold that the delinquent officer guilty. Exactly, this is the lapse committed by the learned single Judge, as she has gone into the question of sufficiency or adequacy of evidence to set aside the findings of fact itself. This approach of the learned single Judge is quite contrary to the settled jurisprudence laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decisions referred to supra and also reiterated in the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in General Manager (Operations) State Bank of India and another Vs. R.Periyasamy reported in (2015) 3 SCC 101.

The Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the settled legal principle in administrative law that the onus of proof rests upon the party, alleging the invalidity of an order as there is a presumption always attached to the decision or executive order that it is properly and validly made as expressed in the maxim omnia prasesumuntur rite esse acta, which means “all things are presumed to be done in due form”.

In the present case, the Tribunal for disciplinary proceedings and also the Disciplinary Authority have referred to all the relevant materials on record and have come to a particular conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty for the misconduct of acquiring wealth disproportionate to the known sources of income. Before the enquiry tribunal, as many as 8 witnesses were examined and 11 Exhibit were marked by the prosecution, while none was presented by the writ petitioner. He was only seeking to elucidate some contradictions and minor variations in the manner of arriving at his income, like, omitting to add bonus and few months salary; alleged miscalculation of the agricultural income (which does not make any huge difference or eradicate the excess income). The disciplinary authority had passed a very detailed and reasoned order to conclude that the misconduct of the delinquent officer is proven. Against this order of the fact finding authority, the Writ Court cannot and does not sit as an appellate authority. It is held impermissible by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a long line of authorities mentioned supra. In her order, the learned single Judge sits as an appellate authority, reviews the entire evidence and arrives at her own conclusion that the evidence available on record is not sufficient to record a finding of guilt. Such finding is not sustainable and is liable to be interfered with.

The learned single Judge had gone wrong in going into the correctness or the truth of the charges by taking over the functions of the disciplinary authority. The standard of proof in the disciplinary proceedings is that of preponderance of probabilities and not a proof beyond reasonable doubt, or for the writ Court testing the correctness during its Judicial review is “some evidence to prove the charge” alone.

In the present case, there is more than some evidence, rather enough evidence on the basis of which the disciplinary authority has arrived at a conclusion that the delinquent officer had acquired wealth disproportionate to the known sources of income. Picking hole in such conclusion on re-appreciation of evidence by the learned single Judge, acting as an appellate authority, is not permissible in law, and it is incorrect. What is required is only that the Writ Court shall ensure that there is procedural fairness.

In this case, the delinquent officer has not pleaded any violation of the principles of natural justice and it is not even his case that the findings are based on no evidence or there is violation of any statutory rules prescribed in the mode of enquiry or that the authorities were actuated by some extraneous consideration or they failed to reach a fair decision or they allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or the conclusion of the disciplinary authority on the face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious.

While exercising our judicial review in a disciplinary proceeding, the first rule is one of restraint. In this case, from the available materials, we are more than satisfied that the determination of the disciplinary authority that a misconduct has been committed, is supported by the required evidence and the materials available on record do not point out any perversity in the said conclusion of the disciplinary authority. The finding in the enquiry is certainly based on no evidence and therefore, there can be no interference by the Writ Court in such conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings. We cannot re-appreciate the evidences. We cannot go into the adequacy of the evidence or the reliability of the evidence and there is certainly some legal evidence on which the findings have been based and there is no error on fact, much less a grave error for an interference by the Writ Court and the proportionality of the punishment also does not shock our conscience. We are guided in this position by the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Union of India and others Vs. P.Gunasekaran reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610; and Director General of Police, Railway Protection Force and others Vs. Rajendra Kumar Dubey reported in (2021) 14 SCC 735; and State of Karnataka and another Vs. N.Gangaraj reported in (2020) 3 SCC 423. We are unable to sustain the order of the Learned Single Judge for all the reasons mentioned above. The reasonings of the writ Court to interfere with the order of punishment are found to be contrary to the settled jurisprudence governing disciplinary proceedings, warranting an interference in this writ appeal.

In fine, the Writ Appeal stands allowed. The order of the Learned Single Judge is set aside. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed. [M.D.I.,J] & [N.D.K.,J] 09.09.2026