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Madras High Court· 20 August 2026

Can delay beyond 120 days in an appeal under Section 42 of the PML Act be condoned?

Bell Tower Enterprises LLP v. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement
CMA.SR106394/2026 · C.M.P.No.17568 of 2026 and C.M.A.SR.No.106394 of 2026
Coram: Justice G.Arul Murugan · Justice Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari
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Answer

No. An appeal lies within sixty days and the proviso allows it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days on sufficient cause, so no appeal can be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of that total 120 days. The appeal here was filed 146 days after the order was communicated and was not maintainable.

Headnote

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 — s.42 — Limitation Act, 1963 — ss.5, 14, 29(2) — Appeal to High Court — Condonation of delay — Exclusion of time — Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 — s.42 — Appeal to High Court — Outer limit of 120 days — Held: An appeal against an order of the Appellate Tribunal lies within sixty days, and may be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days on sufficient cause. No appeal can be entertained after the expiry of this total 120 days. (¶7) Limitation Act, 1963 — s.14 — Exclusion of time — Applicability to special enactments — Held further: The benefit of Section 14 extends even to special enactments, provided the applicability of Sections 4 to 24 is not expressly barred. The five conditions set out in Consolidated Engineering Enterprises must co-exist before the section can be pressed into service. (¶14) Limitation Act, 1963 — s.14 — Same matter in issue — Due diligence and good faith — Held further: Where the final order of the Appellate Tribunal was never the subject matter of challenge in the earlier proceedings, the same matter in issue condition fails. A party who consciously ignored the statutory appeal is not prosecuting with due diligence and good faith. (¶24, 26) Limitation Act, 1963 — s.14 — Liberty to challenge — Limitation not automatically extended — Held further: Liberty granted while dismissing a special leave petition as withdrawn allows the final order to be challenged in appropriate proceedings, but does not automatically extend the period of limitation. Condonation of delay dismissed and the appeal rejected as not maintainable. (¶28, 30, 33)

In the Court's own words
Paragraph 7The above provision makes it explicitly clear that an appeal challenging the order of the tribunal ought to be preferred within a period of 60 days from the date of communication of the order. Further, the proviso to Section 42 of the PML Act allows the High Court to entertain an appeal if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period of 60 days and may allow such appeal to be filed within a further period not exceeding 60 days. Thus, the High Court can condone a delay not exceeding 60 days. Thereby, a person aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Tribunal can file an appeal within 60 days or within the further condonable period of 60 days to be allowed by the High Court and no such appeal can be entertained by the High Court, after the expiry of this total 120 days.
Paragraph 31From the perusal of the materials on record, it is evident that while the Appellate Tribunal has passed the final orders on 03.02.2026, which has been communicated on the same day even as per the affidavit of the petitioner, the appeal has been filed before this Court only on 29.06.2026. The time calculated from 04.02.2026 to 29.06.2026 comes to 146 days. When the appeal ought to have been filed on or before 04.04.2026 and the further period of 60 days granted for condonation of delay also expired on 04.06.2026, the appeal filed on 29.06.2026, being well beyond the maximum statutory period of 120 days, is not maintainable.
Acts & Sections
s.42 Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002s.14 Limitation Act, 1963s.29(2) Limitation Act, 1963s.5 Limitation Act, 1963

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Also decided in this judgment
Can time spent prosecuting a special leave petition be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act?Does Section 14 of the Limitation Act apply to appeals under special enactments?Does liberty granted while dismissing a special leave petition extend the period of limitation?
Plain-language answer prepared by the LexStreak Editorial Desk — verify against the judgment. Source: Madras High Court. Corrections