PARAMJIT SINGH BEDI v. STATE OF PUNJAB
2026 INSC 1054 · CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 203 OF 2015
Coram: Justice Ujjal Bhuyan · Justice Atul S. Chandurkar
A prosecutrix's denial of consent must be read in the overall context of her testimony.
Yes. Her denial of consent is to be read in the overall context of her testimony, and the presence of spermatozoa in the vaginal swab, by itself, would not prove rape given the surrounding circumstances. Here the prosecutrix had travelled with the accused by car and on a scooter through busy, brightly lit streets and intersections, stayed away from home for 5/6 days, raised no hue and cry, made no attempt to alight, and gave contradictory versions of the return journey; taken as a whole, her version that the intercourse was forcible and without her consent did not merit acceptance.
Headnote
Indian Penal Code, 1860 — s.376 — s.366 — Evidence Act, 1872 — s.114A — Rape — Testimony of the prosecutrix — Consent — Part acceptance and part rejection —
Indian Penal Code, 1860 — s.376 — s.366 — Testimony of the prosecutrix — No part acceptance —
Held: A conviction for rape may rest on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix only if it inspires the confidence of the court; her evidence cannot be rejected on the charge under Section 366 and accepted on the charge under Section 376. (¶28, 29)
Indian Penal Code, 1860 — s.376 — Denial of consent — Overall context of testimony —
Held further: A prosecutrix's denial of consent is to be read in the overall context of her testimony; mere presence of spermatozoa in the vaginal swab does not prove rape where the surrounding circumstances show she willingly accompanied the accused. (¶25, 26)
Indian Penal Code, 1860 — s.376 — Immoral conduct — Hard evidence —
Held further: Conduct of the accused that is immoral and unethical does not, without clinching evidence, justify a conviction under Section 376; the charge must rest on hard evidence, not on the presiding judge's value judgment. Conviction set aside; appeal allowed. (¶29, 30)
In the Court's own words
Paragraph 24Let us now analyze the evidence of the prosecutrix, PW-1. As noticed supra is noticed, PW-1’s version is a bundle of contradictions. In her cross-examination, she had stated that she had come out of her house at around 07:30 PM to purchase some articles from the nearby kirana shop. For that, she had taken Rs. 5.00 from her sister Poonam. She went with the appellant in a car to the LIG Flats at Ludhiana where they stayed for two days. From there, they went to Malerkotla on 22.06.2009 on a scooter. They stayed in an abandoned factory at Malerkotla. They had passed through bazaars and brightly lit intersections, particularly when they travelled on a scooter. No alarm was raised by PW-1. As noticed by the learned Sessions Judge, she also did not disembark from the scooter. If at all she was kept confined by the appellant against her wishes, she should have raised hue and cry or alighted from the scooter seeking help from the crowd. She did neither. Therefore, her statement that she had raised hue and cry in the flat at Malerkotla does not make any sense. In the absence of any such hue and cry made by her on the streets and intersections while travelling, learned Sessions Judge rightly held that PW-1 had accompanied the appellant on her own volition; there was no compulsion. In their return journey from Malerkotla to Ludhiana, her statements are contradictory. In her evidence in chief, she stated that she and the appellant had come back by car but in her cross-examination, she stated that the two of them travelled back on a train, travelling ticketless. Either way, no hue and cry was raised by PW-1 in the entire journey back. This is unbelievable. Therefore, the testimony of the prosecutrix cannot be said to be credible and worthy of acceptance.
Paragraph 25From an analysis of the evidence of the prosecutrix PW-1, it is evident that she had willingly accompanied the accused-appellant firstly to the LIG Flats at Ludhiana by travelling in a car, stayed there for two days, and then travelling in a scooter with the accused-appellant from Ludhiana to Malerkotla. Despite passing through busy streets and intersections, she did not raise any hue and cry. Neither did she make any attempt to alight from the scooter to escape from the accused-appellant. Learned Sessions Judge rightly pointed out that if she had not voluntarily gone with the accused-appellant, she could have easily raised a hue and cry or disembarked from the scooter. PW-1 did not do so. Therefore, her statement that she had raised hue and cry when she was in the room at Malerkotla is extremely difficult to accept. Her evidence is riddled with contradictions. Mere presence of spermatozoa in the vaginal swab of the prosecutrix would not prove rape given the surrounding circumstances.
Paragraph 26Prosecutrix’s denial of consent must be seen in the overall context of her testimony. If her evidence is taken as a whole, certainly a view can be taken that her version that the accused-appellant had sexual intercourse with her forcibly without her consent does not merit acceptance. The version of the prosecutrix is not believable at all.
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