Can the Copyright Act be invoked concurrently with the Drugs and Cosmetics Act and BNS for the same counterfeit goods?

Paragraph 7We further direct that the Drugs Inspector, who carry out the arrest. must not only report the arrests, as provided in Section 58 CrPC, but also immediately report the arrests to their superior officers.” 4.2. He further submits that the Copyright Act applies only where the alleged infringement relates to original literary, dramatic, musical artistic works, cinematography films or sound recordings. Even as per the allegations, there is not even a whisper of any allegation to attract the offence under the Copyright Act. The entire allegation revolved about the counterfeit medicines which falls entirely outside the scope of the Copyright. The complaint itself is vague and there is no specific allegations. It doesn’t provide any particulars whatsoever of the alleged counterfeit medicines manufactured in Puducherry based firms. The petitioners are only stockers and they have no manufacturing unit. That apart, the alleged drugs which were seized from the accused were subjected for analysis and it confirms the minimum required standard. Therefore, it cannot be termed as counterfeit or substandard drugs. 4.3. In support of his contention, he relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana reported in 2006 SCC OnLine P& H 1907 in the case of Bikaner Steel Mills Vs. State of Punjab, which held as follows:- “6. The ratio of Piyara Singh (supra) is sufficient indication that in the trial of offence under Section 79 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, it would be improper to use Section 420 IPC. Moreover, the allegations for committing offence under Section 420 IPC, as stated in the FIR, are vague in nature. No where, it is mentioned as to whether any private person had been cheated on account of the mis-representation allegedly made by the petitioner. As per Section 13 of the Copyright Act, copyright could subsist in original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works, cinematograph films and sound record. There could be thus no copyright in the steel Bars produced by TATA TISCON by using TMT-Technology. 7. In view of the above, no offence under Section 420 IPC and also under Sections 63 and 64 of the Copyright Act was made out. The offence under Section 79 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act is non -cognizable in nature and no FIR could be registered. The Complainant will be at liberty to file a criminal complaint in the concerned Court, if so advised, so as to initiate criminal proceedings against the present petitioner.” 4.4. He also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh reported in 2023 SCC OnLine P&H 286 in the case of Deepak Vs. State of Haryana & anr., which held as follows:- “11. The issue that arose in Gurmukh Singh v. State of Punjab, (2011) 18 RCR (Cri) 308 was whether using of trade mark of some other firm would attract the provisions of the Copy Right Act, 1957. The allegations in this case were that petitioners were using trade marks of some other firms on the bags of potatoes. During investigation, it was found that the petitioners were using false trade mark, thus, the offence under the Act, 1957 and Trade Mark Act was made out, upon which the challan was presented and the case was fixed for framing of charge. This Court quashed the FIR noticing that the provisions of Copy Right Act are attracted to original literary dramatic, musical and artistic works; cinematograph films; and sound recording and offence under Sections 78 and 79 of the Trade Mark and Merchandise Act was non-cognizable and could not be investigated by the Police. Further, that after coming into force of the Trade Mark Act, 1999, the complaint can be initiated by the Registrar and the raid could be conducted by an officer not below the rank of DSP.” 4.5. He further relied upon the judgment dated 07.06.2023, passed by this Court in Crl.O.P.No.6357 of 2021 in the case of Chainsingh & anr Vs. State & anr., which held as follows:- “6. This Court, on perusal of the impugned final report, finds that the allegation against the petitioners is that they were in possession of duplicate Reebok/Adidas Bags, Caps and Belts. The said allegation would not attract the offence under Section 63 of the Copyright Act, 1957. Section 63 of the Copyright Act, 1957 reads as follows: "63. Offence of infringement of copyright or other rights conferred by this Act - Any person knowingly infringes or abets the infringement of (a) the copyright in a work, or (b) any other right conferred by this Act, [except the right conferred by section 534 – A], [shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to three years and with fine which shall not be less than fifty thousand rupees but which may extend to two lakh rupees: Provided that [where the infringement has not been made for gain in the course of trade or business] the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months or a fine of less than fifty thousand rupees. Explanation - Construction of a building or other structure which infringes or which, if completed, would infringe the copyright in some other work shall not be an offence under this section." Section 13 of the Copyrights Act, 1957 reads as follows : “13. Works in which copyright subsists - (1) Subject to the provisions of this section and the other provisions of this Act, copyright shall subsist throughout India in the following classes of works, that is to say,- (a) original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works, (b) cinematograph films; and (c) [sound recording]. 7. From the above provisions, it is clear that unless the infringement relates to original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works, cinematograph films and sound recordings, the provisions of the Act are not applicable. In the instant case, there are no such allegations. Hence, the offence under Section 63 of the Copyright Act, 1957 is not made.

