Is property bequeathed under a Will for the absolute enjoyment of the beneficiary separate property in his hands?

Paragraph 19The next point to be decided is whether Ex-B.2 - Gift Settlement Deed executed by remainderman - Veerappa and the life estate holder - Unnamalaiammal, jointly in favour of first defendant - Ganga is valid or not. To decide the same, first the character of the self-acquired properties of Arunachala Chetty including the suit property as it would be in the hands of Veerappa needs to be ascertained. At this point, it is pertinent to cite the Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in C.N.Arunachala Mudaliar -vs- C.A.Muruganatha Mudaliar reported in AIR 1953 SC 495 [Coram Strength =2], wherein Paragraph No.16 reads thus: "16. As the law is accepted and well settled that a Mitakshara father has complete powers of disposition over his self-acquired property, it must follow as a necessary consequence that the father is quite competent to provide expressly, when he makes a gift, either that the donee would take it exclusively for himself or that the gift would be for the benefit of his branch of the family. If there are express provisions to that effect either in the deed of gift or a will, no difficulty is likely to arise and the interest which the son would take in such property would depend upon the terms of the grant. If, however, there are no clear words describing the kind of interest which the donee is to take, the question would be one of construction and the court would have to collect the intention of the donor from the language of the document taken along with the surrounding circumstances in accordance with the well-known canons of construction. Stress would certainly have to be laid on the substance of the disposition and not on its were form. The material question which the court would have to decide in such cases is, whether taking the document and all the relevant facts into consideration, it could be said that the donor intended to confer a bounty upon his son exclusively for his benefit and capable of being dealt with by him at his pleasure or that the apparent, gift was an integral part of a scheme for partition and what was given to the son was really the share of the property which would normally be allotted to him and in his branch of the family on partition. In other words, the question would be whether the grantor really wanted to make a gift of his properties or to partition the same. As it is open to the father to make a gift or partition of his properties as he himself chooses, there is, strictly speaking, no presumption that he intended either the one or the other."

Paragraph 20As it flows from the afore-cited Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court, the nature of properties bequeathed under a Will in the hands of the beneficiary thereunder depends on the intention of the testator. Thus, if bequeath is intended for absolute enjoyment of the beneficiary, then it would be separate property in the hands of the beneficiary; on the other hand, if the intention is to partition the property or leave the property for the benefit of not just the beneficiary but his branch as well, then the property would be in the nature of joint family property in the hands of the beneficiary. Coming to the facts of instant case, as elaborated above, though life interest was granted, ultimate intention of the testator was to bequeath majority of his self-acquired properties absolutely in favour of his son - Veerappa in his individual capacity. It is clear that the bequeath was not in his capacity of the head of the family. Therefore, the suit property along with the other properties covered under Ex-A.1 - Will would be separate property in the hands of Veerappa. In this regard, reference may also be made to Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in M.P. Peria Karuppan Chettiar -vs- CIT, reported in (1975) 3 SCC 439. Relevant extract reads as hereunder: "12.Mr Desai further pointed out that the gift was stated to be in favour of the donees and “their respective heirs, executors, administrators and assignees” which, according to him, indicated that really the object of the bounty were the sons as heads of their respective families. We are unable to agree. It is clear from the deeds that the donor's desire was to transfer the properties to the three sons whom he named and described as donees. It was not stated that the donees would take the property as heads of their family units. The use of the words “heirs, executors, administrators and assignees” in the context in which they appear, in our opinion, indicate on the contrary that the gift was to the sons absolutely, the property gifted being both heritable and alienable. There is nothing in the two documents to suggest that the interest transferred to the sons was limited in any way. The surrounding circumstances also do not support Mr Desai's contention. …"