Supreme Court of India· 30 April 2026
Under Order XIII-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, what standard must a court apply before granting summary judgment in a commercial suit?
RELIANCE EMINENT TRADING AND COMMERCIAL PRIVATE LIMITED v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
2026 INSC 436 · Special Leave Petition (C) No. 22100 of 2025
Coram: J.K. Maheshwari
Answer
The court must find that the party has no real prospect of succeeding or defending the claim, and no other compelling reason exists for a trial; the standard requires a likelihood that is real and substantial, not merely fanciful.
Headnote
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XIII-A — Commercial Courts Act, 2015 — Summary judgment — Fair Compensation Act, 2013 — s.24(2) — Lapse of acquisition — Refund — Article 142 —
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XIII-A r.3 — 'real prospect of success' test —
Held: Order XIII-A permits summary judgment only where a party has no real prospect of succeeding or defending a claim. The standard demands a likelihood that is real and substantial, not merely fanciful or arguable. (¶43, 51)
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XIII-A — nine-point guideline — no mini-trial —
Held further: A court must ask whether either side lacks a real prospect of success without conducting a mini-trial, weighing evidence reasonably expected at trial. Nine non-exhaustive guidelines were laid down, urging courts to 'grasp the nettle' on neat points of law. (¶56, 59)
Fair Compensation Act, 2013 — s.24(2) — lapse — possession not sine qua non for refund —
Held further: Once the acquisition underlying the plot had lapsed under Section 24(2) with finality after dismissal of review and curative petitions, possession was not sine qua non for refund. Both the Authority's possession-based defence and its limitation plea were fanciful, raising no triable issue. (¶64, 66)
Constitution of India, Art. 142 — restitution — refund with interest — conveyance deed set aside —
Held further: Since the acquisition had lapsed with finality, the Court invoked Article 142 to set aside the registered Conveyance Deed and ordered refund of the entire consideration with interest reduced to 7.5% per annum. The appeal was allowed and the suit decreed accordingly. (¶80, 83)
In the Court's own words
Paragraph 43Rule 3 of Order XIII-A of the CPC is the heart of the aforesaid order and reads as under: – “3. Grounds for summary judgment.— The Court may give a summary judgment against a plaintiff or defendant on a claim if it considers that– (a) the plaintiff has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim or the defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending the claim, as the case may be; and (b) there is no other compelling reason why the claim should not be disposed of before recording of oral evidence.” In such light, this Rule 3, as applicable to commercial disputes, empowers the Court to grant a summary judgement against the defendant where the Court considers that the defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending the claim and there is no other compelling reason why the claim should not be disposed of before recording of oral evidence. The aforesaid provision is identical to Rule 24.3 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 1998 as applicable in the United Kingdom. The same reads as under: – “24.2. The court may give summary judgement against a claimant or defendant on the whole of a claim or on an issue if– (a) It considers that the party has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim, defence or issue; and (b) There is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at a trial.”
Paragraph 51This brings us to the expression ‘real prospect of success’, as used in Rule 3 of Order XIII-A of the CPC. This phrase is, by its very nature, self-explanatory and admits of no further interpretation. It postulates that the likelihood of success must be real and substantial, as opposed to being merely fanciful or speculative. In other words, the standard envisages a degree of certainty higher than that of a claim which is merely arguable. Accordingly, where the Court finds that a claim or defence is so weak that it prima-facie discloses no reasonable prospect of success, it is neither necessary nor desirable to subject the parties to the rigours of a full-fledged trial. The provision, thus, empowers the Court to arrest such proceedings at the threshold, thereby preventing undue expenditure use of judicial time and resources. At the same time, the provision reflects the broader obligation of the Court to ensure expeditious delivery of justice. In this regard, reference can be made to the decision of the England and Wales Court of Appeal in Swain v. Hillman, [2001] 1 All ER 91, which set the standard for summary judgement under Part 24 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 1998 of the United Kingdom. In this case, it was held that the power of summary judgement is to be exercised where it is just and expedient to do so, enabling parties to know their legal position without being compelled to endure a trial.
Acts & Sections
Order XIII-A, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Commercial Courts Act, 2015)s.24(2) Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013Art. 142 Constitution of IndiaOne judgment a day. That's the whole habit.
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