Paragraph 8As regards the offence under Section 420 IPC, there is nothing in the impugned final report to suggest that there was any deception practised upon any person. The possession of spurious goods is certainly not a legal act. However, in the absence of the ingredients to constitute the offence of cheating, one cannot be prosecuted merely because he was in possession of spurious goods. In order to constitute the offence of 420 IPC, there must be a deception practised on any person dishonestly or fraudulently. The impugned final report does not satisfy those necessary ingredients to attract the said offence of Section 420 IPC. The Judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Kasim Ali vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh dated 13.06.2016 in Misc. Criminal Case No.1362 of 2015 relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners squarely applies to the facts of the instant case. This Court is not in agreement with the view taken by the Delhi High Court in Sunil Kumar Gupta and another vs. State reported in 1998 (47) DRJ 84 for the aforesaid reasons.” 4.6. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that in order to attract the offence under Section 318(4) of BNS, there must be inducement to deliver any property or valuable security. The accused never induced anybody with dishonest intention to deliver any property. The criminal wheel was sent in motion on presumption that counterfeit drugs were manufactured in Puducherry. Hence, he prayed to quash the present FIR. 5. Heard the learned counsel appearing on either side and perused the materials placed before this Court. 6. On perusal of the counter affidavit filed by the second respondent and on the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, it is revealed that the entire investigation in Crime No.27 of 2025 has been withdrawn from the file of the first respondent and transferred to the file of the third respondent. Now the investigation is pending on the file of the third respondent and the offences involved in Crime No.27 of 2025 are under Sections 276, 318(4), 61 of BNS and Section 27(d), 17B(b) of the DC Act. Both the offences are cognizable offences and the first respondent has empowered to register the case under Section 173 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, (hereinafter referred to as “BNSS”) and also to investigate such offences. Though the FIR was registered for the offences falling under Chapter IV of the DC Act, and those offences should be investigated by the Drug Inspectors, there is no bar to the police officer from investigating the offences under other laws including the offences under the BNS. Nothing contained in Chapter IV of the DC Act that it shall be deemed to prevent any person from being prosecuted under any other law for any act or omission which constitutes an offence against this Chapter. The saving clause under Section 32(3) of the DC Act explicitly permits the prosecution under other laws. 7. The specific contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for petitioners is that, the provision under Sections 63 & 65 of the Copyright Act are not applicable to the present case. On perusal of the records, it is revealed that the second respondent owns a registered trademark for the drugs which were seized from the accused. The Copyright Act is a special statute that operates independently and it can be invoked concurrently and in parallel with remedies available under other laws. The doctrine of overlapping remedies permits the second respondent to seek redress under the Copyright Act, simultaneously with proceedings under other enactments, including the DC Act and BNS. 8. Further the allegations are pertains to infringement of copyright subsisting in an original artistic work embodied in the label and packaging design of the pharmaceutical product manufactured and marketed by the second respondent. Since the second respondent is being a registered proprietor and lawful owner of subsisting copyright for its label and design, which is distinctive, unique and enjoys copyright protection under Section 13(1)(a) of the Copyright Act, 1957. The artistic work of the second respondent is protected under Section 2(c) r/w Section 13(1)(a) of the Copyright Act. Therefore, unauthorized reproduction, copying or imitating of the said artistic work done by the accused persons constitutes infringement of copyright under Section 51 of the Copyright Act and attracts penal provisions under Sections 63 & 65 thereof.