Can delay in initiating or concluding disciplinary proceedings vitiate them where the delinquent officer participated without demur and pleaded no prejudice?

Paragraph 19The above precedents, we are afraid, may not come to the rescue of the writ petitioner, when applied to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In those cases, the aggrieved parties approached the Court at the charge-memo stage. Here, by contrast the petitioner actively participated in the disciplinary proceedings, took his chance with the possible outcome, and only raised the issue of delay after suffering an adverse order of punishment.

Paragraph 21The proposition canvassed by the writ petitioner that the delay in the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings and the completion of disciplinary proceedings vitiate the same is not acceptable to us, for the following reasons:. i. Firstly, the writ petitioner had not challenged the disciplinary proceedings at the stage of issuance of a charge memo on the ground that the disciplinary proceeding is initiated after a long and inordinate delay. Rather, he voluntarily took part in the disciplinary proceedings without demur and had also cross examined the witnesses and entered into defence. ii. Secondly, he had not raised a plea of any prejudice having been caused to him because of such delay in the initiation of disciplinary proceedings before the disciplinary authority and consequently, his plea on the ground of initiation of delay in disciplinary proceedings is not acceptable. In the subject case, the writ petitioner had consciously participated in the disciplinary proceedings and had not espoused any prejudice that occurred to him due to such delayed initiation of the disciplinary proceedings. iii. Thirdly, in fact, he had come before this Court on 25.06.2011 with W.P.(MD) No.6930 of 2011 asking, not to quash the disciplinary proceedings on the ground of delay , but with the following prayer:- “To issue a Writ of Mandamus, directing the respondent to dispose of the disciplinary action against the petitioner by passing orders on the enquiry report sent by the Commissioner of Disciplinary Proceedings, Madurai in his letter No.A-1/326/2007 (T.D.P. No. 15/2007) dated 29.02.2010 within a specified time frame that may be fixed by this Honourable Court. ” It was disposed on 29.06.2011 with a simple direction to pass order in the disciplinary proceedings within a time frame. He was then imposed with an order of punishment on 20.06.2012. The writ petitioner then filed a departmental appeal on 09.09.2012 and structurally came before this Court on 15.02.2013 with W.P.(MD) No.2626 of 2013, not to challenge the punishment or the disciplinary proceeding on the ground of delay or any other ground but with the following prayer:- “To issue a Writ of Mandamus, directing the first respondent to dispose of the petitioner s appeal dated 09.09.2012 against the orders dated 20.06.2012 of the Commissioner of Revenue Administration, Chennai passed in his proceedings No.Ser.V(2) 43877/2011, on merits and in accordance with law within a specified time frame that may be fixed by this Honble Court.” This was disposed on 03.12.2013 with an innocuous direction to dispose of the appeal within a time frame. This ground to attack the disciplinary proceedings on the ground of delay was very much available to the writ petitioner, when he filed the aforesaid two writ petitions. He did not choose to canvass the said ground at that point of time. Though the provision of Code of Civil Procedure is not directly applicable to the writ proceedings by extending the underlying public policy against splitting the claims, and invoking the “Doctrine of Waiver” we hold that the failure of the writ petitioner to challenge the disciplinary proceedings on the ground of delay in the initiation of disciplinary proceedings or in the completion of proceedings in those two writ petitions makes him ineligible to canvass the same, after suffering an order of punishment, and after effectively participating in the disciplinary proceedings and after failing to get himself exonerated of the charges. iv.Fourthly, mere delay cannot be a reason to quash the disciplinary proceedings, more so, when the charges are grave and serious, involving acquisition of assets disproportionate to the known sources of income. Useful reference can be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Anant R.Kulkarni Vs. Y.P.Education Society and others reported in (2013) 6 SCC 515. The Hon'ble Apex Court had held that the court must take into consideration all the relevant facts and evaluate the same, so as to determine, if it is in fact in the interest of clean and honest administration, that the disciplinary proceedings should be terminated, only on the ground of a delay in conclusion of the proceedings. The Court cautioned that the High Court or the Tribunal should verify the gravity of the charges and the departmental enquiry can be quashed on the ground of delay only if the charges are not very grave. In the present case, admittedly, the charges against the writ petitioner are grave and serious. He is alleged to have acquired assets disproportionate to the known sources of income. Useful reference is made to the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in P.D.Agrawal vs. State Bank of India and others reported in (2006) 8 SCC 776. Relevant portion of the same reads as under:- “17.The validity of the disciplinary proceeding and/or justifiability thereof on the ground of delay or otherwise had never been raised by the Appellant before any forum. It was not his case either before the Appellate Authority or before the High Court that by reason of any delay in initiating the disciplinary proceeding he had been prejudiced in any manner whatsoever. It may be true that delay itself may be a ground for arriving at a finding that enquiry proceeding was vitiated in the event it is shown that by reason thereof the delinquent officer has been prejudiced, but no such case was made out. ......... 28. In Additional Supdt. of Police vs. T. Natarajan [1999 SCC (L&S) 646], this Court held: "In regard to the allegation that the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings was belated, we may state that it is settled law that mere delay in initiating proceedings would not vitiate the enquiry unless the delay results in prejudice to the delinquent officer. In this case, such a stage as to examine that aspect has not arisen." 29. In this case, as noticed hereinbefore, the Appellant did not raise the question of delay before any forum whatsoever. He did not raise such a question even before the Disciplinary Authority. He not only took part therein without any demur whatsoever, but, as noticed hereinbefore, cross- examined the witnesses and entered into the defence. The Principles of natural justice cannot be put in a straight jacket formula. It must be seen in circumstantial flexibility. It has separate facets. It has in recent time also undergone a sea change.”