Madras High Court· 27 August 2026

Is bail barred under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act where reasonable grounds exist for believing the accusation is prima facie true?

MOHAMED THALHA v. THE UNION OF INDIA REP BY, THE CHIEF INVESTIGATION

CRL A.328/2025 · 2026:MHC:3496 · CRL A No. 328 of 2025
Coram: Justice Anita Sumanth · Justice Sunder Mohan

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Answer

Bail is barred under Section 43D(5) where there are reasonable grounds for believing the accusation against the accused is prima facie true.

Yes. Bail is barred under Section 43D(5) where there are reasonable grounds for believing the accusation against the accused is prima facie true. Testing the evidence in a wholistic manner, the Court returned a prima facie finding that the appellant was part of the terror conspiracy and had provided logistical support, and that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations are not prima facie untrue. (¶30, 36)

Headnote

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 — ss.15, 16, 18, 38, 39, 43D(5) — Bail — Prima facie true — Logistical support — Terror conspiracy — Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 — s.43D(5) — Bail — Reasonable grounds for believing the accusation prima facie true — Held: Where the material prima facie shows that the accused was part of the conspiracy and supplied the vehicle used in the blast, the bar on bail operates. (¶30, 36) Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 — s.39 — Support to a terrorist organisation — Membership not required — Held further: Absence of material showing membership of a proscribed organisation does not displace s.39, which is attracted by support in the form of logistical assistance. (¶37) Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 — s.15 — Terrorist act — Intention to strike terror — Held further: An intention to re-create an earlier bomb blast and to attack places of worship falls prima facie within a terrorist act. Appeal dismissed. (¶34, 44)

Headnote

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In the Court's own words

Paragraph 30We are thus, prima facie, not persuaded to accept the argument that the appellant had been entirely unaware of the conspiracy being hatched. Taking into account the circumstances in a wholistic manner, we are persuaded to return a prima facie finding that the appellant was part of the terror conspiracy and had provided logistical support for the same.

Paragraph 36The appellant has admittedly supplied the vehicle that was used in the bomb blast. Though he argues is that he was unaware of the use to which it was intended to be put to, the overall circumstances projected before us as discussed in the paragraphs supra, prima facie persuade us that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against the appellant are not, prima facie, untrue.

Acts & Sections

s.43D(5) Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967s.15 Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967s.16 Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967s.18 Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967s.38 Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967s.39 Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967

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Also decided in this judgment

Does Section 39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act apply to support given to a terrorist organisation where no material shows membership of it?Does an intention to strike terror by using explosive substances against places of worship amount to a terrorist act under Section 15?Do decisions in which the accused's overt act was distinguishable avail an accused under Section 43D(5)?

Plain-language answer prepared by the LexStreak Editorial Desk — verify against the judgment. Source: Madras High Court. Corrections