Is judicial review under Article 226 an evaluation of the decision making process and not the merits of the decision itself?

Paragraph 31It is long settled legal proposition that the power of judicial review, of the Constitutional Courts, is only an exercise of evaluation of the decision making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is for the Writ Court to ascertain as to whether there is fairness in treatment and not to verify whether there is fairness of conclusion. The Writ Court can interfere with the disciplinary proceedings held against the delinquent officer, only if it is inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or it is in violation of the statutory rules prescribed in the mode of enquiry or if the conclusion or finding arrived at by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. Also, if the conclusion arrived at by the disciplinary authority is found to be perverse upon consideration of the evidence or it suffers from patent error on the face of record, the power of judicial review can be exercised. It cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of fact finding authority.

Paragraph 34The three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pravin Kumar Vs. Union of India reported in (2020) 9 SCC 471 had reiterated the above proposition and had held as under:- “I. Scope of Judicial Review in Service Matters 25. Learned counsel for the appellant spent considerable time taking us through the various evidencesonrecord with the intention of highlighting lacunas and contradictions. We feel that such an exercise was in vain, as the threshold of interference in the present proceedings is quite high. The power of judicial review discharged by Constitutional Courts under Article 226 or 32, or when sitting in appeal under Article 136, is distinct from the appellate power exercised by a departmental appellate authority. It would be gainsaid that judicial review is an evaluation of the decision making process and not the merits of the decision itself. Judicial Review seeks to ensure fairness in treatment and not fairness of conclusion. It ought to be used to correct manifest errors of law or procedure, which might result in significant injustice; or in case of bias or gross unreasonableness of outcome. 26. These principles are succinctly elucidated by a three- judge Bench of this Court in BC Chaturvedi v. Union of India4 in the following extract: “12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goe this Court held at p.728-29 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.” 27. These parameters have been consistently reiterated by this Court in a catena of decisions, including: (i) State of Tamil Nadu v. S Subramaniam, (ii) Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank, (iii) Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd v. Mahesh Dahiya, 28. It is thus well settled that the Constitutional Courts while exercising their powers of judicial review would not assume the role of an appellate authority. Their jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law, procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Put differently, judicial review is not analogous to venturing into the merits of a case like an appellate authority.”